Chapter 5

The UK: Sleepwalking or Wide Awake?

> From the day I was old enough to walk along the street by myself practically till now I have experienced [only] one month in my life that someone hasn't said something about my colour or my scarf or whatever, and I'm not feeling that I have to stay in the house because of it. But it's a natural part of life. It's just 'what are you doing here?', 'get back home'.
> Asian Britain woman, quoted in Commission for Racial Equality (1998, 18)

> The biggest problem is that the majority of white people have got preconceived ideas about black people. The attitudes of white people who live among blacks are completely different to those of people who have never lived among them. They know us better, they know we are human and not some alien from another planet.
> African Carribean male, quoted in Commission for Racial Equality (1998, 11)

It is the best of times, it is the worst of times (paraphrasing Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities).[1]

Britain is a prime exemplar of the success of multiculturalism as the share of foreign born has risen from 1 percent (the average over 1000 years until 1950) to 11 percent today (Burns, 2010). Prime Minister (at the time) Gordon Brown (2006) exulted that "we the British people should be able to gain great strength from celebrating a British identity which is bigger than the sum of its parts..." A. Sivanandan, director of the Institute of Race Relations, said in 2006: "No country in Europe could be more proud of its multicultural experiment than Britain" (quoted in Cowell, 2006).

Others are not so sanguine. John Burns, a senior correspondent for the New York Times and himself British,

> Tony Blair's early years as prime minister have led to a net inward migration of about two million people since 1997, with a peak of 330,000 in 2007...Britain, with 62 million people, is already one of the most heavily populated countries in the developed world; new settlers put pressure on schools, hospitals, public housing and a welfare system that are bending under the strain. Drawn by Europe's most generous welfare system, and by the status of English as the global lingua franca, illegal immigrants have shown inexhaustible resourcefulness in breaching the border controls of an island nation that Shakespeare vaunted as an oceanbound redoubt — "This sceptred isle ...This other Eden ...This fortress built by nature for herself ...This happy breed of men, this little world, This precious stone, set in the silver sea."

Trevor Phillips (2005, 3, 8), chair of the Commission for Racial Equality and a popular television broadcaster and writer, also drew a dire picture of race relations in Britain:

> ...America is not our dream, but our nightmare.....we are a society which, almost without noticing it, is becoming more divided by race and religion. We are becoming more unequal by ethnicity.....Residentially, some districts are on their way to becoming fully fledged ghettoes – black holes into which no-one goes without fear and trepidation, and from which no-one ever escapes undamaged.

And there is the old skinhead chant, now reintroduced as a warning sign of racial tensions by a black academic working in cultural studies (Gilroy, 1991): "There ain't no black in the Union Jack."[2]

Brown's successor, David Cameron, charged that the "hands-off tolerance" of multiculturalism led to immigrants–and Muslims in particular–"to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream....We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving

in ways that run counter to our values. So when a white person holds objectionable views - racism, for example - we rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or practices have come from someone who isn't white, we've been too cautious, frankly even fearful, to stand up to them" (Burns, 2011). Earlier, David Goodhart (2004), editor of Prospect, created a stir when he argued that "[a] generous welfare state is not compatible with open borders and possibly not even with...mass immigration."

Is the United Kingdom "united" in its commitment to a multiracial, multicultural society? Or is it splitting apart at the seams as whites feel threatened by increasing immigration and non-whites feel left out? This is not a simple academic debate. It is also a central question of public policy in Britain, with a large number of studies by government agencies (mostly the Home Office) as well as private think tanks about issues of "community cohesion" (Community Cohesion Panel [U.K.], 2004; Home Office of the United Kingdom, 2004a, 2004b; Home Office Research, 2004; Hudson, Phillips, Ray, and Barnes, 2007; Laurence and Heath, 2008) and whether there is a "decline of Britishness" (ETHNOS Research and Consultancy, 2006). The studies include focus groups from different ethnic and racial backgrounds as well as large-scale surveys, one of which (the 2007 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey) I shall use here.

Much of the difficulty in describing the state of racial and ethnic relations in the United Kingdom stems from the nature of the questions asked and the measures used. The key term in both government and think tank studies is "community cohesion," which is a catch-all term covering many distinct questions that I shall examine in this chapter:

- Are whites and minorities segregated from each other? More than any other question, the segregation issue is one of measurement. By the measures used in most cross-national studies (dissimilarity), Britain is *not* a segregated society. Another measurement technique paints a very different picture. Both tell part of the story.
- Do minorities see themselves as British? They do–more than whites do.
- Are whites proud of multicultural Britain? Most are, but they are critical of many (if not

most) consequences of the policy.

- Are whites resentful of the level of immigration?: Most are and a large share of the white population feels that minorities are straining the welfare system and do not adapt to British culture.
- Do minorities fare worse than whites economically? Emphatically yes.
- Do minorities perceive discrimination by white society? A large share do, even if they feel comfortable being British.
- Do positive feelings about belonging to Britain carry over to high levels of trust for minorities? No.
- Do minorities have friends of different ethnic and racial backgrounds? Yes.
- Do whites have friends of different ethnic and racial backgrounds? Generally not.
- Does living in an integrated neighborhood with friends of different backgrounds lead to greater trust? Yes, for both whites and minorities, but a bit less so for Muslims than for other minorities. "Optimal conditions" matter far less in the UK than for whites, blacks, or Latinos in the more segregated United States.

Living Apart or Together?

