

Segregation, Mistrust, and Minorities*

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* I am grateful to the General Research Board, University of Maryland–College Park and the Russell Sage Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation for a grant on a related project that is encompassed in my work on the United States on “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement,” 2001-2004. I am also grateful to David Campbell, Ed Fieldhouse, Michael Hanmer, Nils Hortung, Karen Kaufmann, Andrew Mason, Bo Rothstein, Jonathan Rothwell, Kim Sonderskov, Stuart Soroka, and Dietlind Stolle for very helpful comments and to John Iceland for help with the residential segregation data for American cities.

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ABSTRACT

Generalized trust is a value that leads to many positive outcomes for a society. It is faith in people you don't know who are likely to be different from yourself. Yet, several people, most notably Robert Putnam, now argue that trust is lower when we are surrounded by people who are different from ourselves. I challenge this view and argue that residential segregation rather than diversity leads to lower levels of trust. Integrated and diverse neighborhoods will lead to higher levels of trust, but mainly if people also have diverse social networks. I examine the theoretical and measurement differences between segregation and diversity and summarize results on how integrated neighborhoods with diverse social networks increase trust in the US and the UK.

Keywords: trust
segregation
diversity
social cohesion
immigration
minorities
social capital

Word count: 8873 (with endnotes)

Western societies are more diverse than they were half a century ago.. Minority groups now comprise 30 percent of the United States population and nine percent of the British population (Goodhart, 2004). While many in public life extol the virtues of a more multicultural society, others worry that immigrants from countries outside the West constitute a threat to the core values and identity of Western societies. Immigrants are not “like us,” many politicians argue. And diversity leads to more conflict, less effective government, lower economic growth, and less social cohesion.

The charges that diversity drives down social cohesion are especially troublesome since cohesion is mostly about bringing people of different backgrounds together. Diversity—people of different backgrounds, whether racial, ethnic, religious, or national origin--leads to lower levels of generalized trust (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). We prefer to interact with people like ourselves—along any of these indicators of population diversity. Yet generalized trust means having faith in people who are different from yourself (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 2).

Diversity has been hailed for the benefits it brings to society. Greater diversity leads to increased wages and higher prices for rental housing (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005), greater profits and market share for firms that have more diverse work forces (Herring, 2006), greater problem-solving capacities (Gurin, Nagda, and Lopez, 2004), and more innovation in organizations (Burt, 2001).

Diversity is *not* the culprit in low (or declining) social cohesion. Residential segregation, not diversity, leads to lower levels of trust. Segregation has been linked to a wide range of

negative outcomes. Higher levels of social cohesion—especially trust—depend upon both integration *and* diversity—and also upon the diversity of one’s social networks. One can live in an integrated neighborhood and not interact with people of different backgrounds. I shall elaborate on this framework after I discuss the larger debate over diversity and why trust is important for a society. I conclude with a summary of what I have found about the effects of segregation and diversity on trust in research on the United States and the United Kingdom¹ and what the implications of the study are for diversity and immigration.

The Problem With Diversity

Many people in the West question whether immigrants share the same values as the (white) majority population, whether they take jobs away from the “native” (white) population, and whether they become too dependent upon governmental support (welfare) and constitute a financial drain on the country. In the United States, Huntington (2004, 32; see also Huntington, 1996) wrote:

In the final decades of the 20th century, however, the United States’ Anglo-Protestant culture and the creed that it produced came under assault by the popularity in intellectual and political circles of the doctrines of multiculturalism and diversity; the rise of group identities based on race, ethnicity, and gender over national identity; the impact of transnational cultural diasporas; the expanding number of immigrants with dual nationalities and dual loyalties; and the growing salience for U.S. intellectual, business, and political elites of cosmopolitan and transnational identities....Will the United States remain a country with a single national language and a core Anglo-Protestant culture? By ignoring this question, Americans acquiesce to their eventual transformation into two

peoples with two cultures (Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages (English and Spanish).

In the United Kingdom, the non-white population rose from a few thousand in 1951 to 2,500,000 in 1991 and to over 4,000,000 in 2001 (Peach, in press, 22). Following racial disturbances in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham in 2001, the British government commissioned several studies to understand the roots of social cohesion and the sense of identification with the larger society. People debated whether there has been a “decline of Britishness”; white members of focus groups viewed increasing immigration,² greater demands on the welfare state, and “moral pluralism” as threatening the long-standing culture of the United Kingdom (ETHNOS Research and Consultancy, n.d.). The “decline of Britishness study” reported (ETHNOS Research and Consultancy, n.d., 4):

As white people involved in the study were invited to talk about Britishness, many immediately and spontaneously changed the topic of the discussion slightly to talk instead about a perceived ‘decline’ of Britishness. This happened in all focus groups with white people. They attributed the decline to four main causes: the arrival of large numbers of migrants; the ‘unfair’ claims made by people from ethnic minorities on the welfare state; the rise in moral pluralism; and the failure to manage ethnic minority groups properly, due to what participants called ‘political correctness’.

