Diversity, Segregation, Trust, and Altruism

Book Prospectus

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Generalized trust, the belief that "most people can be trusted," is all about having faith in people who are different from yourself. Of course, we trust people like ourselves –especially people we know well. Such trust reflects our experiences, either directly or indirectly (through perceptions of group traits or stereotypes). Believing that "most people can be trusted" is a leap of faith, a moral decision that *we ought to trust others* (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 2).

Generalized trust is a form of "bridging" rather than "bonding" social capital (Putnam, 1993, 93). Trust should thus be a route to having a diverse set of friends and acquaintances. Yet, there is little evidence that this happens (Uslaner, in press).   An even greater enigma is that some prominent papers show that in the United States, at least, people living in areas with diverse populations are *less* likely to trust others and to have heterogeneous social networks (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000, 2002, 2004; Alesina et al., 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2007).

 The negative relationship between diversity and trust stems from the "racial threat" argument made in the 1940s by V.O. Key, Jr. (1949). Key argued when the share of minorities is high in the American South, increased levels of racial discord, rather than greater tolerance, will follow. The racial threat argument has shaped, directly or indirectly, the claims of social identity theorists who claim that out-group trust is the exception, while in-group trust is the norm (Forbes, 1997, 35). In Uslaner (2002), I distinguished between "generalized" and "particularized" trust. Generalized trust is faith in strangers, in people you don't know who are likely to be rather different from yourself. Particularized trust is faith *only* in your own in-group. Messick and Brewer (1983, 27-28, italics in original) review experiments on cooperation and find that "members of an in-group tend to perceive other in-group members in generally favorable terms, particularly as being *trustworthy, honest, and cooperative*."   We are

predisposed to be particularized, not generalized, trusters (Brewer, 1979).

Alesina and LaFerrara (2000, 850) argue:

...individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar to themselves in terms

of income, race, or ethnicity...diffuse preferences for homogeneity may decrease

total participation in a mixed group if fragmentation increases. However,

individuals may prefer to sort into homogenous groups.

Consistent with Key, they find that people living in ethnically and racially diverse communities

are *less likely* to participate in voluntary associations in the United States–especially those

organizations in which face-to-face contact is most likely such as churches and youth groups.

Diversity, they argue, breeds aversion to interaction with people of different backgrounds

and people who are most averse to contact with out-groups participate the least: "...individuals

who choose to participate less in racially mixed communities are those who most vocally oppose

racial mixing" (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000, 891). People living in ethnically heterogenous

communities are also less likely to trust other people in the United States, Australia, and Great

Britain (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2002; Leigh, 2006; Pennant, 2005).. These findings are part of a

more general syndrome of negative effects for diversity that Alesina and his colleagues have

reported in cross-national analyses (Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina and LaFerrara, 2004).

While Putnam and Alesina and his colleagues (among others) argue that diversity is bad

for social capital, Arneil (2006) and Hero (2004, 2007) maintain that social capital (including

trust) is bad for diversity. Generalized trust, and social capital more generally, leads to worse

outcome for disadvantaged groups such as African-Americans, Hispanics, women, people with

disabilities, and gays and lesbians. Arneil (2006, 7) claims that the "unity [implied by the idea of

generalized trust] can represent an enormously threatening force for those groups that have historically been excluded." Instead, "distrust may be positive" for people who feel betrayed by the dominant actors in society (generally white men). Hero (2007) shows that states with higher levels of social capital have worse outcomes on a series of measures of life quality and civic engagement, ranging from graduation and incarceration rates, infant mortality, and political participation. Social capital is negatively correlated with the diversity of state populations (the shares of the population that are minorities)–so diversity first drives down social capital, which in turn leads to worse outcomes for minority citizens.

Putnam's critique is far more wide-ranging. His argument is not that heterogeneity is bad for minorities, but rather that diversity leads to worse outcomes for everyone. His argument differs from both Arneil's and Hero's. They hold that social capital (including trust) do not lead to good outcomes. Putnam (2000) is an evangelist for the positive outcomes of social outcome (including trust). Arneil and Hero argue that minorities don't have access to social capital and the solution to this dilemma is to push for better outcomes through political organization and the power of numbers (Arneil, 2006, 179-180; Hero, 2007, 49). Putnam claims that this power of numbers–greater diversity–leads to worse outcomes, not just for minorities, but for everyone.

Putnam (2007, 142-143) cites a wide range of studies showing a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and indicators of social cohesion, such as trust, investment in public goods, voluntary activities, car-pooling, and desertion in the armed forces. Using the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCBS) in the United States, Putnam (2007, 146-149) shows that inter-racial trust, trust of neighbors, and even trust of one's own race is lower in more ethnically diverse neighborhoods. Putnam's conclusions lead to great pessimism about the effects of

diversity:

> Diversity does not produce 'bad race relations' or ethnically-defined group
> hostility.... Rather, inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from
> collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to
> withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and
> its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on community projects
> less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for social reform more, but have less
> faith that they can actually make a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of
> the television. Note that this pattern encompasses attitudes and behavior, bridging
> and bonding social capital, public and private connections. Diversity, at least in
> the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us.

Is diversity destructive of trust? I argue that much of the debate over diversity is misplaced. The culprit is not diversity *per se*, but rather social isolation. When people of different backgrounds live apart from each other, they will not–indeed, cannot– develop the sorts of ties–or the sorts of attitudes–that leads us to trust people who are different from ourselves.

Concentrated minorities are more likely to develop a strong identity that supercedes a national sense of identification (trust in people who are different from oneself) and to build local institutions and political bodies that enhance this sense of separateness. Geographical isolation may breed in-group identity at the expense of the larger society. Segregation may also lead to greater political organization by minority groups, which can establish their own power bases in opposition to the political organizations dominated by the majority group as their share of the citizenry grows.

I shall elaborate on these arguments (see below). In diverse settings I find support for a far stronger linkage between segregation and trust than for diversity and trust. And trust has consequences, as I argued in Uslaner (2002), most notably altruistic deeds. I consider not only the roots of trust, but also how diversity and segregation shape volunteering and giving to charity.

I employ data from national surveys in the United States, among whites, African-Americans, and Latinos, as well as from the United Kingdom and Sweden, and Canada.   The United Kingdom and especially Sweden are marked by low levels of segregation. While ethnic Swedes are isolated from minorities, there is relatively little segregation among the different immigrant groups in Sweden–and immigrants move out of their initial communities relatively quickly (Andersson, n.d., 14). Segregation is considerably lower than racial separation in the United States (Murdie and Borgegard, 1998). British minorities are far less segregated from whites than are blacks in the United States; there is no evidence of ghettos or "hypersegregation" even among ethnic/racial groups that do tend to live apart from whites and, as in Sweden, there is considerable geographic mobility as immigrants seek better housing (Fieldhouse and Cutts, in press, 29; Johnston, Forrest, and Poulsen, 2 002; Peach, 1996, in press). The effect of segregation on civic norms is far more pronounced for whites in the United States compared to whites in Britain (Fieldhouse and Cutts, in press, 29).