Britain is not a high trust country as the Nordic nations are. But it is a *relatively* high trusting society, tied for 10th (with Northern Ireland and Iceland) of 94 states/places in the 1995-96 World Values Survey, the most reliable cross-national measure.[3] In 1959, trust was much higher (56 percent). Hall (1999, 444-445) attributes the decline most likely to a worsening economic situation. Britain's level of trust was approximately the same as America's during the boom years of the 1960s, but it did not fall as precipitously: The U.S. share of trusting responses was 36 percent in 1995-96. The most likely explanation for the divergence of trust levels for the two nations is the level of inequality: The U.K. ranked 31st of 101 countries on inequality in the Deininger and Squire (1996) inequality database, while the U.S. ranked 54th. The Gini index of inequality increased strongly in both countries–as trust fell–but the overall level of inequality was

much higher in the United States than in the United Kingdom (Weeks, 2005, 5-6).

Britain's inequality is relatively high at least in part because many of its immigrants are poor and have few skills–much as in the United States and Sweden. It is not surprising that immigrants to Britain have much lower trust than native whites–and the British story is thus different from two of its former colonies, Canada (Chapter 4) and Australia (Chapter 6). Canada and Australia have limited immigration to people who score high on a "points test" for skills, literacy, education, and English proficiency. Most of the immigrants to the U.K. have come from former colonies, as was their right until a series of more restrictive bills were enacted in the 1960s and 1971, even as migration from Commonwealth nations continued at high rates throughout the 20th century.[4] Britain adopted a "tier" system based upon qualifications, similar to the "points" systems in Canada and Australia, in 1983.[5] However, the Labour government relaxed many of the restrictions in the early 21st century, leading to considerable conflict over who should be admitted to the United Kingdom (Whitehead, 2009). Britain has less control over its borders (even as an island) than do Canada or Australia–since as a member of the European Union, once an immigrant finds entrance into one EU country, (s)he can freely migrate elsewhere in the Union.

The problem of inequality, especially between the races, set the framework for the debates over community cohesion in Britain. Concern over cohesion stemmed from race riots in Brixton in 1981, followed by disturbances in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham in 2001 (Finney and Simpson, 2007, 119), and bombings of the underground (subway) in London in 2005. These incidents were intertwined with claims that immigrant anger was fueled by their isolation–segregation–from whites. Yet, there were also many, perhaps at least as many, people who claimed that racial and ethnic provocations were exceptions to the norm of a society that had largely accommodated differences in race, religion, and ethnicity. The government commissioned a wide range of studies, quantitative and qualitative, on community cohesion and required each locality to develop a cohesion plan (Simpson, 2004, 679).

The plethora of studies on cohesion reflects the widely held belief that Britain, far more than many other societies, was succeeding in becoming a welcoming home for people of different races and religions. A BBC poll in 2005 found that 62 percent agreed that multiculturalism "makes Britain a better place to live" and the British compared their success at assimilating minorities very favorably, especially compared to the problems of France (Cowell, 2005).

Three government-sponsored reports following the 2001 disorders attributed the conflicts to the isolation–the segregation–of minorities from the majority white population. The Cantle Report's authors (2001, 10, 28) were "particularly struck by the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities" and of "the acute problems of segregation of, and lack of contact between particular communities." They quoted two young people, one Pakistani and one white whom they interviewed (Cantle, 2001, 10):

> "When I leave this meeting with you I will go home and not see another white face until I come back here next week."
>
> "I never met anyone on this estate who wasn't like us from around here."

This report concluded (Cantle, 2001, 71): "The high levels of residential segregation found in many English towns would make it difficult to achieve community cohesion."

The Ouseley (2001, 3, 28) Report argued that the key lesson of the Bradford disturbances was that

> [t]he high levels of residential segregation found in many English towns would make it difficult to achieve community cohesion.... At the heart of the self-segregation tendencies are issues of ignorance, fear and unfounded beliefs that affect attitudes and behaviour. These are deeply held attitudes and perceptions. They also restrict social interaction between different cultural groups, with the main casualties being young people who are discouraged by their parents and peer groups from mixing, interacting and socialising."

The Denham (2001, 13) Report echoed these worries:

> Until this year, segregation was a term that was rarely used in discussion of community relations in Britain....a trend towards segregation may be a symptom of deeper concerns, fear of racist attacks, or of deep seated prejudices and racism."

The three reports all focused on social isolation as the underlying cause of the racial conflicts in British cities. Hudson et al. (2007) reported that black Carribean and Somali immigrants found their own communities more welcoming than the larger society. They argued that "residential segregation between different ethnic communities...is at the root of problems of social cohesion." The three government reports concluded that the failure to recognize segregation as a central problem was a major failure in social and political dialogue.

Or was it? Three years after the reports were issued, Ludi Simpson, a British academic who studies and measures segregation, challenged the claims that British communities were highly segregated and that different ethnic and racial groups were isolated from each other (Simpson, 2004, 668. 679): "Increasing residential segregation of South Asian communities [the largest minority in Bradford] is a myth...segregation is not the problem it is perceived to be."

Simpson (2004,. 664, 665) argues that increases in segregation are temporary. As new immigrants come to a community, they quite naturally flock to areas with people like themselves–who speak the same language, eat the same foods, worship together, and provide social and economic support, the familiar argument about immigrant segregation. Seeming increases in segregation levels reflect influxes of new immigrants into communities. As groups become settled, they move out of ethnic enclaves and into more diverse communities. Moreover, Britain does not have ghettos as the United States does. No group is isolated as are African-Americans. Trevor Phillips's claim that no one ever escapes from British ghettos, on Simpson's argument, is simply wrong: "The broad picture that can be painted from these data is one of dispersal of a growing South Asian population from the inner city. This does not result in lower segregation because the inner-city South Asian population is 'refilled' by natural growth (more births than deaths) and by immigration..." (Simpson, 2004, 674).

Trevor Phillips's "Sleepwalking to Segregation" speech to the Manchester Council for Community Relations on September 22, 2005 kindled a larger debate throughout the country. Phillips is a black man who had clearly "made it" in Britain. His address drew upon an alternative academic perspective that pointed to a trend toward increasing segregation of racial and ethnic groups in Britain. Phillips (2005, 10) argued: "Increasingly, we live with our own kind. The most concentrated areas, what the social scientists call "ghettoes", aren't all poverty stricken and drug ridden. But they are places where more than two-thirds of the residents belong to a single ethnic group...."