White respondents felt victimised and frustrated, and many anticipated that social unrest would become inevitable.

David Goodhart (2004), editor of Prospect, created a stir when he argued that “[a] generous welfare state is not compatible with open borders and possibly not even with...mass immigration.” Hudson et al. (2007) reported that black Caribbean and Somali immigrants found

their own communities more welcoming than the larger society.

Publics in the United States and the United Kingdom expressed support for limiting immigration. In the 2007 Citizenship Survey in the United Kingdom, 83 percent favored restrictions on immigration (59 percent wanted strong reductions). In the U.S. General Social Survey (1994 to 2004), 60 percent of white Americans favored restrictions (but only 32 percent strong reductions). Americans found some value in immigration: 76 percent agreed that immigrants bring new ideas, 64 percent agreed that immigration makes the society more open, and 57 percent said that immigrants improve American society. Yet, immigrants have “too many rights” (59 percent) and just 37 percent said that immigrants should have the same rights as native Americans. Immigrants increase crime (74 percent) and lead to higher unemployment (89 percent) and lower economic growth (71 percent). The government spends too much on immigrants (54 percent), who should not be eligible for government assistance (66 percent). Only 38 percent said that immigration was “good for America” and 64 percent worried that immigrants will “affect national unity.”

The value of diversity came under attack in academic research as well. Some prominent papers show that in the United States people living in areas with diverse populations are *less* likely to trust others and to have heterogeneous social networks (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000, 2002, 2004; Alesina et al., 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2007).

Alesina and LaFerrara (2000, 850) argue:

...individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar to themselves in terms of income, race, or ethnicity...diffuse preferences for homogeneity may decrease total participation in a mixed group if fragmentation increases. However,

individuals may prefer to sort into homogenous groups.

People living in ethnically and racially diverse communities are *less likely* to participate in voluntary associations in the United States—especially those organizations in which face-to-face contact is most likely such as churches and youth groups. Diversity breeds aversion to interaction with people of different backgrounds and people who are most averse to contact with out-groups participate the least: “...individuals who choose to participate less in racially mixed communities are those who most vocally oppose racial mixing” (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000, 891). People in diverse communities are also less likely to trust other people (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2002) in the United States, though not in Australia—where it is linguistic diversity that drives down trust (Leigh, 2006). These findings are part of a more general syndrome of negative effects for diversity that Alesina and his colleagues have reported in cross-national analyses (Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina and LaFerrara, 2004).

Putnam (2007, 142-143) cites a wide range of studies showing a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and indicators of social cohesion, such as trust, investment in public goods, voluntary activities, car-pooling, and desertion in the armed forces. His study (Putnam, 2007, 146-149), using the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCBS) in the United States, shows that inter-racial trust, trust of neighbors, and even trust of one’s own race are lower in more ethnically diverse neighborhoods. Putnam’s conclusions lead to great pessimism about the effects of diversity:

Diversity does not produce ‘bad race relations’ or ethnically-defined group hostility.... Rather, inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to

withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for social reform more, but have less faith that they can actually make a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television. Note that this pattern encompasses attitudes and behavior, bridging and bonding social capital, public and private connections. Diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us.

Trust as a Bridging Mechanism

We normally think of trust as a relationship between particular persons about something specific—or as Hardin (1992) argues, A trusts B to do X. Beyond this notion of what I call “strategic trust” are notions of generalized and particularized trust (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 2; Yamigishi and Yamigishi, 1994). Particularized trust is faith *only* in your own in-group (however one defines it). Generalized trust is the belief that “most people can be trusted,” as in the “standard” survey question (as opposed to “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”). It is trust in *people you don’t know who are likely to be different from yourself*. People interpret the standard survey question as reflecting faith in strangers (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 3). Generalized trust is a form of “bridging” rather than “bonding” social capital (Putnam, 1993, 93).

Generalized trusters have an optimistic world view—that things are good, going to get better, and that you can help make them better. These senses of optimism and control reduce people’s perceived vulnerability to risk (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 2, 4). Generalized trusters see greater opportunities than risks in dealing with people who are different from themselves. They are tolerant of immigrants and minorities and support equal rights for women and gays. People who

trust others are more likely to give to charity and volunteer their time, especially for secular causes that help people unlike themselves—as opposed to religious causes that benefit people like themselves. Trusting societies have more effective governments, higher growth rates, less corruption and crime, and are more likely to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor (LaPorta et al., 1999; Uslaner, 2002, chs.5 and 7).