We might expect Canada to have less integrated minorities than the United States. The US, after all, is supposed to be the "melting pot," where people of different backgrounds come together for a common culture, represented by the national motto, "E pluribus unum" (one out of many). Canada, on the other hand, is a mosaic, or, in the words of former Prime Minister Joe Clark, "a community of communities." Yet, Canadian cities seem somewhat *less* segregated than

their American counterparts (Hou, 2006). Much of the difference is attributed to the greater integration of black Canadians compared to African-Americans. Segregation levels are twice as high for African-Americans as for black Canadians, but this result stems mostly from the tiny size of the black Canadian population (one percent of Canadians compared to the 12 percent for African-Americans). Asians in Canada are strongly isolated, especially compared to their counterparts in the United States, so overall "...with the exception of the Black population...the differences in levels of segregation between Canada and the United States are not great. They do not bear out any major distinction between a Canadian Mosaic and a US Melting Pot models (sic)" (Peach, 2005, 22). The four countries fit into two high segregation (US and Canada) and two low segregation (UK and Sweden) patterns. Canada, of course, is distinctive in that it has language cleavages and considerable segregation of Francophones, which is comparable to that of Asians (Peach, 2006, 15). Integrated communities might matter more for trust and altruism where segregation is more widespread and where people might have fewer contacts with people of different backgrounds: in the United States and Canada.

There is another pattern that bears noting, though it might not be as critical as the overall levels of segregation. Racial residential segregation has been declining in the United States and the United Kingdom for both whites and minorities (Massey and Fischer, 2003; Simpson, 2007), even as economic inequality has been increasing. In Sweden and Canada, segregation has been increasing: Segregation increased sharply–by a factor greater than 50 percent--in Stockholm from 1970 to 1990 (Murdie and Borgegard, 1998). Exposure to whites fell for all minorities in Canada from 1981 to 2001, but most sharply–by a third–for South Asians. The exposure of every group to neighbors of their own group grew dramatically–by a factor of four for South Asians and

almost doubling for Chinese (Hou, 2006, 1201).

The evidence on diversity and trust is not all supportive: Gesthuizen et al. (2008) and Hooghe et al. (2009) estimated hierarchical linear models of trust among European nations (using Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey, respectively) and found no significant impact of fractionalization. Collier, Honohan, and Moene (2001) find that ethnic group dominance, but *not* simple ethnic diversity, leads to a greater likelihood of civil conflict. In Uslaner (in press), I show that a wide variety of aggregate measures of cross-national group diversity (fractionalization) are unrelated to trust, but that a measure of group segregation by the Minorities at Risk Project at the University of Maryland is significantly (and negatively) related to trust at the country level. I also show that a measure of population diversity for the American states is unrelated to trust levels in the states. Residential segregation is highly significant in a cross-national model of trust.

I am awaiting more refined cross-national data on segregation from Ekaterina Zhuravskaya of the New Economic School, Moscow, who has developed these measures with Alberto Alesina. They show (Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2009) find that ethnically and linguistically segregated neighborhoods, but *not* fractionalization, lead to a lower quality of government. Using similar measures to the ones I employ, Rothwell (2009, 19) finds that integrated neighborhoods lead to greater faith in others and tolerance without examining the interaction between integration and diverse social ties. Letki (2008), examining the 2001 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey, finds initial support for a negative relationship between community-level diversity and a composite indicator of social capital–but the result becomes insignificant when she controls for the economic status of the community.

I shall present the findings from the cross-national analysis in Chapter 3 of the book. I also estimate models using aggregate data from American cities using recently developed measures of residential segregation to support my theoretical claim that segregation creates conditions that should lead to lower trust. Finally, I consider how segregation might lead to either fewer altruistic acts–or to altruistic behavior primarily benefitting one's own in-group. Segregation, however, is not exogenous: Whites generally prefer to live in white neighborhoods. Minorities may prefer to live in mixed neighborhoods, but often face discrimination in housing and the simple reluctance of whites to live among them. Whites who are more trusting are more likely to favor living in integrated neighborhoods–so the direction of the linkage between trust and segregation may not be so clear, perhaps limiting the impact of integrated neighborhoods on trust.

The book outline follows.

Chapter 1: The Roots of Trust

Generalized trust, I argued in Uslaner (2002), is a moral value learned early in life from one's parents. It is largely stable over one's lifespan. The roots of trust extend well beyond one generation: Trust is "inherited" from one generation to another through one's ethnic heritage. People whose grandparents came to the United States from countries that have high levels of trust (Nordics, and the British) tend to have higher levels of generalized trust–and the effects of "inherited" trust are much stronger than living among high-trust people (Uslaner, 2008b).. Trust does *not* depend upon experience, including who your friends (or enemies) are, personal experiences (divorce, being robbed), or belonging to civic groups or participating in most other ways.

If trust largely does *not* depend upon experience, the link between either diversity or segregation may seem quizzical. However, the two arenas where experience clearly matters point to how segregation might matter. Volunteering for secular causes and giving to secular charities both increase trust–because they connect people to others who are different from themselves (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 5). One reason why experiences generally do not matter is that most of our contacts and group memberships are with people very much like ourselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001; Uslaner, 2002, 121-135).

A second reason is that contact with people of different backgrounds is insufficient to make people trust or tolerate others. There is a large literature on the "contact hypothesis" and there are conflicting findings on whether interaction with people of different backgrounds leads to greater or less sympathy for out-groups. The bulk of the evidence seems to suggest that simply knowing someone of a different background, even having them as a casual friend, is not sufficient to shape more fundamental beliefs such as trust (or tolerance). Marschall and Stolle (2004) argue that contact will only increase trust if it occurs in a diverse community. Pettigrew (1998, 66; cf. Forbes, 1997) holds that we assume too much from simple contact because we have not followed the complex argument on contact originated by Gordon W. Allport: Contact alone, Allport held, is not sufficient; contact must be accompanied by "equal group status within the situation, common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom."

These are rather demanding conditions. They may not be met often and they are especially unlikely to be met where people of different backgrounds live separately from one another (Massey and Denton, 1993, 65, 167). Sustained contact as equals with people of

different backgrounds will be least likely to occur where people have minimal contacts with each

other in an environment that encourages such mixing. Bowles, Loury, and Sethi (2009, 11) argue

that "...when segregation is sufficiently great, group equality cannot be attained even

asymptotically, no matter what the initial conditions may be." Equality is the objective condition

that is the strongest determinant of trust, over time in the United States, across the American

states, and across nations without a legacy of communism (Uslaner, 2002, 186-189, 230-237;

Uslaner and Brown, 2005). Following Marschall and Stolle (2004), trust should be greatest

where people have frequent contact with others of different backgrounds *in integrated*

neighborhoods and lowest where people have few contacts with others of different backgrounds

in segregated neighborhoods. The interaction of diversity and contacts should not raise or lower

trust.