Phillips's claims stemmed from the work of Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest (2005, 2007), who took strong issue with Simpson on both the extent and consequences of segregation in the United Kingdom. It is rare that questions of measurement in academic research influence a public policy debate–much less get the attention (albeit indirectly) of the Prime Minister.

Simpson uses the familiar dissimilarity index. Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest claim that this aggregate measure hides concentration of minority groups. They construct six alternative measures based upon the dominance of a particular group in a neighborhood and the relative sizes of other ethnic or racial groups. The most extreme segregation occurs in areas where one group comprises 80 percent or more of the population. The most integrated neighorhood is where two groups contain between 50 and 70 percent of residents, with other ethnicities/races having substantial shares (Johnston, Poulsen, Forrest, 2007, 718-719). Their measure is sensitive to the relative sizes of group populations, while the dissimilarity index used by Simpson and most other researchers is not. While Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest (2005, 1223) argue that "[n]either index is right and neither is wrong," their measure "involves the degree to which it dominates the population of areas rather than shares those areas with members of other groups, and hence the degree to which it is encapsulated from the remainder of society."

I am not going to repeat the debates over measurement that I discussed in Chapter 2. What matters more here is how different measurement techniques: (1) tell different stories about

segregation in Britain; and (2) shaped a public policy debate. Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest (2005, 1226) argue that Simpson underestimates the negative consequences of segregation:

> If segregation has negative effects, on feelings of self esteem and identity among the minority population...on conflict between them and the 'others' who live elsewhere, and on educational and other opportunities...then the pattern now is possibly more important to policy-makers than the emergent process. Segregation, as defined here, not only exists now but is becoming more marked.

Simpson (2005, 1230) responded that a preoccupation with high levels of minority group concentration is "partly a xenophobic response (highly White areas are not seen as a problem), partly a response consistent with global power relations, partly a diversion from real social issues affecting all groups including millions of White families...".[6]

So who is right? There is no simple "right" or "wrong" answer to the question of British segregation. The hypersegregation of African-Americans means that blacks live apart from whites on multiple dimensions (see Chapter 2). The correlation of Iceland's multigroup entropy index and the P* measure of isolation of whites from African-Americans is strong (r = -..699; see Lieberson, 1981 and Racial Residential Segregation Measurement Project, n.d., 153 on p*). across 239 municipalities. But Britain (like most other countries) is largely free of ethnic ghettos (Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse, 2010, 29; Peach, 1996, 232; Poulsen, Johnston, and Forrest, 2007, 722). So measures of isolation are not as strongly related to dissimilarity indices.

The levels of segregation, as measured by dissimilarity indices, are much lower in the U.K. than in the U.S. Across 12 major urban areas, values of the index were .35 for Caribbeans, .40 for Indians, .54 for Pakistanis, and .61 for Bangladeshis (Waters, 2009, 23). Fifty-six percent of blacks would have to move from their neighborhoods to make them more representative of larger areas–compared to 80 percent or more for African-Americans (Daley, 1998, 1715). The major exception is South Asians–and especially Bangladeshis, who are the most segregated with dissimilarity indices approaching .75 (Peach, 1996, 224; Simpson, 2004. 669).[7] and are said to

live in ghettos (Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest, 2002, 609). Yet Pakistanis, and South Asians more generally, are considerably less segregated. Indians are even less isolated than Pakistanis (Peach, 1996, 225-226).

Peach (1996, 232) explains why Britain does not have ghettos:

> [minority] populations...rarely achieve a majority of the population of urban wards and relatively low proportions of the ethnic populations are found at such high concentrations. Thus, if one accepts the dual definition of the ghetto - that all the inhabitants of the area are of that group and that all members of that group are in such areas - the British ethnic-minority populations do not conform to such conditions.

While segregation is not as strong in Britain as in the United States, it is common to find clustering–multi-ethnic neighborhoods that set minorities apart from the majority white population (Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz, 2002, 10; Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest, 2005, 595). While most minorities live in majority-white areas, many live in mixed-minority enclaves (Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest, 2002, 591, 601)–where people of African and Asian descent live among the "host population," as well as "newer" white immigrants such as Poles, Greeks, Italians, Turks, among others (Phillips, 1998, 1698). But even these communities are not the norm (Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest, 2005; Peach, 1996).

The lower levels of segregation in Britain can be attributed to the smaller share of minorities in the British population, residential mobility among minorities, British housing policy, and a weaker tie between segregation and inequality compared to the United States.

A central factor in shaping lower levels of segregation is the smaller share of minorities in the United Kingdom (9 percent) compared to the United States (30 percent, see Goodhart, 2004). Two-thirds of all immigrants are white, mostly from Europe (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 57). Most minorities live: (1) in England rather than in Scotland or Wales; (2) in large cities; and (3) in a small number of wards. More than two-thirds of blacks and South Asians lived in fewer

than 10 percent of wards in the United Kingdom in the 1990s. While half of African-Americans live in majority black neighborhoods, only 16 percent of minorities live in majority non-white areas in Britain (Peach, 1996, 220; Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse, 2010, 29). Most whites in the United Kingdom don't live near minorities–and are thus more segregated than minorities.

After a generation in an enclave, minority group members tend to move out–and into areas dominated by majority whites (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 127; Simpson, 2004, 675). The level of segregation declines sharply over time for most minorities (Peach, 1996, 227; Simpson, 2004, 668).