At the individual level, the strongest predictors of trust are senses of optimism and control, whether one’s parents are trusting, and how much education one has. Higher education brings people into contact with people of different background and with greater understanding of other cultures (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4). At the aggregate level, the most important determinant of trust is the level of economic inequality--a result that holds across countries without a legacy of Communism,³ across the United States over time, and across the American states (Uslaner, 2002, 186-189, 229-237; Uslaner and Brown, 2005). When inequality is great, people at the top and the bottom will not perceive that each has a shared faith with the other. They will lack both the contact and the sense of connection with each other that are essential for trust (Uslaner, 2002, 181-185).

Generalized trust promotes diversity and tolerance of people who are different from yourself. It seems ironic that there are now many arguments linking trust with greater homogeneity.

Contact Versus Aversion

The competing accounts of diversity as good or bad for society rest upon different theoretical accounts of how people interact with each other. The predominant frameworks are contact theory³ and conflict theory (or “racial threat”).

According to contact theory, when you get to know people of different backgrounds, your negative stereotypes about them will break down and tolerance and trust will develop. Putnam (1993, 90, 180) argues: "...a dense network of secondary associations both embodies and contributes to effective social collaboration" and "[e]ffective collaborative institutions require interpersonal skills and trust, but those skills and that trust are also inculcated and reinforced by organized collaboration." He elaborates (2000, 137): "...people who trust others are all-around good citizens, and those more engaged in community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy....the critically disengaged believe themselves to be surrounded by miscreants and feel less constrained to be honest themselves. The causal arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti."

Yet, the bulk of the evidence seems to suggest that simply knowing someone of a different background, even having them as a casual friend, is only modestly linked to greater tolerance, as a meta-analysis of 515 studies shows (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006).

Why does the contact hypothesis not fare better? I suggest three reasons. First, contact with people who are different from yourself may not matter that much if it is not so common. Our social connections are mostly people very much like ourselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). We tend to shy away from political discourse with people who don't share our views (Mutz, 2006).

A weak test of the diversity of our social ties is whether we have friends of different backgrounds. In the 1998 General Social Survey in the United States, 69 percent of respondents did *not* have friends of different races—74 percent of whites and just under half of African-Americans.⁴ In the 2007 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey, 69 percent of all respondents and

83 percent of whites said that they did not have friends of another race. Only 22 percent of whites mix with other racial groups in clubs and barely more than half at work or in their children's schools. We tend to stick to our own kind.

Second, there is a disconnect between social interactions and generalized trust. Putnam's argument is that we develop trust from interacting with people. He explicitly assumes that trusting people like ourselves provides us with the basis of extending that trust to strangers, including people unlike ourselves--the basis of generalized trust (cf. Hardin, 1992). The empirical support for this claim is weak (Claibourn and Martin, 2000; Uslaner, 2002, chs. 4, 5). And the theoretical arguments are even weaker.

Rosenblum (1998, 48) argues:

...there is the tendency to adopt a simplistic "transmission belt" model of civil society, which says that the beneficial formative effects of association spill over from one sphere to another....The "transmission belt" model is simplistic as a general dynamic. It is one thing to say that within face-to-face rotating credit associations "social networks allow trust to become transitive and spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you," and quite another thing to show that habits of trust cultivated in one social sphere are exhibited in incongruent groups in separate spheres.

We join groups *in order to have more contact with people like ourselves*—if not demographically (racial, gender, income) then in terms of interests (bowling, singing in choral societies, political values, among others). When we join civic groups—and especially when we have social interactions such as going on picnics or having dinner parties—we *are not likely to*

encounter people who are different from ourselves. The entire point of such activities is to bond with people whom we can easily trust. And there is little evidence that either informal socializing or group membership—which Stolle (2000, 233) calls “private social capital”—leads to greater trust (Stolle, 1998; Uslaner, 2002, 121-125, 145-148; chs. 4-5).

Second, *there is little evidence that simple contact with people who are different from yourself is sufficient to lead to generalized trust.* I examined data from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey in the United States, the UK Citizenship Survey, the Economy, Security, Community in Canada (from the University of British Columbia), and the German Social Survey and the results are remarkable in their consistency: Simply having friends of a different race or ethnicity does not lead to greater generalized trust—the belief that “most people can be trusted”—or even trust in specific groups.

Pettigrew (1998, 66; cf. Forbes, 1997) holds that we assume too much from simple contact because we have not followed the complex argument on contact originated by Gordon W. Allport: Contact alone, Allport (1954) held, is not sufficient; contact must be accompanied by “equal group status within the situation, common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom.”

Forbes (1997, 19) claims that contact must involve “intimate” knowledge of the other person. He (1997, 167, 144, 150) argues:

If the groups in question differ in language or culture, increasing contact between the groups will mean increasing competition between incompatible ways of life. Friendship with outsiders will generally mean defection from the beliefs and practices of the in-group... “[t]he more frequent and the more intimate the contacts

among individuals belonging to different tribes or nations, the more these groups come to resemble each other culturally or linguistically... Different languages, religions, customs, laws, and moralities—in short, different cultures—impede economic integration, with all its benefits.... Isolation and subordination, not gore and destruction, seem to be the main themes in linguistic conflict.”