Chapter 2: The Persistence of Trust

I review evidence from Uslaner (2002, ch. 6) that trust is stable over time and update

these findings with more recent panel data. Then I present the argument and evidence I advanced

in Uslaner (2008b; cf. Algan and Cahuc, 2007 and Sapienza et al., 2007) on inherited trust:

People's ethnic background (where their grandparents came from) is a key factor in shaping their

levels of trust. I present a model of inherited trust from General Social Survey (1972-1996) data

matched with "home country" trust from the World Values Survey. I then add to this model

variables for whether one's parents were immigrants to the United States. The only two ethnic

groups with sufficient numbers of cases are Hispanics and Asians. Both Latin American and

Asian countries have low levels of trust. Hispanics whose parents immigrated to the United

States are less likely to trust others, but Asians whose parents were immigrants were neither

more nor less likely to immigrate.

Hispanics have significantly lower levels of education–and Asians considerably higher levels of education–than others in the sample, but education is already controlled in the model. Aggregate data on residential segregation for Hispanics and Asians (Iceland, 2004) show that Hispanics live in far more segregated neighborhoods and are considerably less likely to have interaction with the majority white population than are Asians (Lewis Mumford Center, nd; U.S. Census Bureau, 2002, chs. 4, 6).. They are also much less likely to speak English as their primary language–which both stems from and contributes to their high level of residential segregation.

Most of the "stickiness" of trust over time stems from socialization and the transmission of cultural norms across generations. Low levels of trust also persist when there are few opportunities for sustained and equal interactions with people of different backgrounds. Moreover, these low levels of trust persist over time. While the data do not permit a test of this claim in the United States, the European Social Survey has questions on where parents immigrated from and the length of time a respondent has spent in his/her country. Time since immigration is not significant for trust either by itself or when interacted with any of the countries of parental origin (but see Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston, 2006, for contrary evidence in Canada).

Residential segregation is common in most large European cities. In November, 2005, immigrants from Islamic countries rioted in cities across France to protest their lack of economic opportunities–and also their isolation. A young man born in the Paris suburb of La Courneuve of a Malian father say, "We're French, but we also feel like foreigners compared to the real

French." Many young people in the town identify themselves as "Nine Three," the first two

digits of the postal code of their segregated region (Bennhold, 2005). Housing for immigrants is

located outside the main urban areas, creating a sense of isolation from mainstream French

society, in contrast to the integration of immigrants in the center cities of Anglo-Saxon nations.

Massey and Denton (1993, 13, 138, 155-6, 167, emphasis in original) write about 20th

century America::

> Segregation increases the susceptibility of neighborhoods to...spirals of
>
> decline...In the face of persistent neighborhood disorder, residents come to distrust
>
> their neighbors and to look upon them as threats rather than as sources of support
>
> or assistance...they...limit their contacts outside of close friends and family....The
>
> historical confinement of blacks to the ghetto...meant that blacks shared few
>
> political interests with whites....The existence of solid black electoral
>
> districts...did create the potential for bloc voting along racial lines....an alternative
>
> status system has evolved within America's ghettos that is defined *in opposition*
>
> to basic ideals and values of American society.

Soss and Jacobs (2009, 122-123) add: "As residential segregation increases, larger disparities are

also likely to emerge in the longer term processes that shape citizens' political attitudes

and behaviors....[A]s poverty becomes more isolated, the diverse problems of the poor compound

to reshape the social ecologies of their communities....As these sorts of neighborhood problems

concatenate, levels of collective efficacy—beliefs in a shared capacity to achieve goals as well as

beliefs in government responsiveness—decline markedly....[T]he degree of class bias in

American electoral politics hinges, in large part, on patterns of residential segregation in

American society. As income inequality rose in the United States in the last decades of the twentieth century, so too did levels of residential segregation."

Economic inequality is a powerful factor in reducing generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 4, 6, 8)–and the growth of both economic and racial segregation provide a compelling narrative of the decline of trust in the United States. In contrast, other countries I shall consider–Great Britain, Canada, and especially Sweden–have lower levels of both residential segregation and economic inequality–and, hence, more trusting citizens.

Simply having friends of diverse heritages should not be sufficient to lead to greater trust. Reporting friendships of people from different backgrounds tells us little about the context of such contacts–and the Allport/Pettigrew/Forbes framework should lead us to expect that trust will only develop where there is sustained interaction on an equal basis. I present data from the 2002 Social Capital Benchmark Survey in the United States and the Equality, Security, Community surveys (2002, 2007) in Canada to show that having friends of different heritage by itself does not affect trust.

Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) argue that contact with people of different backgrounds *does lead to* less prejudice against minorities in a metaanlysis of 515 studies–yet they also report considerably a stronger correlation of contact with prejudice when the "optimal contact conditions" (as reflected in Allport's work) are met (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, 760-761). Ihlanfeldt and Scalfaldi (2002) show, consistent with Allport, that whites living in integrated neighborhoods exhibit more positively oriented toward African-Americans only when they have contact with blacks of equal or higher status. The crux of the problem is that few people who live in highly segregated areas–most notably African-Americans--do not have many (if any)

white friends or even acquaintances (Massey and Denton, 1993, 160).

Chapter 3: Diversity or Segregation?

The argument that diversity drives down trust has now become widely accepted. Why is it in need of revision? I suggest three reasons. The first is theoretical. If trust means faith in people who are unlike ourselves–and I have demonstrated that this is indeed how people interpret the question (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 3)–then it is discomfiting to find that a diverse environment leads to less trust. Diversity has been linked to many positive outcomes, from increased wages and higher prices for rental housing (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005), greater profits and market share for firms that have more diverse work forces (Herring, 2006), and greater problem-solving capacities (Gurin, Nagda, and Lopez, 2004). The   The link between segregation and low trust is more straightforward. If anything, we would expect diversity to *increase* the prospects for trust since faith in people who are different from yourself makes little sense if you never encounter them.   Segregation isolates people, especially the poor and minorities who do not have access to the same networks for finding jobs as the majority white population (Loury, 1977; Massey and Denton, 1993, 65, 167). The link between segregation and distrust seems much more straightforward.

Second, diversity and segregation are *not* the same thing. Figure1 presents alternative scenarios on residential segregation. They represent hypothetical neighborhoods of blue and red ethnicities. Each neighborhood has equal shares of blue and red residents. On the left the two ethnic groups live apart from each other, divided by a highway, so there is less of an opportunity to interact.   On the right, the neighborhood is mixed.   Each blue (red) resident has at least one red (blue) neighbor.   Yet the diversity (fractionalization) indices are identical.

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Figure 1 about here

Across 325 communities in the United States, the simple correlation between Iceland's

(2004) diversity and segregation measures in 2000 is just .297 (and .231 for 1990 and .270 for

1980).   Third, the diversity measure is actually a surrogate for the percent nonwhite in a

community (r = -.793) while the segregation measure is only modestly correlated with the non-

white share (r =   -.279) for the 2000 data. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999, 1271) admit that

their measure of ethnic diversity is strongly correlated with the percent African-American in a

community (r = .80) and worry that their diversity measure "...could just be proxying for black

majorities versus white majorities." They show that ethnic diversity matters even in majority

white communities, but this does not resolve the issue of whether diversity is another name for

the share of the minority population.