Mobility itself is tied to British housing policy. Prior to 1970, minorities faced strong discrimination in obtaining housing, facing both racism and public policy. Many low-income people live in council housing (formerly all owned and operated by local governments). Government policy initially restricted access to council housing to people who resided in an area for five years (Peach, 1998, 1670), as did the unwillingness of banks to give mortgages to minorities and, as in the United States, white opposition to having minorities as neighbors. The Race Relations Acts of 1967 and 1976 were designed to improve access to public housing for minorities, but, as with changes in the law in the United States, its effects on residential discrimination were weak. Estate agents continued to discriminate against minorities.

The Greater London Council introduced an experimental program in the borough of Tower Hamlets in the mid-1980s to try to attract Bengali-speaking immigrants, but with limited success. Birmingham adopted a program in the 1970s to make public housing more diverse and Bradford bussed students to white neighborhoods to attend integrated schools. Yet, efforts to bring more minorities into council housing foundered upon the partial privatization of such residences in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the government stepped up enforcement of the Race Relations Act and made some notable progress on integration (Phillips, 1998, 1693-1696; Phillips and Karn, 1991, 67-69, 86).

The path to greater integration is eased by the weaker link between inequality and

segregation in the Britain compared to the United States (Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest, 2007, 733; Peach, 1998, 1674). When segregation and poverty go together, minorities become trapped in the ghetto. The greater mobility of minorities in the U.K. is a clear sign that segregation of new immigrants does not lead to permanent isolation.

Phillips and Karn (1991, 68, 74, 87) paint a picture of Britain that is more ominous:

> The prevailing trend for the South Asian and Afro-Carribean population has been one of continuing residential concentration, segregation, and deprivation, with a growing overrepresentation within the poorest areas....Black minority segregation and deprivation is produced and sustained through widespread institutional discrimination against the South Asian and Afro-Carribean population in Britain. The process is one of cumulative disadvantage which arises...from discrimination against black minority groups in the job market and the education system, by the police...and the judiciary, as well as in the housing market itself....South Asians and Afro-Caribbeans find themselves in a position of special disadvantage....The whole trend of the British housing system is to become more like the U.S. system, with greater dependence on market forces and greater segregation according to race and income....attempts to introduce racial harassment legislation in 1985 and again in 1988 were thwarted in Parliament.

The situation likely has improved substantially since Phillips and Karn wrote. More recently only 25 percent of British respondents to a European survey preferred to live in a neighborhood where "almost nobody is of a different race, color, or ethnic group" than the majority–lower than in most other countries on the continent (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 103).

Whose Cohesion?

Why, then, so much worry about segregation? The nuances of the academic literature were lost on the public. As always, bad news (Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest) travels faster and has a bigger impact than good news (Simpson, Peach). The stark language of Trevor Phillips's

speech, as well as his own status as a prominent black public figure, heralded a real crisis in British society.

There was a more than a bit of reality–and a dose of discomfort–in some findings that both sides accepted. The two sides to the segregation debate agreed that South Asians are highly segregated, far more than other minorities. Muslim South Asians are isolated from the majority white population. Most of the racial disturbances involved young Muslims. They are perceived to be the minority that has not well integrated into mainstream society–and to be least willing to fit in. For many British people, the riots were a clarion call to reassess what society was doing to help new immigrants. For others, it was an alarm that multiculturalism was not working, that British society was under threat, especially since most immigrants are now coming from Muslim countries.

Britain, like Canada, is committed to a policy of multiculturalism. Leaders (before Cameron) exulted in the island nation's diversity. This led to a "redefinition" of Britishness as a set of commonly shared values and institutions rather than a racial identity. Proponents such as Lord Biku Parekh (2002, 17, 38) wrote in a government-sponsored report:

> How is Britain's story imagined?...In the dominant version...there are several recurring themes....People believe that Britain has been unified since time immemorial–hence the respect for tradition, for established social conventions and ancient institutions with roots in an ancestral past...

Instead, he argued (Parekh, n.d.): "The sense of belonging cannot be ethnic and based on shared cultural, ethnic and other characteristics, for a multicultural society is too diverse for that, but must be political and based on a shared commitment to the political community. Its members do not directly belong to each other as in an ethnic group but through their mediating membership of a shared community, and they are committed to each other because they are all in their own different ways committed to a common historical community. They do and should matter to each other because they are bonded together by the ties of common interest and attachment."

> This, then, is the core of "community cohesion," according to Phillips (2005, 6):
>
> What makes us British: First and foremost, our shared values: for example an attachment to democracy, freedom of speech, and equality, values which anyone who expects to live in Britain must respect and abide by, both notionally and in practice. Second, we share common traditions which, whatever we do at home, we all agree to respect and observe in our everyday encounters. Central to these I would say are our common language, our good manners, our care for children. We also cherish a tradition of poking fun at politicians, priests and do-gooders.

These demands are not demanding. The reassuring news is that minorities, including Muslims, *feel British*. They "belong" to Britain. Belonging is as slippery a concept as community cohesion. There is more than a bit of irony that minorities feel *more* British than do the majority whites, by 51 percent to 29 percent. Whites are more likely to identify as English, Scottish, or Welsh–by 52 percent compared to 11 percent for blacks and Asians. "Belonging" to Britain may simply reflect an acceptance of one's new country as home, rather than identification with its culture. Even that veneer had become less shiny: In 1996 52 percent called themselves British, but only 44 percent did so in 2005 (Taher, 2007). Phillips's idea of a national identity is ambiguous: Democratic institutions and "good manners" are easy for people of different backgrounds to accept, but "shared values" and "common traditions" seem more connected to an integrationist model–and at odds with British multiculturalism.

Manning and Roy (2007, 4, 5, 9, 13) find that immigrants from Muslim countries (especially Pakistan and Bangladesh) are *more* likely than other migrants to see themselves as British and to adopt this identity faster. Second generation immigrants, wherever their background, are ready to say that they "belong" to Britain. Maxwell (2006, 748; 2009, 1461), using similar surveys, reports just the opposite: Muslims are *less* likely to see themselves as British, while Carribean immigrants, who grew up with British institutions and the English language, feel *more* British.