When people live apart from one another, the sort of contacts Forbes (with Allport and Pettigrew) claim are essential to build trust and tolerance are unlikely to develop.

Marschall and Stolle (2004) found support for this argument. They analyzed data on trust in a survey of Detroit area residents that allowed them to merge data on the diversity of a neighborhood with people’s contacts. They found that contact only increases trust if it occurs in a diverse neighborhood. Pettigrew and Tropp’s metanalysis of tests of contact theory (2006, 760-761) report considerably stronger correlations of contact with prejudice when the “optimal contact conditions” (as reflected in Allport’s work) are met.

Third, diversity may erode trust *because it discourages contact with people who are different from oneself*. This is the core of the Alesina-LaFerrara and Putnam arguments, but it has a longer history. In the 1940s, V.O. Key, Jr. (1949) offered what became known as the “racial threat” or “conflict theory” hypothesis. Key argued when the share of minorities is high in the American South, increased levels of racial discord, rather than greater tolerance, will follow. Putnam (2007, 142) argues: “... most (though not all) empirical studies have tended instead to support the so-called ‘conflict theory’, which suggests that, for various reasons – but above all, contention over limited resources – diversity fosters out-group distrust and in-group solidarity. On this theory, the more we are brought into physical proximity with people of another race or

ethnic background, the more we stick to ‘our own’ and the less we trust the ‘other’.”

The racial threat/conflict theory argument has shaped, directly or indirectly, the claims of social identity theorists who claim that out-group trust is the exception, while in-group trust is the norm (Forbes, 1997, 35). Not only are we predisposed to interact mostly with people like ourselves. We are predisposed to trust our own kind more than out-groups (Brewer, 1979). Messick and Brewer (1983, 27-28, italics in original) review experiments on cooperation and find that "members of an in-group tend to perceive other in-group members in generally favorable terms, particularly as being *trustworthy, honest, and cooperative*."

Generalized trust is the exception, not the norm. There is support for such claims in cross-national data. In each of its four waves, the World Values Survey has asked the generalized trust question: In each wave, only a minority—and seemingly a shrinking one—trusts fellow citizens. Across 24 countries and regions in 1981, 38.5 percent believed that “most people can be trusted.” with only the four Nordic nations (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) having a majority of trusting respondents. As the number of countries rose to 44 in 1990, the trusting share shrunk to 34.6 percent, with the United States, Canada, and China showing a majority of trusting citizens.⁵ The addition of more countries in 1995 led to a decline in the overall trust level to 25.1 percent, with only Norway, Sweden, and China having a majority of trusting citizens. In 2001, the World Values Survey had responses to the trust question in 82 countries with 26.9 percent trusters and majorities in just eight countries.

Contact with people of different backgrounds may not lead to higher levels of trust or tolerance because our interactions with people who are unlike ourselves are not frequent nor are they based upon equal status. Ironically, where contact seems most likely—in diverse

neighborhoods—it seems to be least frequent. If trust is important, these results are depressing because trust is in short supply in most countries. The countries where trust is highest-- the Nordic countries—are also low in diversity. While there is no overall relationship between diversity and trust (Uslaner, in press), the cases of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have given some observers pause (Delhy and Newton, 2005). Most people are simply not predisposed to trust people unlike themselves—or even to have sustained contact with them.

Diversity and Segregation

Diversity seems to drive down trust and other positive outcomes, according to the literature surveyed so far. But this conclusion is too hasty for two reasons. First, there is accumulating evidence that these linkages may not be as strong as first thought. Across 13 measures of diversity across nations and the American states, the relationship between diversity and trust is minimal, with only one r^2 (state minority share of population) exceeding .10 (Uslaner, in press). Across nations and states, diversity does *not* lead to less trust.

Hooghe et al. (2009) estimated a hierarchical linear model of trust among people in the European Union (using the European Social Survey) find no significant impact of fractionalization. Letki (2008), examining the 2001 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey, finds that community-level diversity is insignificant in a model of social capital once she controls for the economic status of the community. Collier, Honohan, and Moene (2001) find that ethnic group dominance, but *not* simple ethnic diversity, leads to a greater likelihood of civil conflict.

The one measure of “diversity” that is related to trust in a cross-national analysis is a measure of residential segregation. Using data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at University of Maryland, I

estimated the geographical isolation of major minority groups within a wide range of countries.⁶

The MAR project created a trichotomous index for each major minority group in a country and he aggregated the scores across countries. Countries where minorities are most geographically isolated have the lowest levels of generalized trust.