Segregation is _not_ as strongly correlated with the share of African-Americans in a

community (r = .542) or the share of minorities–African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians–

more generally (r = .150, both N = 237). Similarly, in the SCBS, the aggregate data show a

strong negative correlation between trust and diversity (r = -.662, N = 41). When I add the

shares of population in a community who are African American and Hispanic to a regression,

diversity is no longer significant (t = -.032), while the African-American and Hispanic population

shares are significant at p < .001 and p < .10, respectively (t = -3.41 and -1.62, one-tailed tests). .

We know that minorities have less generalized trust–and more particularized trust--than whites

(Uslaner, 2002, 35-36, 98-107).

Putnam's worry about the negative effect of diversity on trust and other forms of civic

engagement and altruism may be misplaced. He argues (2007, 148): "[e]thnocentric trust [ingroup trust - outgroup trust] is completely uncorrelated with ethnic diversity." Yet, he also finds (Putnam, 2007, 147) that "inter-racial trust" is higher when there are few minorities around (less diversity). Out-group trust seems more important than "ethnocentric trust" and it is *negatively* correlated to both diversity and segregation. However, there is a much stronger positive relationship between outgroup trust and the interaction of diverse friendship networks and integrated neighborhoods.

There is also a quizzical pattern among the aggregate patterns of racial trust for the 41 communities in the SCBS. There are moderate to low negative correlations between racial trust and the shares of minorities in these communities, ranging from -.468 for the correlation for trust in blacks and the share of African-Americans in a jurisdiction to -.395 for Hispanic trust/ population share, and -.280 for Asians. The greater the minority population in a community, the lower the trust level for the minority group in question. Yet, the opposite dynamic holds for whites: The larger the share of whites in a community's population, the greater the trust the community has in whites (r = .849).

So it seems as if diversity may lead to a polarization of racial trust–except for the enigmatic findings that the more whites there are in a community, the more people trust African-Americans (r = .849), Hispanics (r = .686), and Asians (r = .817). The key to these seemingly confusing results is that four of the top six–and six of the top 11– communities are in the high-trusting states of the Dakotas, Minneapolis, Oregon, and Washington–and these communities are largely white. All measures of racial trust are strongly correlated with generalized trust (ranging from r = .943 for trusting Hispanics to r = .820 for African-Americans). Putnam's seemingly

puzzling results stem from the fact that most minorities are less trusting: 28 percent of African-Americans, 31 percent of Hispanics, and 54 percent of Asians, compared to 60 percent of whites believe that most people can be trusted.   It is hardly surprising that most minorities are less trusting than whites–so diversity *per se* does not seem to be the root of the problem of low trust.

First, I present aggregate cross-national analyses of trust showing that residential segregation is an important determinant of faith in others, while a range of diversity measures are not significantly linked to trust. Segregation matters because it is linked to inequality: Inequality matters more in highly segregated countries than in nations with lower levels of group separation. Segregation, but not diversity, also predicts trust in a cross-national model of trust using World Values Survey data.

I next establish the segregation-inequality nexus in the United States. I compare four sets of measures of residential segregation in American communities –those developed by Iceland (2004), the Lewis Mumford Center (n.d.), Echenique and Fryer (2006), and Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (2006). These measures lead to very similar conclusions–but the Mumford Center measures are particularly useful since they measure the likelihood of interaction between different ethnic groups in a community. I show that the measures of residential segregation are strongly related to indicators of economic inequality in American communities–as Bowles, Loury, and Sethi (2009) posited and supportive of my argument that inequality leads to lower trust. The connection between diversity and inequality is much weaker. Diversity is more strongly related to the non-white share of the population in a community, the percentage of the population who are citizens, and the adjusted gross income of the population. Diversity thus reflects poverty, segregation inequality.

These results clarify the differences among Putnam, Arneil, Hero, and myself. Arneil and

Hero both stress the inequality of both influence and outcomes for minorities–and this inequality

stems from low trust rather than "too much" social capital. High levels of trust are associated

with better, not worse, outcomes for minorities (Uslaner, 2004). Segregation is far more strongly

associated with inequality than is diversity, as measured either by the minority share of the

population, on one measure or fractionalization. Segregation not only leads to lower levels of

trust, but also to a wide array of negative results for minorities (Massey and Denton, 1993, 18,

138).

Chapter 4: Contact and Context: The United States

Contact matters in integrated neighborhoods. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey

(2002) and the Knight Community Indicators Survey (2002) are surveys of communities. I

integrate measures of diversity and segregation to these data sets. I estimate probit models for

trust for both surveys. Consistent with Putnam (2007) and others, there is a strong negative

relationship between diversity at the community level and trust. However, in both surveys,

interaction terms between residential integration and diverse social ties are strongly associated

with *increased trust*. Both the diversity of group membership and friendship networks lead to

greater trust *when they occur in integrated neighborhoods* (Social Capital Benchmark Survey).

The Knight survey has no good measure of the diversity of social ties but the interaction between

integrated neighborhoods and the evaluation of neighborhood safety is strongly related to trust.

The interaction terms of social ties and diversity are generally *not* significant. A

composite multiplicative measure of residential segregation (segregation * diversity) leads to

similar results as I find for segregation alone–so the results for segregation are robust.   To ensure

that my results for segregation are not artifacts of the "whiteness" of the least segregated cities, I interact segregation and diversity–and find almost identical results for the interaction of social ties and the combined segregation/diversity index as I do for the interaction of social ties and segregation. Thus, it is segregation and not diversity that appears to depress levels of trust.

I also examine the 1989-90 Latino National Political Survey, where respondents were asked to describe the ethnic composition of their neighborhoods and four different questions about interaction with people of different ethnic backgrounds. In every case, there is a strong positive relationship between trust and living in an integrated neighborhood *and* having frequent social contacts with people of different backgrounds. Group context clearly matters. However, the Latino case may be atypical. In the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, the effects of the interaction between diverse ties and integrated neighborhoods on trust is lower for African-Americans compared to whites (see also Chapter 5 on the United Kingdom).

I also examine a survey of ethnic Chinese in Southern California conducted by the Los Angeles *Times* in 1997 (Uslaner and Conley, 2003). The survey did not have a measure of trust nor did it have any measures of residential segregation. However, it did ask whether people had only Chinese friends and their levels of attachment to ethnic Chinese neighborhoods. Attachment to Chinese neighborhoods had no effect on friendship patterns, nor was being born in China. Younger, more educated people were less likely to have only Chinese friends, as were Christians. For a community that is relatively well integrated, context seems to matter less for social ties. The survey evidence on Hispanics and ethnic Chinese is consistent with the analysis in Chapter 2: Ethnic Chinese are well integrated into majority white neighborhoods–so attitudes toward Chinese neighborhoods have little impact on their friendship patterns. Hispanics are

more likely to live in segregated neighborhoods, but when they do live in integrated

neighborhoods and have a diverse set of social ties, their generalized trust levels increase.