Mason (2010, 867-868) argues that the loose set of connections underlying "belonging" in a multicultural state may be too thin: A commitment to a set of core values and practices such as good manners, taking care of your children, and even speaking English won't bind people to any particular identity. One could be an American, a Canadian, an Australian, a citizen of Belize, or a Swede (where almost everyone speaks English). A more demanding "thick" sense of identity, even if adopted voluntarily, "would threaten to be assimilationist in an oppressive or unjust way."

Mason (2010, 871) makes a telling distinction between belonging and trust. Belonging is far less demanding. Britain is where immigrants live–and half of minorities were born there (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 57). They don't "belong" anywhere else. Belonging only demands a commitment to a country's customs and institutions (cf. Parkeh, 2002). Acceptance of customs and institutions is not difficult–and even minimal (or no) contact with people of different backgrounds should be sufficient to achieve a sense of belonging (Mason, 2010, 867).

People can "belong" to Britain even if they have underlying feelings of discrimination and pessimism, which are recipes for mistrust. To get to trust, you need more than contact, even more than the "meaningful contact" among members of different groups urged by the Cantle Report and other government studies. You need to develop equality among different groups (Mason, 2010, 863-864, 872; Uslaner, 2002, chs. 2, 6, 8). Trust among citizens will develop "if and only if they believe that there is some reason why they should be part of the same polity, other than that they happen to live within its borders." These two types of attachment are different–and confidence in institutions generally does *not* lead to increased faith in one's fellow citizens (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 5) even as Mason (2010) believes that a sense that we all share identification with national institutions can create bonds of trust among citizens.[8]

Yet minorities fare worse than majority whites–usually substantially so. Two-thirds of minorities, but only 37 percent of whites, live in the 88 most deprived districts in England (Home Office of the United Kingdom, 2004, 13). They "invoke a narrative of downward mobility..."

(Waters, 2009, 39-41). Caribbeans, who have achieved far greater financial and educational success than most minorities, nevertheless perceive persistent discrimination and feel that they may never be accepted as fully British (Maxwell, 2009, 1461). A third of black people and a fifth of Asians thought that the police would treat them worse than they would whites. And just a quarter of Asians and a fifth of blacks reported that people of different backgrounds "got on well together" in their neighborhoods (Home Office Research, 2004, 83, 109).

Muslims are the least likely of any ethnic/racial group to be in the labor force and to have professional positions, with 17% long-term unemployment compared to three percent for all Britons. Many Muslims perceive bias "...from mainstream society that does not fully accept them as British" (Change Institute, 2009, 25, 32). Tony Blair, when he was Prime Minister, called upon Muslim women not to wear the veil, which he called "a mark of separation" and which David Davis, the Conservative Party's Home Affairs shadow minister called a mechanism of "voluntary apartheid" (Cowell, 2006).

Economic discrimination and inequality lower trust. So does multiculturalism. The government has tried to integrate the Muslim community by funding community centers and programs as well as religious schools (Lyall, 2006). Yet, despite–or perhaps because of–these institutions, Muslims are more likely to have dual identities and to identify as Muslim first and British second (Change Institute, 2009, 34; Mogahed, 2007, 3).

Overall, 66 percent of whites, 83 percent of non-whites, and 88 percent of Muslims–argue that a dual identity as British and one's home country or religion is possible.[9] Modood (2008, 130, 127, 131), reporting on the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, argues that "[t]he majority of respondents had no difficulty with the idea of hyphenated or multiple identities," that religion is a common form of second identity–especially for Asian immigrants–and that "there was very little erosion of group identification down the generations....there seems to be less subjective incompatibility between being British and Pakistani than being British and Scottish." A strong sense of in-group identity should work to reduce generalized trust, especially if that dual

identification is overlaid with economic distress.

The debate over how well integrated minorities are is marked by lots of accusations from each side. Whites, including leaders such as Blair and Cameron, put much of the blame on minorities who segregate themselves and may adopt extremist political views. Minorities counter that they want to see themselves as British but aren't really accepted as British (Change Institute, 2009, 31; Condor, Gibson, and Abell, 2006, 150). The overall result is at least partially one of tension: In a seven-nation survey of attitudes toward immigration in the West in 2008,[10] the British were most likely to say that immigration is a problem (62 percent) and to agree strongly that immigration will raise taxes (43 percent), increase crime (34), to be involved in terrorist attacks (29 percent), to take jobs away from those born in the country (29 percent), and that unemployed immigrants should be forced to leave the country (51 percent). The British were also the most likely to say that it is very important to be born in the country. Yet, the picture is not all dire: More so than any people other than Americans, the British were the *most* likely to agree strongly that immigrants are hard workers (29 percent compared to 45 percent for Americans and about 10 percent of Italians, Dutch, and Poles) and that Muslims respect other cultures (21 percent compared to 25 percent of Americans and six percent of Italians and Poles, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2008).

Minorities want to integrate, but they can't accept the almost thousand year history of a white colonial power as their own narrative. Unlike settler societies such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, Britain is *not* a nation of immigrants. So there are not easily resolvable questions about what the common identity underlying trust should be. Lord Parekh (2002, 38) argued, "Britishness, as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations. Whiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness, is racially coded." Muslim scholars at the Policy Exchange think tank stressed the centrality of assimilation but blamed the government's policy of multiculturalism for creating barriers between peoples:

"Stressing difference has pushed some people apart to the degree that they feel no empathy for the suffering of others who are 'not their own'....promoting Britishness like this ends up treating an organic identity as if it were simply a public relations invention or a marketing ploy. You cannot re-name significant days in the calendar according to the whims of the latest focus group" (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, and Ja'far, 2007, 90-91).