There is also new interest in segregation from other scholars. Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2009) find that ethnically and linguistically segregated neighborhoods, but *not* fractionalization, lead to a lower quality of government. Rothwell (2009, 18-19) finds that “[s]egregation is associated with significantly more racist views on Black intelligence and more psychological distance from Blacks” and that “[i]ntegration...is strongly and robustly correlated with higher levels of trust, voter turnout, and more favorable views of Whites towards Blacks.”⁷

Why segregation rather than diversity? We can see much of the answer in one core theoretical question and one methodological issue. If we live apart from people of different races and ethnicities, we are unlikely to develop the sort of contact that can lead to greater trust or tolerance. Sustained contact as equals with people of different backgrounds will be least likely to occur where people have minimal contacts with each other in an environment that encourages such mixing (Massey and Denton, 1993, 65, 167). When people are isolated from each other, they will be more likely to develop a strong in-group loyalty that works against trusting people who are different from yourself. Segregation may also lead to greater political organization by minority groups, which can establish their own power bases in opposition to the political organizations dominated by the majority group as their share of the citizenry grows (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1997, 1278).

Segregation isolates people. Diversity *per se* does not. How, then, do we account for the

strong negative relations between diversity and trust that have been reported in many studies? Segregation and diversity are *not* the same thing. The standard measure of diversity is a Herfindahl or fractionalization index: It indicates the probability that two randomly selected individuals who meet will be from different groups. There are several measures of segregation, but the most commonly used is the index of dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; Iceland, 2004). The segregation index is a measure of “the percentage of a group’s population that would have to change residence for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that group as the metropolitan area overall” (Iceland and Scopilliti, 2008, 83).

High levels of diversity are compatible with perfect segregation, perfect integration, or anything in between. In Figure 1 I show two scenarios on residential segregation. Each has an identical index of (maximum) diversity with the community equally divided between red people and blue people. The neighborhood on the left is divided by a railroad track and all of the red people live on one side and all of the blue people on the other—complete segregation. On the right every blue person lives next to a red person and every red person lives next to a blue person—complete integration. The diversity index is identical for the two communities.

Figure 1 about here

In data for 325 American communities (Iceland, 2004), diversity and segregation are only moderately correlated. The correlations are .297 for 2000, .231 for 1990, and .270 for 1980—rather modest for aggregate indices.

The diversity measure is actually a surrogate for the percent nonwhite in a community ($r =$

-.793) while the segregation measure is only modestly correlated with the non-white share ($r = -.279$) for the 2000 data. Segregation is *not* as strongly correlated with the share of African-Americans in a community ($r = .542$) or the share of minorities—African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians— more generally ($r = .150$, both $N = 237$). Unlike the diversity index, it is insensitive to the size of each group in the population so it is not a surrogate for minority share of the population (Iceland, 2004, 8). We know that minorities have less generalized trust—and more particularized trust—than whites (Uslaner, 2002, 35-36, 98-107), so the negative relationship between diversity and mistrust may simply reflect the lower trust levels for minority groups rather than an aversion by whites for minorities in more diverse neighborhoods.

Beyond the methodological issue there is a far stronger theoretical link between segregation and mistrust than between diversity and mistrust. First, segregation makes contact with people of different backgrounds unlikely even in the absence of aversion to people of different backgrounds. Second, segregation is strongly linked to inequality, which is the strongest determinant of trust. Diversity is not as strongly connected to inequality.

Segregation also isolates the minority poor and makes them less likely to have access to the resources that would help them escape poverty. Massey and Denton (1993, 13, 138, 155-6, 167, emphasis in original) write about 20th century America::

Segregation increases the susceptibility of neighborhoods to...spirals of decline...In the face of persistent neighborhood disorder, residents come to distrust their neighbors and to look upon them as threats rather than as sources of support or assistance...they...limit their contacts outside of close friends and family....The historical confinement of blacks to the ghetto...meant that blacks shared few

political interests with whites....The existence of solid black electoral districts...did create the potential for bloc voting along racial lines....an alternative status system has evolved within America's ghettos that is defined *in opposition* to basic ideals and values of American society.

Segregation also leads to greater inequality (Massey and Denton, 1993, 127-128). Bowles, Loury, and Sethi (2009, 11) argue that "...when segregation is sufficiently great, group equality cannot be attained even asymptotically, no matter what the initial conditions may be."

Diversity, Segregation, and Trust: The Evidence So Far

In a series of papers (Uslaner, 2009, in press a, in press b) and a book in progress (see n. 1), I have explored the relationship among diversity, segregation, and trust both at the aggregate level across countries and in individual-level analyses of surveys in the United States (the Social Capital Benchmark Survey) and the UK (the 2007 Citizenship Survey).

The aggregate analyses provide strong support for the argument that segregation drives down trust (Uslaner, 2009). Across 38 countries, the highest level segregation leads to a population that is 12 percent less trusting than the lowest level of segregation using the Minorities at Risk measure. This is just about the same effect as I found for economic inequality, where the decline is 13 percent. Moreover, the size of the informal economy has a greater impact on trust in more highly segregated countries than when there is greater integration. Segregation marginalizes minority ethnic groups whose members are more likely to be involved in the informal sector.

There is also strong evidence that inequality is more closely linked to segregation than it is to diversity. Using community-level indicators of both for 323 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States for 2000 (Iceland, 2004), the correlations between the ratio of minority

to non-Hispanic white income in a community are $-.603$ for segregation but only $-.206$ for diversity.

The individual-level analysis for the United States is based upon the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. I examine the determinants of trust, including diversity and a two-way interaction between integration and diversity and three way interactions among integration, diversity, and the heterogeneity of social networks (first) and group memberships (second). I focus on the interaction between integration and diversity, since the “least” segregated communities in the data set are virtually all-white and thus do not present many opportunities for social interaction among different groups. I find that diversity does indeed drive down trust: Living in the most diverse city (Houston) reduces trust by 27 percent compared to residing in the least diverse city (Lewiston, Maine). Living in a city that is both diverse and integrated does *not by itself* increase trust. However, someone living in a city that is both diverse and integrated will be 27 percent more likely to trust others if (s)he has a diverse friendship network, as Allport, Forbes, and Pettigrew hypothesized.

When I analyze the data by race for the United States (Uslaner, in press b), I find that diversity drives down trust for whites (by 29 percent) but not for African-Americans. Diverse friendship networks in communities that are both integrated and diverse boost trust for both whites (by 27 percent) and African-Americans (30 percent). For whites, there is also a boost in trust if they live in integrated and diverse cities and belong to civic groups with diverse memberships (by 19 percent), but there is no similar increase for African-Americans. Overall, living among people of diverse backgrounds boosts trust more than diversity drives down faith in others—for both whites and blacks.

Segregation and Contact in the UK

In the UK data, there are no community identifiers so I use instead the perception of the share of people of different backgrounds within walking distance of the survey respondent. These are estimates by each respondent and are thus likely error-prone, but they are the best available measures. In the UK there is substantially less segregation than in the United States (Peach, in press). Living in integrated neighborhoods *and having diverse friendship networks* matters for all groups I analyzed: The effects are strongest for East Asians, who are 10 percent more likely to trust others if they have diverse networks in integrated communities. Other groups—whites, Africans,⁸ East Asians, and Muslims—are affected approximately equally (with a change of about 6 percent in their levels of trust). The effects seem far smaller in the UK than in the US. This could reflect the much lower level of segregation in the UK and the difference in estimation procedures (estimates of neighborhood integration compared to the Census-based measures in the US).

Minorities in the US and the UK both have considerably lower levels of trust than the majority (whites): The majority (white) populations now have roughly similar levels of trust: 43 percent for the UK in the Citizenship survey and 39 percent for the United States in the 2008 General Social Survey. In the US 29 percent of African-Americans believe that “most people can be trusted,” while in the UK 31 percent of East Asians, 26 percent of Africans, and 28 percent of Muslims are trusters.

The results for the US and the UK point to a puzzle. African-Americans are by far the most segregated minority. Their situation is often described as “hypersegregation” (Massey and Denton, 1993). When African-Americans do live in integrated and diverse neighborhoods, they

are no more likely to trust people in general—unless they also have friends of different backgrounds. For whites, simply living in diverse and integrated neighborhoods boosts trust, with additional increases if they have friends and group members of different backgrounds. Even though African-Americans are more segregated, integration matters more for whites.

In the UK, almost 80 percent of whites estimate that more than half (or even all) people within walking distance of them are from the same ethnic group as they are. Most non-whites, including people of African and East Asia heritage—and most Muslims—say that less than half of the population within walking distance are from different groups. Yet, this is not a simple picture of a fully integrated society. Almost 60 percent of whites believe that the ward they live in is less than half minority. Almost 90 percent of East Asians, Africans, and Muslims say that their wards are 80 percent or more minority—and 70 percent of each say that 90 percent of their immediate neighbors are from minority groups. The British pattern of integration is not a melting pot where people of all backgrounds live together (Johnston *et al.*, 2002). In the UK, minorities live close to other minorities and whites live in more segregated environments. In contrast to the US, integration and diverse ties seems to matter most for the *most segregated minority—the East Asians*.

Diversity, Segregation, and Trust: Implications

The differing results in the US and the UK likely reflect the divergent patterns of segregation. Segregation is far more severe for African-Americans. However, whites and minorities in the UK do seem to live in separate worlds even as minorities, notably Muslims, identify readily as British (Manning and Roy, 2007). Heterogeneous social networks in integrated and diverse communities matter more in the US than in the UK—most likely because the US is

more segregated. Such ties also matter more for whites than for African-Americans in the US, most likely because whites are less likely than African-Americans to have diverse social networks. Diverse networks are most likely to build trust when they are least common

This does not mean that we can boost trust simply by integrating neighborhoods. The link between integrated neighborhoods and trust is not one-way. People choose where to live to a considerable extent based upon their racial views and upon trust. Trusting or tolerant people are more likely to choose friends of a different group and mistrusters will shy away from such contact (Forbes, 1997, 111-112; Pettigrew, 1998, 77).

Many people, most notably the majority (white) population, choose to live with people of their own kind--to a considerable extent because they don't want to associate with people who may be different from themselves. Such aversion to integrated neighborhoods often rests upon negative stereotypes of minorities and upon low levels of generalized trust. Minorities shy away from integrated neighborhoods because they fear harassment, not simply because they prefer to live with their own kind--or do not like whites (Farley *et al.*, 1994; Massey and Denton, 1993, 89-94; Zubrinsky and Bobo, 1996).

The persistence of negative racial stereotypes in the US and the UK is a key obstacle to both neighborhood integration and to trust of people who are different from oneself. White Americans view African-Americans less favorably than themselves--both in general and in stereotypes. Whites rates whites at 73 on a "feeling thermometer" ranging from 0 to 100 in the 2008 American National Election Study, compared to 63 for African-Americans. They are more likely to say that African-Americans are unintelligent and lazy compared to whites. Yet, the feeling thermometer scores for blacks are almost identical to those for Asian-Americans,

Hispanics, and even Jews and Catholics. While more whites have negative stereotypes for blacks than for other groups (except for Hispanic intelligence), only a minority of whites see African-Americans as unintelligent (14 percent) or lazy (19 percent).

There are no similar stereotype or thermometer questions in the UK Citizenship Survey. However, there is clear racial resentment in the British data: 45 percent of whites say that Asians are treated better than they are in British society; 28 percent make this claim about blacks and 27 percent about new immigrants. (Not surprisingly, 81 percent of non-whites say that whites are treated better than they are).

While the majority population seems reluctant to live in neighborhoods that are overwhelmingly composed of minorities—and indeed do *not* live in neighborhoods with many African-Americans in the United States or with many non-whites in Britain—segregation has been declining as have negative racial attitudes. In the far more segregated United States, only a small share of whites adhere to racial stereotypes.

My own analyses of data from the United States and the United Kingdom strongly supports the argument that segregation among whites reflects negative stereotypes, while preferred housing patterns among blacks are not based on views on race. For the United States, I examine the 2000 GSS which has a battery of questions on respondents' preferred racial composition of neighborhoods (Farley *et al*, 1994). I created a summary measure of whether people preferred to live in neighborhoods dominated by their own kind (whites, African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians). For whites, the choice of neighborhoods depended strongly upon negative racial stereotypes (lazy vs. hardworking, how intelligent, how wealthy, and how devoted to one's family) for African-Americans—but not for Hispanics or Asians—and mistrust. Preferred

neighborhood integration had a modest ($p < .10$) impact on trust. For African-Americans trust had no significant relationship to preferred neighborhood composition— and neighborhood composition played no role in shaping trust. For African-Americans, stereotypes don't matter either; the only significant predictor of preferences for living in an integrated neighborhood was income (cf. Massey and Denton, 1993, 89-94; Farley *et al*, 1994, 774; and Bobo and Zubrinsky, 1996, 899 for similar findings). *Most, though not all, of the effect of residential choice on trust for whites stems from positive attitudes toward minorities and high levels of trust. For African-Americans, choosing to live among whites neither depends upon trust nor builds faith in others.*

The 2007 Citizenship Survey in the United Kingdom did not have a comparable measure of preferred neighborhood composition. The only measure of neighborhood satisfaction is whether someone enjoys his/her neighborhood. For whites and for East Asians, enjoyment depends strongly upon worries about crime and concerns about problems caused by neighbors (teens hanging out, litter, vandalism, drug use, drunk people, and abandoned cars). People who saw their neighbors as causing problems were substantially less likely to trust others and more likely to worry about being attacked because of their race and especially to be harassed because of their race.

East Asians also linked neighborhood problems to the share of minorities in their neighborhoods. For whites, East Asians, and people of African backgrounds, there was no direct impact of trust on enjoyment of neighborhoods. For whites and East Asians, there was an indirect link from mistrust to perception of neighborhood problems and then to enjoyment. For blacks, low trust and fear of harassment lead people to see more neighborhood problems—but they do not

link these problems to the enjoyment of their neighborhoods (similar to the U.S. findings). The importance of ethnic identity to a sense of who you are mattered only for whites. High levels of (perceived) minorities in your neighborhood made each group less likely to enjoy the community, but the effects are much more powerful for whites and East Asians than for blacks. For blacks, the safety of neighborhoods, being treated with respect, and satisfaction with local authorities were the key to enjoying their communities. Mixing with people of different ethnic and racial backgrounds had no significant effect on enjoyment of neighborhoods for any ethnic/racial group.

Nor was there much evidence that social interaction in diverse neighborhoods led to more trust in the UK. In simultaneous equation models, trust led whites, non-whites, East Asians, and to a much lesser extent Muslims to have diverse social networks in integrated communities. Such networks only led to an increase in trust for Africans—and their level of trust does not lead them to seek out heterogenous networks. These connections may be particularly important to the one ethnic/racial/religious group that sees itself facing considerable discrimination in the public sector. (36 percent compared to 28 percent of other British respondents).

The 1996 Pew Survey of Metropolitan Philadelphia, asked respondents how much they like their neighborhoods. Whites living in both the central city and in suburbs as well as blacks in central cities all liked their neighborhoods less if they perceived many urban problems (rundown buildings, unsafe to walk at night, gangs, violence, and robbery). Whites were less likely to like their neighborhoods if they perceived tensions or arguments among different racial groups. Neither African-Americans living in the central city nor the small number in the suburbs liked their neighborhoods less if they perceived such tensions. Whites in the central city and to a greater extent in the suburbs liked their neighborhoods less if they saw them as highly integrated.

African-Americans in the central city liked their neighborhoods *more* if they had a diverse mix of groups.

The evidence indicates that whites opt out of integrated neighborhoods because they don't want to live among blacks. Blacks in both the United States and the United Kingdom appear far less likely to choose their neighborhoods based upon how they view whites (or other minorities) but rather upon their fears of discrimination and harassment. Where one lives is thus not simply a matter of choice for all groups. If whites choose not to live near minorities, blacks don't have equal opportunities to live in integrated neighborhoods. Whites who choose to live among minorities are already trusting. Living with minorities does seem to lead to slightly higher levels of trust—but this may simply be making people who are already trusting even more so.

Can We Build Trust by Building Houses?

There is some evidence that housing policies can help create integrated neighborhoods. More recent legislation in the US and the UK has reduced discrimination in housing (Johnston, 1991; Massey and Denton, 1993, 105, 193-210; Phillips and Karn, 1991). However, negative stereotypes of minorities persist in both countries and likely elsewhere, so the path to integration is neither easy nor immediate. Integration is possible, but it will require political effort to see if the public is sufficiently receptive.


Yet integration by itself is not sufficient to build trust. Separating the effects of building trust by contact with people of different backgrounds in diverse and integrated communities from the effects of trust on residential choice is difficult. There are few natural experiments where we can control for how people came to live where they do. However, an early study of contact by Deutsch and Collins (1951) provided strong support for contact theory in a natural experiment.

They studied four public housing projects in Newark, New Jersey and New York City. Two of the projects were segregated by race, two were integrated. Whites who were assigned to the integrated projects developed much more positive views of minorities while those in the segregated communities persisted in negative stereotypes of African-Americans. Yet, the large number of studies on the contact hypothesis reveal a more mixed picture.


Such housing experiments are rare. Where there are national policies that “distribute” immigrants throughout the country—as in Norway and Denmark (and in the past in Sweden)—they are adopted in countries already high in trust. And over the longer run, such policies do not seem capable of preventing the formation of enclaves of minority groups in the larger cities. Segregation inhibits the development of diverse social networks, but it may be as much an effect of low trust as it is a cause.

FIGURE 1

High Fractionalization, High Segregation



High Fractionalization, Low Segregation



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NOTES

1. The research is reported in several papers and a book in progress, *Segregation and Mistrust: Diversity, Isolation, and Social Cohesion*, under contract to Cambridge University Press. In the book, I shall also examine Canada and Sweden.
2. Peach (in press, 22) presents data showing that the non-white population of Britain rose from a few thousand in 1951 to 2,500,000 in 1991 and to over 4,000,000 in 2001.
3. Former Communist countries generally have low levels of inequality, but: (1) this equality was enforced from above rather than the result of market forces; (2) was based upon official statistics that may not be reliable; and (3) does not necessarily reflect the way people see the distribution of wealth even in Communist nations.
4. In the 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey in the United States, 69 percent of all respondents (and 68 percent of whites) claimed to have friends of different ethnic backgrounds. The difference between the General Social Survey and the Social Capital Benchmark Survey is not readily explicable.
5. See Uslaner (2002, 220, n. 1) for a discussion of why the Chinese results in this and other waves should be discounted.
6. The data are available for download at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.htm>, accessed May 10, 2004.
7. Rothwell uses the 2000 General Social Survey and has access to the municipal codes (not generally available) to merge the Iceland segregation data I employ here.
8. The African and East Asian heritage categories comprise people whose main language is African/East Asian or who had at least one parent born in Africa/East Asia. The Africa

category includes Caribbean blacks. There were few differences in survey responses between Africans and Caribbeans and there were too few Caribbean respondents to treat them separately. Muslims may come from Africa, East Asia, or elsewhere, but I estimated a separate equation for them because of their salience in the debate over the “decline of Britishness.”