I find additional, if modest, support for my argument by examining aggregate measures of

trust for the 20 metropolitan areas in the SCBS that can be matched with the Ireland data on

segregation and diversity. Communities that have seen an increase in both integration and

diversity from 1980 to 2000 show somewhat greater levels of trust (r = .455). There is a much

stronger relationship (r = -.731, in the predicted direction) between the level of trust and having

diverse networks of friends in communities that have become both more diverse and better

integrated.

Chapter 5: Contact and Context: The United Kingdom

Do the strong results for segregation hold outside the United States? Great Britain is an

excellent case to study because it has traditionally been a society with trust above the mean for

most nations. In recent years, Britain has become a magnet for immigrants, especially from

lower-trust countries in South Asia and Africa. While the British boast about their success in

integrating people of diverse backgrounds into their society, there is some doubt that the most

numerous immigrant group–Muslims from South Asia and Africa–have adapted well to a

dominant culture (Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, and Zenou, 2006). While Muslims do share many

of the values of procedural democracy and identify as British, especially among those who have

friends of different backgrounds, they are less likely "to think that that minorities should blend

into the larger society"(Georgiadis and Manning, 2008, 16, 20).   Cultural assimilation is central

to generalized trust (Uslaner, 2002, 197-198). Muslims throughout the world are less likely to

believe that "most people can be trusted" (Uslaner, 2002, 232-236). Most immigrants in Britain,

as racial minorities virtually everywhere, are less likely to trust others. Does interaction with the white majority lead to greater trust–for the minorities or the majority? Does the segregation of minorities from South Asia and Africa lead mitigate the impact of social interactions?

The 2007 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey provides an excellent venue to examine this question. Britain has become more diverse over time with a different mix of immigrants than in the United States. Most of Britain's immigrants come from South Asia and Africa–but the immigrants from Africa are not as well integrated into British society as are African-Americans. The Citizenship Survey includes a wide range of measures of contact and socializing with people of different ethnic groups as well as people's estimates of the diversity of ethnic groups in their neighborhoods. Again I interacted these contact measures with residential segregation/intergration perceptions. The interaction terms *consistently* lead to greater generalized trust. The effects are strongest for whites, who report the least frequent interactions with people of different backgrounds. The effects are powerful for South Asians but less strong for people from Africa (either immigrants or people who spoke a South Asian or African language as their main tongue). South Asians are considerably more likely than Africans to live in integrated neighborhoods, so they may be more likely to be in a position to become more trusting through greater interactions with others.

Chapter 6: Contact and Context: Sweden (and Canada?)

I am working with scholars led by Lars Svedberg of Ersta Skondal University College, Stockholm, and Thorlief Petterssen of Uppsala University on a large survey of social capital in Sweden. This survey, which will go into the field in the summer of 2009, will be conducted by Statistics Sweden, so that census data can be readily merged into the survey, which will cover

more than 30 municipalities. Sweden is an excellent case study to complement the United States and the United Kingdom–since Sweden is a society high in trust (usually ranking first in the world or second behind Norway in international surveys), volunteering, and charitable giving, mostly secular but with a long history of religious good works. There has also been a considerable influx of immigrants from Africa and the Middle East but there is less residential segregation than in other countries. In the 1940s, immigrants constituted less than one percent of Sweden's population, but by 2000, 20 percent of Swedes had immigrant parents or grandparents (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2008, 11).

While immigrants from Africa and the Middle East generally live apart from the majority white community, they do not live in their own ethnic enclaves. Instead, immigrants live in mixed minority communities, have more frequent interactions with people of different backgrounds than if they were more segregated, and become more trusting as they have more diverse networks, especially when they believe that they are treated equally in their interactions with others (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2008). Sweden has long prided itself on how well it has treated its immigrants. Do immigrants become more like the majority white Swedes? Do they become more trusting and participate more in charitable giving and volunteering for secular causes? Do whites who interact more with immigrants also become more trusting and more altruistic? This survey will contain a variety of questions on trust and contact with people of different backgrounds and Statistics Sweden will create measures of residential segregation. The survey data will be available in Fall, 2009, but my working arrangement with the Swedish team is that all work for at least one year with this data set will have to be joint projects.

I shall also include some joint work Dietlind Stolle of McGill University. We have

already produced one paper and are scheduled to write another showing that Quebecois are less trusting than Anglophone Canadians, even controlling for all of the usual predictors of trust (including trust in the federal government). We show that Francophones in Switzerland and Belgium are also lower-trusting than their German- and Flemish-speaking fellow citizens–and that the French themselves are low trusting (Uslaner and Stolle, 2007). We intend to examine whether we can trace this low trust to both friendship patterns and the level of segregation of neighborhoods. The neighborhood data can only be accessed through Statistics Canada at their offices by someone associated with a Canadian institution. So this work will be joint and the inclusion here will depend upon our results and Professor Stolle's willingness to include the material here.

Chapter 7: Diversity, Segregation, and Altruism

Americans are by international standards extremely generous. Giving to and volunteering for religious causes has declined somewhat over time, but the downward trend for secular giving and volunteering has been far stronger (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 7). I trace the decline in giving and volunteering for secular causes–which is largely giving to strangers who are likely to have far less than you do– to falling levels of generalized trust. When people have less faith in strangers, they are not as predisposed to give their time and money to people unlike themselves. Putnam (2007) has linked diversity to fewer acts of altruism (see above) as well as to lower trust. Since trust is a key determinant of charitable giving and volunteering, especially for secular causes, this linkage seems appropriate. But is it diversity that leads to lower levels of volunteering and charitable giving or is it residential segregation? I posit that residential segregation might lead either to lower levels of charitable giving and volunteering overall–or that it might lead to more

religious altruism (since faith-based altruism may depend more upon particularized trust) but less secular giving and volunteering (which help people unlike ourselves).

I test these arguments both at the aggregate and the individual levels. The aggregate measures come from city/SMSA measures provided to me for volunteering and charity–by Nathan Dietz of the Corporation for National and Community Service and Katie Uttke and Tom Pollak at the Urban Instiute, respectively as well as estimates for religious and secular charitable giving from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics estimated by the Boston Foundation (2007). The Boston Foundation data are limited, however, since they only cover 18 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).

The aggregate models show that both segregation leads to lower levels of volunteering in American communities, but diversity has no effect on volunteering levels. However, both diversity and segregation lead to *higher levels of charitable giving,* contrary to what I expected. Moreover this pattern persisted when I examined secular and religious volunteering (from the Boston Foundation data) separately. This might not be so surprising, since people who give to religious charity are also likely to give to secular charities. There are several possible explanations for this anomalous result. First, trust is related to whether one gives to charity, not how much one gives (the only data available). Second, the amount one gives depends most strongly upon one's income–but I controlled for both average household income and the relative equality of minority to white income in the model. Third, the religious composition of a community may shape the level of giving. I will test this using community-level data on religious membership from the Glenmary Research Institute. Fourth, the small number of cases may make these results atypical. But fifth, an alternative specification seems to have resolved at

least part of the difficulty: When I measure secular giving *relative to religious giving* in the Boston Foundation data, segregation indeed drives down contributions while diversity has no effect.