Yet, given the task of integrating large numbers of people, Britain is hardly a bleak house. British minorities are neither as badly segregated nor as isolated as African-Americans.[11] While there is dispute over what integration or cohesion means to different groups (ETHNOS Research and Consultancy, 2006, 27), even most Muslims–widely believed to be the *least* integrated minority--say that they have as much in common with non-Muslims as with members of their own faith (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, and Ja'far, 2007, 39).

What, then, can we say about segregation, friendship networks, and trust in Britain?

Trust and Social Networks in the UK

I move now to an analysis of trust and the diversity of social ties in the UK. The data I employ are the 2007 U.K. Citizenship Survey, conducted by the Home Office. The survey has face-to-face interviews with 14,095 respondents from England and Wales, including a large ethnic boost allowing me to estimate models for different minorities.[12] I look at the full sample and then at whites and non-whites and minorities I label South Asians, Africans, and Muslims. The racial/ethnic classifications are straightforward. I focus on Muslims (who may come from more than one ethnic or racial group) because they are the minority group that has received the most attention in discussions of integration–and the more recent violence has involved Muslims. South Asians and Africans are two other major immigrant groups. I classify people of South Asian (African) heritage if either: (1) both parents came from South Asia (Africa) or (2) the respondent speaks an South Asian (African) language as their main tongue. The survey also had a modest number of immigrants from Carribean countries. Carribean respondents were virtually identical to Africans on most variables, so I included them in the African heritage category.

The data sets in use here, the Social Capital Benchmark Survey in the US and the 2007 U.K. Citizenship Survey show trust levels that are either too high (the former) or too low (the latter) compared to other surveys. Nevertheless, both surveys show that minorities are considerably less trusting than is the majority white population (see Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 for the United States and Figure 5-1 below for the UK). Minorities are less trusting than whites: 43 percent of whites believe that most people can be trusted, compared to 29 percent of nonwhites, 31 percent of South Asians, 26 percent of Africans, and 28 percent of Muslims. These figures are substantially higher than the 13 percent trusting among African-Americans but are comparable to the share of Hispanics who agree that "most people can be trusted."

Figure 5-1 about here

More notable is the pattern of diverse friendships among majority and minority respondents and especially compared to the US. While British whites are more trusting than minorities, they are substantially less likely than minorities to mix with friends of different ethnicities. Almost half of non-whites–especially East Indians–socialize with people of different backgrounds. Almost 40 percent of the supposedly isolated Muslims do. Yet barely more than 15 percent of whites do so. While the question in the SCBS is somewhat different, the share of whites with diverse friendship networks is about the same in the US as in the UK, but the far more segregated African-Americans have less heterogenous social ties. American Hispanics seem to have even more diverse networks (again, noting the very different questions).

Whites are the most likely to be isolated socially and residentially–to have no friends of different backgrounds and to live in the most segregated neighborhoods (by their own perception): 83 percent of whites are so insulated, followed by Muslims (61 percent), South Asians (57 percent), all non-whites (53 percent), and Africans (52 percent).

As elsewhere, minorities are less trusting but have more heterogenous social ties. The negative relationship between trust and diverse ties across the five groups is strong, even with the

tiny sample ($r^2 = .760$). This puzzling finding shows why Allport and Pettigrew are correct to stress that context matters. Diversity of friendships alone does not lead to trust (see Chapter 2): the connection with segregation is key.

The low level of segregation in the UK makes contact with people of other backgrounds more likely. The smaller size of the minority population in the UK, especially when compounded with the lower levels of segregation, helps to explain the high levels of diversity in social networks. If you live in a diverse neighborhood, you will have more chances to meet people who are different from yourself. But the composition of neighborhoods is not sufficient to explain why the levels of heterogenous networks are uniformly low for whites, be they Brits or Americans.

How segregated are British neighborhoods? Aggregate data on segregation in the UK are not publicly available, so I have to rely upon a measure in the Citizenship Survey similar to that in the Latino survey in the U.S.: an estimate of the share of people of the same group who live within walking distance. This measure of segregation is distinct from the dissimilarity indices I use elsewhere–and is closer to the measure of group concentration of Poulsen, Johnston, and Forrest (2002). Their approach focuses on the share of each group living in an area relative to the percentage of other groups. Despite the differences, the two measures are complementary–and there is no alternative measure closer to dissimilarity available. I present the estimates for each group in Figure 5-2.

Figure 5-2 about here

There is less segregation in Britain, but that does *not* mean that whites and non-whites live next to each other. Almost 80 percent of whites estimate that more than half (or even all) people within walking distance of them are from the same ethnic group as they are (see Figure 5-2). Most non-whites, including people of African and South Asia heritage–and most Muslims--say that less than half of the population within walking distance are from different groups. Yet,

this is not a simple picture of a fully integrated society. Almost 60 percent of whites believe that their environs are less than half minority. Almost 90 percent of South Asians, Africans, and Muslims say that their neighborhoods are 80 percent or more minority–and 70 percent of each say that 90 percent of their immediate neighbors are from minority groups.

The British pattern of integration is not a melting pot where people of all backgrounds live together (Johnston et al., 2002). The correlations between the walking distance measure (closest to an indicator of segregation) and the minority share (which is an indicator of diversity) is modest: For the full sample, the tau-c correlation is modest (.484). For whites, it is .363; for non-whites, the correlation is -.231 and for Muslims it is only -.159. For minorities, living in an integrated community largely means living near other people of color. Yet since minorities constitute a small share of the British population, the prospect for diverse friendship networks to lead to the belief that "***most people*** can be trusted" may be less than in the US.

The evidence on diversity and trust in the UK is mixed. Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse (2010, 82, 90) find weaker, but still significant negative effects of diversity on social capital (see also Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010, 300). Pennant (2005) reports that people living in more diverse areas of Britain are less likely to trust others in their communities. However, Letki (2008), as I note in Chapter 2, finds initial support for a negative relationship between community-level diversity and a composite indicator of social capital–but the result becomes insignificant when she controls for the economic status of the community. Laurence and Heath (2008, 41, emphasis in original) who argue that "far from eroding community cohesion, ethnic diversity is generally a strong positive driver of cohesion....*It is...deprivation that undermines cohesion, not diversity*." Bowyer (2009), analyzing multiple surveys, finds that more diversity leads to greater tolerance. Laurence (2009, 8, 14) finds that diversity builds *in-group* ties, but not social capital more generally.

Do diverse social networks in integrated settings lead to greater levels of trust? I estimate probit equations for trust in Figure 5-3 for all groups except Muslims. Because Muslims are the

focus of so much attention on integration, I present the results separately in Figure 5-4. The key variable, as in the model for the United States, is an interaction between whether one has close friends of different backgrounds and the share of people of different backgrounds within 15-20 minutes walking distance of your residence. I replace this measure with a series of other measures of social interaction in diverse communities, each interacted with the percent minority a respondent perceives rather than the share of people of the same background within walking distance. This is more of an indicator of diversity (heterogeneity) than of segregation, so it provides a rough test of the effects of segregation versus diversity. The social interactions I examine for the diversity measures are: (1) having diverse friends, close or not; (2) how often one mixes with diverse friends; and how often one mixes with diverse friends (3) in clubs; (4) in school (as parents); (5) in houses of worship; and (6) at home.

The balance of the model for trust is somewhat different from conventional models (esp. Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4), since the Citizenship survey did not have many of the questions I use for trust models elsewhere. The variables in the model, while less conventional, seem important for examining trust among minorities. The predictors include measures of local cohesion–do neighbors share your values and do they get on well with each other, as well as three questions about factors shaping one's identity: If you place a great deal of importance on your country of origin or your ethnicity,[13] you will be more likely to trust your in-group rather than out-groups. But if your identity is shaped by your interests, you may be more responsive to bridging ties. Uslaner (2002, 197) argues that trust presumes a common culture, so we might expect that support for the idea that everyone should speak English would lead to higher levels of trust. For minorities, demands that everyone speak English might be construed as an assault on their cultural heritage–so an argument from multiculturalism might lead to the opposite expectation for speaking English: Respect for one's heritage might build trust for minorities.

Worrying about a racial attack should reduce trust, while being respected at stores might increase faith in others. Brehm and Rahn (1997) argue that fear of crime should reduce trust (cf.

Uslaner, 2002, 128-129), so people who worry about crime or who don't feel safe at night should be less trusting. Rothstein (2000) has argued that the justice system is supposed to be a neutral, fair arbiter among citizens (and groups), so faith in the judicial system should lead to greater trust in other people. He finds that trust in the police is more strongly linked to generalized trust than is confidence in other political institutions. The standard demographics would lead us to expect that more educated and older people would be more trusting, but would be more agnostic about the positive effects of higher income (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4).

The estimations for trust point to four key findings. First, the interaction between the number of close friends and the level of integration in one's environment is *always* significant– for every group. The probit effects are similar for most groups–with the exception of South Asians, for whom a diverse set of friends in an integrated environment matters most. South Asians are less likely than other minorities (other than Muslims) to have such diverse environments and ties– though still 3.5 times as likely to do so as whites. While the probit effect for Muslims is about equal to that for most other groups, the significance of the coefficient is less than for other groups.

Second, the probit effects in Britain are much smaller than those for the American models . This suggests that white (majority) populations respond to diverse environments more powerfully where there are higher levels of segregation.

Third, the effects for the close friends*diversity (walking distance) measure are mostly, though not exclusively, stronger than are the measures interacted with percent minority (a better measure of diversity). The effects for whites are actually stronger for some measures of diversity–and they are all positive. For whites, then, *any interaction with minorities in a more diverse or integrated setting seems to boost trust*. The major exception for whites–and all groups–is mixing as parents at school. Interactions at school may not be as intense as mixing elsewhere–they may be fleeting meetings. Meetings at church seem to matter mightily for whites–and only for whites. Overall, then, interactions in an integrated setting seem to matter

somewhat more for all groups in Figure 5-3 except for whites, where all interactions matter. For the groups in this figure, the effects of having close friends of different backgrounds in an integrated neighborhood matter most for South Asians and least for Africans.

The story changes in Figure 5-4, showing the results for Muslims. The results for Muslims are distinctive: The only strongly positive effect is for having friends of different backgrounds in an integrated setting. All of the other measures, employing estimates of diversity, are either tiny or even negative (mixed clubs, simply having diverse friends). If Muslims are the least well integrated minority, then the path toward greater trust is through integrated neighborhoods–and friends of diverse backgrounds. This result supports the argument that Muslims *want* to put their faith in fellow Brits–indeed, perhaps even to assimilate while maintaining their religion as other groups have done. It is not quite time to exult in these findings: The effects for Muslims are still modest (about six percent).

On the other hand, the weakest effects for *any* of the measures are for Africans. Despite their longer ties to the British empire, their historical ties to British customs and the English language, the discrimination they report (34 percent say that they were denied a job because of their race, more than any other group) may make trusting others a more difficult task. Finally, the stronger effects for the close friends*diversity measure for South Asians and the weaker impact for Muslims suggest that the most powerful effect is for South Asians who are not Muslims–mostly Indian Hindus (and Jains and Singhs, among other minority religions). So the minority group that is already among the most integrated (if not *the* most integrated) becomes even more trusting as Allport's "optimal conditions" are approximated.