These results are hardly conclusive given the small number of cases. A stronger set of tests, yet to be conducted, is to examine survey data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey and the 2007 United Kingdom Citizenship provide the opportunity to determine whether the interaction of either diversity and segregation with fewer friends of different background leads to: (1) less charitable giving or volunteering in total; or (2) less charitable giving or volunteering for secular causes, while (3) segregation and less contact with diverse people might lead to *more* charitable giving and volunteering for religious causes.

I can also control for different types of trust (in-group only versus generalized trust) as predictors of different forms of volunteering and charitable giving and also seek to determine whether segregation and few friends of different backgrounds leads to more in-group trust than out-group trust. This could be the basis for a causal argument from segregation and isolation to high in-group trust and low out-group trust to generosity only among one's own kind. I plan to estimate a simultaneous equation model to test this for different groups in the United Kingdom in the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey in the United States does not ask respondents to estimate the share of people in their neighborhood of different backgrounds. I can use the interaction terms for the survey data merged with the segregation and diversity measures in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey to examine the causal links from residential segregation (and diversity) interacted with the structure of friendship networks to

predict both in-group and out-group trust and giving to and volunteering for secular and religious causes. The UK Citizenship survey has estimates by each respondent of the share of one's own group in the neighborhood and an extensive range of questions on multiple types of volunteering and giving to charities. The Swedish data will also have questions on volunteering and charitable giving, both religious and secular.

I have analyzed charitable giving and volunteering both in the aggregate and in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey–and the results are striking. The aggregate results indicate that as the share of evangelicals in a community increases, there is a modest decline in secular volunteering but a sharp rise in religious volunteering–and a moderate increase in religious charitable giving. As the share of mainline Protestants in a community increases, there is a moderate rise in religious donates and a very substantial increase in the frequency of donations to secular causes.

For the SCBS, I first analyze all respondents and then consider separately two Protestant groups with different orientations toward others and to volunteering and charitable giving: evangelicals/fundamentalists and mainline Protestants. Fundamentalists believe that the Bible is the literal word of God and hold that a key tenet of the Scriptures is that humans are born with original sin. This view of human nature stands at odds with the optimism that underlies trust in others (Schoenfeld, 1978, 61).

Throughout American history, they have been active in "nativist" organizations that sought to restrict immigration and immigrants' rights. More recently, they have led the fight to bring religious practices and instruction back to public schools and to fight the teaching of evolution in the science curriculum. They fear that people who don't believe as they do are trying to deny them their fundamental rights. When they participate in civic life, they restrict

their activities to their own faith's organizations (Uslaner, 2001; Wuthnow, 1999). White fundamentalist churches "do not embrace social service provision as an essential part of their mission [and] concentrate their energy on evangelism on meeting the immediate needs of congregational members" (Greenberg, 1999, 19-20).

Mainline Protestant congregations have been very active in civil rights and peace movements that connect their members to people unlike themselves.   So heterogeneous social networks and diverse social networks should matter more for people who seek out such contacts. Evangelicals are more likely to have strong in-group trust and lower levels of generalized trust (45 percent in the SCBS compared to 53 percent in the full sample, 30 percent in the 1972-2006 GSS compared to 40 percent for all respondents; cf. Uslaner, 2002, 87-88).   Mainline Protestants are significantly more likely than others to have diverse friendship networks in integrated and diverse communities (by about 15 percent, $p < .0001$) while evangelicals are slightly less likely to have such networks (by about five percent, $p < .001$).   Mainline Protestants are far more trusting (66 percent in the SCBS, 47 percent in the cumulative GSS). Mainline Protestants are far more likely to volunteer for secular causes (by almost 10 percent) and to donate to secular causes (by 13 percent) compared to evangelicals.

There is modest evidence that a community's religious context reinforces the level of altruistic acts by adherents of different religious orientations. Mainline Protestants are more likely to volunteer for secular causes–and the likelihood that they will do so increases modestly if they live in communities with large numbers of mainline Protestants. When they live among many evangelicals, however, they are *less* likely to volunteer for secular causes. Context doesn't matter much for religious volunteering or any form of charitable giving–which makes sense since

you can make donations from the privacy of your home without directly interacting with people of different backgrounds. Altruism among evangelicals–either secular or religious–does not depend upon how many other evangelicals live in the community–but rather on how often people attend religious services. So there is little support that living among many co-believers leads evangelicals to withdraw either further from secular good deeds–or even promotes religious altruism.

Another measure of diversity–or the lack of it–is the share of co-believers living in one's community. If people are more likely to give either money or time to religious causes when surrounded by fellow believers–and less likely to give time or money to secular causes–then a more homogenous environment may lead people to withdraw into their own faith communities. However, not all faith communities are the same. Evangelicals have a stronger in-group identity and are more likely to focus their attention on religious altruism if surrounded by their own. Mainline Protestants have a long history of altruistic activities beyond their own kind, including working for civil rights and social justice, and the dynamic may be very different for them.

I find that as the share of mainline Protestants increases, there is a modest increase in secular volunteering by mainline Protestants, but more liberal Protestants volunteer less frequently for secular causes when they live in communities with large numbers of evangelicals. Evangelicals are very active in giving to and volunteering for religious causes (89 percent and 84 percent, respectively). They are less involved in secular altruistic activities (70 percent and 58 percent). Living among many evangelicals leads these believers to be more likely to donate to religious causes, but not to give to religious charities. The size of the evangelical population leads co-believers to be less likely to volunteer for secular causes, but has no effect on secular

charitable giving.

I have been using the categories of evangelicals and fundamentalists interchangeably, largely because some surveys ask about evangelicals and others about fundamentalists. Not all evangelicals are fundamentalists (Kellstedt and Smidt, 1996), though the differences between the two groups have been overemphasized (Smith, 2000). I expect that the dynamics of diverse social networks in heterogenous communities should apply equally to fundamentalists and evangelicals.

While diversity and segregation both lead to *more* secular volunteering, their effects are dwarfed by the effect for having diverse friendship networks in integrated and diverse communities (hereafter dfns). Living in an integrated and diverse community (the interaction of the two aggregate measures) and having friends of diverse backgrounds leads a person to be *73 percent more likely to volunteer for secular causes–but only 33 percent more likely to give time for religious causes.* Similarly, charitable contributions are greater if one has dfns for secular causes by 49 percent – but only by 16 percent for giving to religious causes. Having diverse group memberships in integrated and diverse communities leads to a 15 percent increase in religious giving, while it has no effect elsewhere. *Overall, diverse social contexts matter more for secular altruistic deeds than for religious giving and volunteering.*

These findings hold for evangelicals as well as for mainline Protestants. The effect of dfns for evangelicals is twice as large for secular volunteering (.73) as for giving time to religious causes (.37). Having diverse social networks in an integrated and diverse community leads evangelicals to be 38 percent more likely to make secular charitable contributions, compared to a 21 percent boost in religious giving. For mainline Protestants, dfns are not as influential for

religious giving (16 percent) as for secular contributions (45 percent).

The heterogeneity of social ties matters for all sorts of altruistic deeds, but more for secular giving and volunteering–the types of activities that are likely to benefit people who are different from yourself–rather than for religious good deeds, which benefit people who share your core values and may be very much like yourself in other ways. The social context seems to be more critical for mainline Protestants than for evangelicals–except for secular volunteering where there are similar–and extremely powerful--effects for such networks for evangelicals and mainline Protestants.

In each case, the sample sizes are large enough to consider minorities and the majority white population. Do minorities, who have lower levels of outgroup trust, reserve their altruistic deeds for their own community? Do minorities especially reserve their more limited financial resources for members of their own communities? Everyone has the same number of hours in a day, so the poor (including minorities) volunteer as much as the well-off (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, 192). Do they volunteer only in their own (religious) communities or for more general causes? If they volunteer for more general causes, can we trace such actions to higher levels of generalized trust?

My analysis indicates that African-Americans volunteer and donate less frequently to secular causes than do whites, but are more likely to give more money and time to religious causes. African-Americans who live in diverse and integrated neighborhoods and who have friends of different races *are* more likely to donate and volunteer for secular causes–and the effects are similar to those for the full sample: 60 percent for secular volunteering (somewhat lower) and 64 percent for secular charitable contributions (somewhat higher). The likelihood of

religious contributions and volunteering goes *down* when African-Americans live in diverse and

integrated neighborhoods and have friends of different races (by 26 percent and 15 percent,

respectively). Living in diverse and integrated neighborhoods and being in groups with people of

different races leads to an additional 26 percent decline in the likelihood of giving to religious

charities. The reason for more limited contributions of time and money to religious causes may

be that African-Americans who live in such environments are less likely to attend church

frequently.

Chapter 8: Does Segregation Drive Down Trust or Does Low Trust Lead to Segregation?

The presumed negative relationship between diversity and trust calls into question the

idea of trust as faith in people who are different from yourself. Most critically, there does not

seem to be a connection between diversity and the greatest barrier to trust, inequality. Putnam

(2007, 157) argues that "economic inequality does not appear to be a significant confounding

variable in our analyses of ethnic diversity" and "we have been able to discover no significant

interactive effects between economic inequality and ethnic diversity." Residential segregation, on

the other hand, is moderately related (r = .268) to a Gini index for communities estimated by

Eliana LaFerrara and Angelo Mele (2005). It is much more strongly correlated (r = -.577) with a

measure of the ratio of minority income to white income from Timberlake and Iceland (2007). In

each case the correlation with the measure of diversity is about half that for residential

segregation.

The stronger negative relationships between racially homogenous social networks in

segregated communities and generalized trust (as well as measures of altruistic behavior)

suggests that the problem is not simply one of better acculturation for immigrants, as Putnam

(2007, 159-166) suggests. Instead, the key issues are residential segregation and economic inequality – which are linked to each other in a vicious circle.

It may be too simplistic to argue that moving people into more integrated neighborhoods is the key to generating more trust. First, integration by itself does not lead to more trust–it must be linked to having more diverse social networks. Second, both friendship networks and where people choose to live are not random. Trusting or tolerant people are more likely to choose friends of a different group and mistrusters will shy away from such contact (Forbes, 1997, 111-112; Pettigrew, 1998, 77).

Many people, most notably the majority (white) population, choose to live with people of their own kind--to a considerable extent because they don't want to associate with people who may be different from themselves. Such aversion to integrated neighborhoods often rests upon negative stereotypes of minorities. Minorities shy away from integrated neighborhoods because they fear harassment, not simply because they prefer to live with their own kind–or do not like whites (Emerson, Chai, and Yancey, 2001; Farley et al., 1994; Krysan, 2001; Krysan and Farley, 2002; Massey and Denton, 1993, 89-94; Zubrinsky and Bobo, 1996).

My own analyses of data from the United States and the United Kingdom strongly supports the argument that segregation among whites reflects negative stereotypes, while preferred housing patterns among blacks are not based on views on race. For the United States, I examine the 2000 GSS which has a battery of questions on respondents' preferred racial composition of neighborhoods (see Farley et al, 1994). I created a summary measure of whether people preferred to live in neighborhoods dominated by their own kind (whites, African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians).

I then estimated a two-stage least squares model of trust and the racial composition of a hypothetical preferred neighborhood. For whites, the choice of neighborhoods depended strongly upon negative racial stereotypes (lazy vs. hardworking, how intelligent, how wealthy, and how devoted to one's family) for African-Americans–but not for Hispanics or Asians–and mistrust. Preferred neighborhood integration had a modest ($p < .10$) impact on trust. For African-Americans trust had no significant relationship to preferred neighborhood composition– and neighborhood composition played no role in shaping trust. For African-Americans, stereotypes don't matter either; the only significant predictor of preferences for living in an integrated neighborhood was income (cf. Massey and Denton, 1993, 89-94; Farley et al, 1994, 774; and Bobo and Zubrinsky, 1996, 899 for similar findings). The sample sizes for Hispanics and Asians were too small to estimate similar models.

The 2007 Citizenship Survey in the United Kingdom did not have a comparable measure of preferred neighborhood composition. The only measure of neighborhood satisfaction is whether someone enjoys his/her neighborhood. For whites and for East Asians, enjoyment depends strongly upon worries about crime and concerns about problems caused by neighbors (teens hanging out, litter, vandalism, drug use, drunk people, and abandoned cars). People who saw their neighbors as causing problems were substantially less likely to trust others and more likely to worry about being attacked because of their ace and especially to be harassed because of their race.

East Asians also linked neighborhood problems to the share of minorities in their neighborhoods. For whites, East Asians, and people of African backgrounds, there was no direct impact of trust on enjoyment of neighborhoods. For whites and East Asians, there was an

indirect link from mistrust to perception of neighborhood problems and then to enjoyment. For

blacks, low trust and fear of harassment lead people to see more neighborhood problems–but

they do not link these problems to the enjoyment of their neighborhoods (similar to the U.S.

findings). The importance of ethnic identity to a sense of who you are mattered only for whites.

High levels of (perceived) minorities in your neighborhood made each group less likely to enjoy

the community, but the effects are much more powerful for whites and East Asians than for

blacks. For blacks, the safety of neighborhoods, being treated with respect, and satisfaction with

local authorities were the key to enjoying their communities. Mixing with people of different

ethnic and racial backgrounds had no significant effect on enjoyment of neighborhoods for any

ethnic/racial group.

These patterns are replicated in the United States. A more limited survey, the 1996 Pew

Survey of Metropolitan Philadelphia, asked respondents how much they like their

neighborhoods. Whites living in both the central city and in suburbs as well as blacks in central

cities all liked their neighborhoods less if they perceived many urban problems (rundown

buildings, unsafe to walk at night, gangs, violence, and robbery). Whites were less likely to like

their neighborhoods if they perceived tensions or arguments among different racial groups.

Neither African-Americans living in the central city nor the small number in the suburbs liked

their neighborhoods less if they perceived such tensions. Whites in the central city and to a

greater extent in the suburbs liked their neighborhoods less if they saw them as highly integrated.

African-Americans in the central city liked their neighborhoods *more* if they had a diverse mix of

groups.

The evidence indicates that whites opt out of integrated neighborhoods because they don't

want to live among blacks. Blacks in both the United States and the United Kingdom appear far

less likely to choose their neighborhoods based upon how they view whites (or other minorities)

but rather upon their fears of discrimination and harassment. Where one lives is thus not simply

a matter of choice for all groups. If whites choose not to live near minorities, blacks don't have

equal opportunities to live in integrated neighborhoods. Whites who choose to live among

minorities are already trusting. Living with minorities does seem to lead to slightly higher levels

of trust–but this may simply be making people who are already trusting even more so.

Chapter 9: Reprise

Inequality and discrimination thus lead to residential segregation, which in turn reinforces

the low levels of outgroup trust among minorities.   Residential segregation for linguistic

minorities leads people to maintain the language of their heritage (or a street dialect, cf. Massey

and Denton, 1993, 162-164)–and thus isolates them from interaction with diverse friendship

networks, which leads to more inequality. Segregated neighborhoods also receive lower funding

for public schools (LaFerrara and Mele, 2005). Education is a critical determinant of trust

(Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4) so both directly and indirectly–through lower support for

schools–segregation compounds the problem of low trust in minority neighborhoods. The initial

discrimination by whites also stems from low out-group trust as well, so we have low trust for

both the majority and minority both leading to segregation and stemming from it.

Even if the direction of the linkage between trust and integration is unclear, integrated

neighborhoods do seem to create a critical (if not necessary or certainly not sufficient) condition

for generalized trust to develop. Trusting people who are different from yourself makes little

sense if you have no contact with the "other." Segregation breeds in-group (particularized) trust

so having diverse friends in an integrated neighborhood should make a difference to one's level of trust, even if it is not the primary determinant of faith in others.

Since the data are not comparable across nations, it is difficult to make firm conclusions about the impact of residential segregation on trust in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. Nevertheless, some comparisons can be made: Of the four countries studied, the United States has the lowest level of trust (34 percent in the 2008 GSS) and Sweden the highest (60 percent or higher in a variety of surveys). British trust is moderate (43 percent in the core sample of the 2007 Citizenship Survey) while Canada is high in trust (62 percent in the 2002 Equality, Security, Community survey). Sweden is a relatively equal society (with a Gini index of 28.4 in 2000 from WIDER (http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/) while the UK and Canada are "moderately" equal at 33.4 and 33.0, respectively. The United States is the least equal of the four societies with a Gini of 41.9. Segregation is linked to inequality (Bowles, Loury, and Sethi, 2009; Massey and Fischer, 2003) and inequality is the principal determinant of low trust. The most segregated of the four nations has the lowest level of generalized trust and the most inequality. Residential segregation in Sweden, the most trusting country, is only modestly related to income differentials (Harsman, 2006, 1350).

The levels of segregation rest to a considerable extent on the housing policies of each nation. The United States became a segregated society in the 20th century as cities and real estate agents enforced discriminatory policies that prohibited African-Americans from moving into white neighborhoods. Even as these laws were declared unconstitutional and fair housing legislation was passed in 1968, the new law was too weak to protect minorities against discrimination–and federal authorities made little effort to enforce even the most basic

protections (Massey and Denton, 1993, 105, 193-210). Even seemingly innocuous land use policies, notably zoning laws designed to reduce overall density, has led to greater racial segregation by limiting the amount of affordable housing in white neighborhoods (Rothwell and Massey, in press). American housing policy has mostly focused on building apartments ("the projects") where minorities became highly segregated and later on vouchers that gave poor people rent subsidies, but were not specifically focused on integrating neighborhoods–with the result that African-American segregation increased (Feitosa and Wissman, 2006) .

There were sporadic experimental efforts to create more diverse environments for minorities–and they appeared to pay off. Deutsch and Collins (1951) report an experimental program in New York City following the enactment of the Housing Act of 1949. They contrasted two apartment buildings (in "the projects") in New York City with tenant assignments designed to foster a black-white mix with two segregated buildings in Newark (New Jersey). In the apartments integrated by the managers, white residents were far more likely to have favorable impressions of minorities, to make friends with them and to work with them on community projects, to reject stereotypes about African-Americans, to support interracial living, and to say that their opinions of blacks had become more favorable since moving into the mixed apartments. Another experimental program, Moving to Opportunity, awarded housing vouchers in 1994 both with and without geographical restrictions. Yet there was no evidence from studies in several cities that the program actually improved life quality more for people who were selected to live in more affluent areas (Feitosa and Wissman, 2006, 14).

Great Britain adopted a housing program after World War II (the New Towns policy) designed to bring people of different ethnic backgrounds (but similar classes) together.

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Evaluations of the program were mixed and segregation did rise under a policy in the 1980s to sell public housing units to tenants who could afford them (Feitosa and Wissmann, 2006, 15-19). Yet the United Kingdom did far more than the United States to promote integration. Even greater efforts were made by Sweden, where housing policy followed the more general social goal of granting immigrants equal rights and access to that of native Swedes (Andersson, n.d., 2-3). Sweden did not succeed in creating an integrated society, but it has not been marked by the hypersegregation with little to no mobility that marks many American large cities (Massey and Denton, 1993, 74).

Creating integrated neighborhoods is not simple. Integrated neighborhoods *can* promote diverse social networks: People who live in more integrated neighborhoods *are* more likely to have friends from diverse backgrounds, especially if they live in more affluent areas (van de Laan Bouma-Doff, 2007). Yet, even the best intentioned housing policy may founder if the majority population chooses to restrict, subtly or not so subtly, minorities from living in white neighborhoods. Stronger enforcement of fair housing laws–and stronger laws–are an important first step. But it will take us only part of the way–and all too often not far enough.

Since trust is a value learned early in life, it might be most productive to focus on young people. The contact hypothesis, Forbes (1997, 58-59) argues, is more likely to be applicable to children rather than to adults, since "[c]hildren have minds that are almost blank slates, lacking historical lore or knowledge. Their thinking, unlike that of adults, is not tangled up with complicated ethnic mythologies.... children do not meet as superiors or inferiors, in relations of authority and subordination...". My own results are consistent with Forbes's speculation: I found that having a friend of an opposite race was far more likely to shape the trust of young

people than adults (Uslaner, 2002, 171). Programs that bring children of different backgrounds together either in school or in after-school programs have the potential to instill greater trust among young people. This is hardly a quick fix for larger problems in society. But it is a first step.

Plan of Work

Research is ongoing. One paper is scheduled for publication and another has been submitted to <u>World Politics</u>. However, the final manuscript will be at least two years away because: (1) I will not be free to use the Swedish data on my own for at least another 18 months; and (2) the Science of Generosity Project at the University of Notre Dame has solicited a grant proposal from me and I have made a preproposal based upon this project. If I receive funding, I will have more time and resources to devote to the project, but the grant will extend one to two years from the present.

I plan a manuscript of about 250 pages and will strive to incorporate the results into as few tables as I can, presenting results simply and when possible graphically.

FIGURE 1

High Fractionalization, High Segregation

High Fractionalization, Low Segregation

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