South Asians who have close friends from different races or religions and who live in diverse neighborhoods are 10 percent more likely to be trusting than those without such friends who live in more homogenous areas. The boost in trust is slightly larger for South Asians than for all respondents (five percent), Africans and Muslims (six percent), and both whites and nonwhites (seven percent). These effects are substantially lower than I reported for whites,

blacks, or Hispanics in the United States or for majority groups in Canada. The effects for other measures– diverse friendship networks, mixing with people of different backgrounds in clubs,worshipping in mixed congregations (interacted with the estimated share of your community who are minorities) much greater, ranging from 11 to 13 percent. For Africans, mixing with people of different backgrounds at home (again interacted with diversi ty) boosts trust by 12 percent.

These closer, perhaps more intimate, contacts seem to come closer to the notion of optimal contact, so the stronger impacts on trust are not surprising. However, they are far less common than friendships–and the "close friends" questions in the Citizenship survey do reflect the equality that is important in Allport's formulation. The other forms of contact in diverse settings seem to matter mostly for whites, not for minorities. Indeed, for Muslims, friendship and mixing either don't increase trust at all, or perhaps (curiously) even reduce faith in others (Figure 5-4).

The roots of trust differ for majority and minority groups in Britain. Ironically, many of the factors I expected to shape trust for minority groups are significant *only for, or primarily for, whites.* Country of origin matters only for whites and for Muslims. The importance of ethnicity to your sense of identification matters *only for whites*, while concern about crime and the belief that everyone should speak English are more consequential for whites. The more isolated white majority seems to respond more to the demands of multiculturalism than do minorities. For South Asians, Africans, and Muslims, the key factors underlying trust are educational and economic status and especially confidence in the police.

Among minority groups, only Muslims' trust is shaped by identification with their home country and how well they feel treated in stores. Muslims are the most segregated of the minorities and have the fewest friends of different backgrounds. Africans, who are the most likely to live in integrated areas (in contrast to black Americans) and to have close friends of different backgrounds, are *least* affected by perceptions of safety and multicultural values. They

are the only minority group where the importance of interests rather than ethnicity or country of origin shapes trust.

I also estimated an additional model for diverse friendship networks in integrated neighborhoods including the measure of whether we you live is the most important factor shaping your identity (see Chapter 2). For most samples, this variable was dropped because few people defined themselves by where they live. For the most segregated group– Muslims– residence as the source of identity *is the most important determinant of trust*. Muslims whose identity is shaped by where they live are 23 percent less likely to trust others. Only whether people share common values and have common values shape trust almost much as this sense of identification.

Finally, familiarity by itself does not breed trust. I include a dummy variable for immigrating to the UK within the past seven years for each minority group. It is never significant in any of the estimations: People do not become more trusting simply by living in a higher-trust country. This finding reinforces data from Canada as well as Britain (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, and Ja'far, 2007, 39) that younger people have a stronger sense of ethnic identity than their parents–and this constitutes a threat to building trust.

Reprise

Diverse social contact in integrated settings matter in the UK as well as elsewhere. They matter for whites and non-whites, though somewhat less for Muslims and people of African heritage.

And they matter less than they do in the United States, but about the same as they do for whites in Canada. But this is not all bad news. With its higher levels of segregation and the greater link between segregation and inequality in the United States, this is not surprising. The "optimal conditions" matter, but they have a lot of mistrust, especially among minority groups, to overcome. A boost in trust of six percent (Muslims) or even 10 percent (South Asians) is a modest increment in relatively low levels of trust among minorities. The biggest boost for

minorities who have close friends of different backgrounds and who live in the most integrated neighborhoods will still leave South Asians slightly less trusting than a white who might get no effect from their social ties in an integrated neighborhood. Fear for safety, distrust of the police, and low levels of education, and income limit the impact of "optimal conditions" for minorities, even as inequalities are much lower than in the United States. For the majority, diverse friendship networks in integrated neighborhoods might matter more–if there were more of them. And the more segregated a group is (as with Muslims), the more likely they are to maintain a sense of strong in-group identity–which, in turn, leads to lower levels of trust in people unlike themselves.

Brtish minorities seem to become more trusting under "optimal conditions" than do Asians in Canada. Most likely this reflects the initially higher levels of trust of Asian immigrants in Canada–and perhaps their greater segregation than in the U.K. The Canadian pattern is closer to that of Australia (see Chapter 6) because their immigration regimes are more similar. Britain does not impose as strict requirements for immigration as either Canada or Australia–in part because of the legacy of colonialism, which has led to large-scale immigration from countries formerly ruled by Britain. Canadian blacks, rather than Asians, seem more like British immigrants in terms of trust, economic distress, and perceptions of discrimination.

But social ties *do* seem to matter. How well the results hold up when I examine why people choose to live where they do I leave (as with the U.S.) to Chapter 8.

NOTES

1. Published in 1859, available online at http://www.online-literature.com/dickens/twocities/1/.
2. The Union Jack is the British flag.
3. Later World Values Surveys, especially for the UK, give estimates that seem too low.
4. See http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/immigration.htm#The%20Commonwealth%20Immigration%20Act%20of%201968 and http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/Briefingpaper/document/48.
5. See http://www.workpermit.com/uk/uk.htm and the links from that page.
6. He is careful to exonerate Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest from these sentiments.
7. Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest (2002, 609) maintain that South Asians live in a ghetto in Bradford.
8. I owe this interpretation to Andrew Mason (personal communication, March 11, 2011).
9. From the 2007 U.K. Citizenship Survey.
10. The countries are the UK, the US, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland.
11. Waters (2009, 23, 26) argues that the levels of segregation of Britain's minorities are close to those for Hispanics and Asians in the United States.
12. The data in the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey, conducted for the Home Office, are described in Tonkin and Rutherfoord (2008). The data are available at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/findingData/hocsTitles.asp (registration required). A description of the technical details of the survey can be found at http://www.esds.ac.uk/findingData/snDescription.asp?sn=5739. The survey is comprised of a core sample of 9,336 people and a minority ethnic boost of 4,759.
13. For most whites, the country of origin is either Britain or England, Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland.