Chapter 4

Canada: Trust, Integration, and the Search for Identity

...there cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for all others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly.

Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1971) in the Commons, October 8, 1971, announcing Canada's multiculturalism policy.

...Canadians are far from sanguine about the country's increasing diversity.... While visitors often marvel at the multicultural mix evident on our city streets, there is growing evidence that Canada's fabled mosaic is fracturing and that ethnic groups are self-segregating....Despite good efforts and well-intentioned policies, poverty and disenfranchisement in Canada are becoming increasingly race-based....Over the coming years, Canada's ability to accommodate diversity is sure to become a central issue. As is the case in England, France, and other advanced liberal democracies, national unity in Canada is threatened by the growing atomization of our society along ethnic lines.

Allan Gregg, "Identity Crisis" (2006)

...the hyphenation of Canadian identity prevents people from full citizenship in Canada, but at the same time allows them to retain their heritage. I, like many of my peers, have found it difficult to accept that we are not viewed to be "full Canadians." In many ways people of colour are contained within Canadian

society, but they're never quite a part of it, they are seen as the "other", as harsh as it may seem.

Auvniet K. Tehara (2010), an Indian-Canadian

[Renee] ...St. Germain [17 years old, of Ojibwa and British parents], who identifies herself as Canadian, says it is already impossible to define a single Canadian identity. "But I like that we're not all the same," she says. "I would hate to be somewhere where everyone is the same."

Quoted in Bhattacharya, Kassam, and Siad (2007)

"We feel cultural and ethnic art, music and traditions should be celebrated as in Winnipeg's Folklorama. However, we must remain Canadian first and reinforce that fact through education and cultural events. We must have a strong core to avoid being distracted from who we are."

Focus group report, Richmond, British Columbia, UNI (Uniting Canada), 1991

If trust rests upon a common culture among citizens and optimism for the future, Canadians should have little faith in each other. Canadians debate what, if anything, binds them together and fret that this search may not lead to a happy ending.

Canada is the "home" of multiculturalism, where it was first proclaimed (in 1971) as a "solution" to the perennial problem of national unity. Unlike the United States, Canada never had an independence movement, much less a revolution. The colonial power, Great Britain, walked away in 1856, leaving the new country without a shared vision of the country's foundation. Was this new country a federation of ten provinces or two founding peoples (the English and the French)? Where did the native inhabitants (now called the "First Nation") fit

in?[1] "There is no sense...of a differentiated national nationality," Resnick (2005, 25) argued. Nor is there a "Canadian culture."

While Americans brag about their commonality in the "melting pot" and the national motto, *E pluribus unum*, Canadians extol their country as a "mosaic" (Gibbons, 1938) or what former Prime Minister Joe Clark called "a community of communities," with each maintaining its own identity and customs. Yet, it is not always a happy family.

Quebecois (French residents of Quebec) have never reconciled themselves to being part of a country where "to be Canadian implied a sense of racial identification with the British Isles, with its people, its customs, and its traditions" (Resnick, 2005, 25). The two "founding peoples" live together in what novelist Hugh MacClennan (1945) called the "two solitudes." Southerners in the United States have reconciled themselves to a common identity with Northerners. They no longer hold dear their Civil War anthem "Dixie"–where "Old times there are not forgotten."[2] But residents of Quebec, the overwhelmingly French province, are reminded daily of the long-standing grievances against English Canada: Their car license plates have the message: "Je me souviens" ("I remember"), from a 1883 carving of architect Eugene-Etienne Tache, which the Quebec government says reflects "...a declaration of the French Canadian nation remembering its past: the glories, the misfortunes, and the lessons."[3] Another interpretation is recalling the grievances of the military victory by British forces over the French in the Plains of Abraham in Quebec City in 1759, a century before Canada became independent.[4] Even as independence referenda in Quebec went down to defeat in 1980 and 1995, Canadians are constantly bickering over who really is part of their "moral community."

If optimism is the foundation of trust, Canadians should not display much faith in their fellow citizens. Scholars of Canadian politics have pondered the nation's future in such volumes as Must Canada Fail? (Simeon, 1997), Canada in Question (Smiley, 1980), and Canada's Unity Crisis (Fry, 1992). Forbes (1993, 82) worries that Canadians are "searching for its universally valid truths where perhaps none are to be found...". The satirical troupe, the Royal Canadian Air

Farce,[5] opined in 1982 about their country: "Things are going to get a lot worse before they turn bad."

Canada's population is becoming more diverse, but its population is far less heterogenous than that of its southern neighbor, the United States. Canada was the 34th *most* diverse nation among 190 on Alesina's ethnic fractionalization index, with a score of .712. The United States, at .490, ranked 89th. Canada also ranks 61st of 201 countries on linguistic fractionalization, with a score of .577. The United States ranks 118th, with a score less than half of that of Canada (.251). Half of Canadians now have heritages that are neither British, French, nor First Nation (Kymlicka, 2010a, 303). Non-whites are called "visible minorities" in Canada and in 2000 they constituted 12 percent of the country's population, less than half that of the United States (Peach, 2005, 5-6).

Canada regularly ranks as one of the most trusting countries in the world–fifth out of 94 in Uslaner's (2002, ch. 8) data set, one of a handful of countries where more than half of the people believe that "most people can be trusted." The 53 percent of Canadians who trusted others in 1995 remained remarkably consistent across three different surveys in 2000. While trust seems to have fallen somewhat–to 48 percent in 2008–Canada still outranks all but a handful of countries in the faith its citizens have in others.[6]

Why are Canadians so trusting? First, Canada is relatively equal. Its Gini index for 2003 from the United Nations Human Development Index is .315, ranking 22nd of 122 countries. Four years later, the index rose slightly to .331.[7] Second, Canada has relatively low segregation. On the Alesina-Zhuravskaya index of ethnic segregation, it ranks 16th of 97 countries (with a score of .0056)–very close to Italy, which is far less diverse. Canada has low levels of segregation in part because minorities are concentrated in the three largest cities–Toronto and Vancouver, where visible minorities constitute more than a third of the population and Montreal, where minorities comprise 14 percent of residents (Hou, 2006, 1196). Winnepeg has a somewhat smaller share (Walks and Bourne, 2006) and other large cities such as Calgary and Edmonton have few

minorities. Third, not all Canadians are high trusters. English Canadians are far more trusting than French Canadians and visible minorities from Asia have substantially higher levels of faith in others than do black immigrants (see Stolle and Uslaner, 2003 and the data presented below).

Who Lives Where in Canada

Canada, the United States, and Australia (see Chapter 6) are the three "settler" societies in this study–lands where immigrants from Europe displaced the native populations. The United States is distinctive in two ways: Alone among these three nations, it brought large numbers of blacks from Africa to the New World to serve as slaves. And alone among these three nations, the United States shares a border with Mexico. The influx of immigrants, both legal and illegal from and through Mexico, has led to even greater diversity for the United States compared to Canada and Australia.

Canada and Australia have long had restrictive immigration policies. As with Australia, immigrants to Canada came almost exclusively from Europe. As recently as 1980 only five percent of Canadians had non-European (and non-indigenous) backgrounds (Trovato and Wu, 2005). Prior to 1967, Canadian immigration policy changed to a system Australia would adopt about 20 years later: Country (and effectively racial and ethnic) quotas were replaced by a "point system" based upon educational and occupational qualifications. Canada was on its way to becoming a far more diverse country. By the 1970s more than half of all immigrants were visible minorities, compared to just over 10 percent a decade earlier; by the 1990s visible minorities comprised three-quarters of all immigrants and 13 percent of the population, compared to less than one percent in 1971 (Reitz and Banerjee, 2007, 489). From the 1960s to the 1970s the share of immigrants from Europe dropped from two-thirds to one-third and by 1996 almost two-thirds of all migrants came from Asia (Peach, 2005, 6-7).

The 1967 law established three major categories of immigrants: economic migrants, family reunions, and refugees. By 2010 economic refugees constituted two-thirds of all immigrants, with family unifications constituting another fifth (Citizenship and Immigration

Canada., n.d. (b)). The "points" system is based upon language proficiency (in English and French), level of education, professional qualifications, previous work experience in one's profession, and a certified offer of work in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada., n.d. (a)).[8] By 2001 more than half of all immigrants were skilled workers and 45 percent had university degrees. Immigrants are better educated than the average Canadian, 23 percent of whom have college degrees (Adams with Langstaff, 2007, 61-62).

The new immigrants from Asia, especially China and India, were highly educated and came with strong professional credentials (as in Australia, see Chapter 6; Murdie and Ghosh, 2010, 302). Their levels of trust and segregation are comparable to Canadians of English background. However, black Canadians are far less educated, less trusting, and more segregated. Overall, Canada is substantially less segregated than is the United States–one estimate leads to segregation levels 1.5 times as great below the 40th parallel (border) as above it (Peach, 2005, 14). Johnston, Poulsen, and Forrest (2007) place Canada–with the UK–between Australia and the United States in levels of segregation, though Peach (2005, 22) sees Canada closer to the United States if one excludes the extreme case of African-Americans.

There is substantial segregation within some white communities–the English and French live apart from each other and Jews are the most highly segregated ethnic/racial group in the country (Fong and Wilkes, 2003, 590; Hou, 2004, 24; Peach, 2005, 15; 21). The overall segregation (and diversity) indices do not include measures of isolation for groups within the white population–which nevertheless are considerably lower than black-white segregation in the United States (Peach, 2005, 21).

Asian immigrants have very high levels of education and professional skills and, compared to blacks in the United States, they are not isolated from the majority community. Nevertheless, segregation levels are relatively high for Asians in Canadian communities, especially in Vancouver, where they are most numerous (Balakrishnan and Gyimah, 2003, 121). Even where most Asians live in mixed neighborhoods, such as in Toronto, the level of

segregation tripled from 1981 to 2001–and segregation has increased for all visible minorities (Hou, 2006, 1196-1202). The increase in segregation is largely traceable to the growth of the minority population in major cities–as new immigrants choose to live in neighborhoods with people from their own background (Hou and Picot, 2004, 12). Yet, succeeding generations of visible minorities are not less segregated (Balakrishnan and Gyimah, 2003, 123). As in the U.K. (see Chapter 5), while minorities are not "hyper-segregated," they tend to live in neighborhoods where most of their neighbors come from their own or other visible minority groups (Hou, 2006, 1207).

Racial segregation is greatest for blacks, who constitute one percent of Canada's population, and lower-income Asians, notably the Vietnamese and Bangladeshis (Peach, 2005, 14; Fong and Shibuya, 2000, 454; Fong and Wilkes, 2003, 591-592; Murdie and Ghosh, 2010, 306). While segregation is not as strongly linked to inequality as in the United States (Fong and Wilkes, 2003, 597), groups with fewer resources live in more segregated neighborhoods–and in communities with clusters of different visible minorities.

Diversity and Multiculturalism

Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau announced Canada's multiculturalism policy in a speech to Parliament on October 8, 1971. Multiculturalism was a response to the growing diversity of Canadian society–as in the U.K. (Chapter 5) and Sweden and Australia (Chapter 6), recognizing the heritage of different minority groups was an attempt to make new immigrants feel at home without forcing them to adapt to a majority culture that was not their own (Kymlicka, 2010a, 303). Under the "older" assimilationist policy, "[i]mmigrants were encouraged to assimilate to the preexisting British mainstream culture, with the hope that over time they would become indistinguishable from native-born British Canadians in their speech, dress, recreation, and way of life in general" (Kymlicka, 2010a, 303). Multiculturalist policies, Kymlicka (2007a, 158) argues, "...can positively assist in reducing the cultural, political, and economic inequalities facing immigrant ethnic groups."

Multiculturalism fit more naturally into the Canadian mosaic than it would do in the U.K., Sweden, or Australia. Canadian identity has always been contested. British heritage was only part of Canadian history–and a legacy resented by a considerable share of the country's population. Moreover, Canada has not simply been divided between Anglophones and Francophones. A third group, Allophones (speakers of languages other than English or French), is a significant force in Canadian society. There are portions of Montreal where people speak neither English nor French, but Italian. In the Prairie provinces, immigrants long held to the languages of their homelands.[9] Retaining your home country's language in a community that is linguistically (or ethnically) segregated has long been acceptable in Canada's "community of communities." Multiculturalism came naturally to Canada. To some extent, it has always been in place.

Kymlicka (2007a, 72) argued that assimilationist policies elsewhere in the West "were intended to ensure that all citizens, wherever they live, would have certain identical experiences and expectations of national citizenship, and that these would be the source of solidarity, trust, democratic responsibility and community of fate. This strategy was never possible in Canada, given our bilingual and federal structure. We cannot have a single monolingual public sphere... and we cannot have a unitary national education system....even pan-Canadian institutions like the CBC and the army are divided along linguistic lines." Soroka, Johnston, and Banting (2007, 585) argue in a similar vein: "...seeking to build a single, overarching sense of identity may well be counterproductive; in the case of the relationship between Canada and Francophones Quebec, the most feasible strategy is probably to try to strengthen the sense of attachment to a Canada that incorporates distinctive identities....this thinner sense of a Canadian culture among the historic communities may actually have benefits in a multicultural era, making it easier for new immigrants to feel comfortable here."

Trudeau's announcement in 1971 was not simply a response to growing immigration. As the quote at the beginning of the chapter indicates, it was part of his larger agenda to "patriate"

the Constitution (make it independent of the Crown in London), to enact a Charter of Rights for all Canadians (patterned after the American Bill of Rights), and to "create" a sense of national identity. Multiculturalism was at the heart of this new Canadian identity and especially to blunt the demands of Quebecois for equality with English (and Allophone) Canada. Canada would no longer be a country of two founding peoples. It would be a land where *all* cultures would be equal–and treated as such. Canada had no single overarching culture but Trudeau was trying to create a "coat of many colors" (as in the Biblical story of Joseph) from the red and white maple leaf flag (adopted as a neutral symbol in 1964) and the blue and white fleur de lis flag of Quebec.

Multiculturalism was not popular among Quebecois, who quickly realized Trudeau's agenda. The Prime Minister's policy faced a strong backlash in Quebec, leading to demands for independence or at least autonomy so that Francophones could protect their language and culture (Salée, 2007, 114, 115-116):

> ...the pluralistic and formally egalitarian bent of the multiculturalist logic propounded by the Canadian state puts French Canadians and Quebec francophones on the same footing as any other ethnocultural minority group, thus neutralizing their historical status as one of Canada's founding nations and delegitimizing the nationalist aspirations of Francophones Quebecers....The Quebec state...has moved toward a thick definition of Quebec citizenship, which subordinates nonfrancophone forms of ethnic identification to a national community and a common culture primarily defined by the French-speaking majority.

Multiculturalism further divided English and French Canada. Did it bridge the gap between English Canada and the new visible minorities?

Canadians say that they favor multiculturalism: 85 percent replied that it is important to Canadian identity in a 2003 survey, up from 74 percent six years earlier. Immigrants express pride in Canada, especially its multiculturalism. Immigrants are well integrated into politics,

with high levels of political participation (Kymlicka, 2010b, 7-8; cf. Reitz, Breton, Dion, and Dion, 2009, 11). Focus groups in 1991 nevertheless revealed wariness about government support for programs that reinforced home country culture at the expense of a common set of values (UNI (Uniting Canada), 1991).

Integrating into a Multicultural Canada

Minorities may participate in the political process in Canada, but they are less integrated into Canadian society on measures such as belonging and trust. Discrimination against minorities persists and this is a barrier to generalized trust.

Visible minorities are substantially less likely to identify as Canadians–they are 30 percent less likely to say that they feel Canadians compared to whites (Jiminez, 2007; Reitz and Banerjee, 2009, 134). Reitz also reports that visible minorities as a whole are not less trusting than whites. Yet some groups–notably blacks--are substantially less likely to have faith in others (Reitz, Breton, Dion, and Dion, 2009, 34-36; Reitz and Banerjee, 2009, 141, 150; cf. Phan, 2008, 37; but see Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston, 2007, 106). I report similar results with a different data set, the 2008 General Social Survey, below.[10] Reitz and his colleagues find that minorities have lower levels of life satisfaction and a sense of belonging to Canada, both of which I show to lead to greater trust.

Inequality by itself does *not* explain variations in trust or belonging to Canada. However, perceived discrimination is a strong predictor of lower trust. Visible minorities have much lower incomes and higher rates of poverty compared to other immigrants (Reitz and Banerjee, 2007, 491, 520-521). Forty-four percent of the least trusting visible minority–blacks–speak of recent discrimination–but even 35 percent of the most trusting minority (the Chinese) report racial bias. One's sense of identity has a strong effect on trust. Immigrants who identify only with their home country are substantially less likely to trust others than are minorities who define themselves as primarily Canadian or both Canadian and their own group. When you perceive discrimination, you are more likely to define your identity in terms of your group–and thus are

less likely to trust others. This effect is much stronger in Quebec than in the rest of Canada, most likely because the sense of ethnic identity among Quebecois is stronger than it is in the rest of Canada (see Chapter 2; Phan and Breton, 2009, 107).

Living in a diverse neighborhood leads to a withdrawal of political participation for majority whites, but has no effect on minorities (Gidengil, Roy, and Lawlor, 2009). Phan (2008, 41-42) reports similar null findings between neighborhood diversity and trust. Yet, whites who live in diverse neighborhoods have weaker in-group ties and greater attachment to Canada (Wu, Schimmele, and Hou, 2009, 28-29). Hou and Wu (2009, 706) report positive effects of neighborhood diversity on trust for the majority: "...in the White population, exposure to racial minorities has a positive effect on trust in neighborhoods where the White population remains dominant and the minority neighbors are relatively evenly distributed across multiple racial categories rather than concentrated in only one or two groups." For whites, living in a homogenous neighborhood leads to stronger in-group ties (Wu, Schimmele, and Hou, 2009, 28) . Soroka, Johnston, and Banting (2007, 286) report that majority respondents in a neighborhood are more trusting when surrounded by members of their own group–although they use a different measure of trust than I employ.[11] However, minorities do *not* become more trusting if they have lived in Canada for a long time (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting, 2007, 584).

Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston (2008, 68-69) use a framework that is more consistent with mine and they report positive results for the effect of contact in diverse neighborhoods (using a different data set):

> Respondents who have diverse neighbors and talk to them on a regular basis are significantly more trusting than those who have diverse neighbors and do not talk to them. In short, diversity is a challenge to trust only when it is not accompanied by enough social interactions....virtually all of the negative effect of diversity occurs among those who do not talk to their neighbors.

Canadians like multiculturalism in theory. But they are less enamored of it as policy

granting special favors to minorities. Visible minorities still face discrimination–and those who have had the least economic success (blacks, some Asians) are substantially less likely to trust others. Some visible minorities have prospered, live in high-income integrated neighborhoods, and trust their fellow citizens as much as other Canadians. Is this socialization–or, as we shall see for Australian minorities, the result of Canada's immigration policy that "selects" well-off and educated migrants who might already have high levels of trust?

Trust, Friendships, and Segregation in Canada

Does contact in integrated neighborhoods lead to more trust in Canada? And, if so, for whom? The 2008 General Social Survey was a telephone poll of 20,401 respondents throughout Canada except for the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. The survey focused on social connections and norms and the large sample size makes it possible to focus on a wide range of ethnic and racial groups within the country (see n. 5). These groups have different levels of trust, contacts with people of *visibly* different ethnicities and who speak different languages, and live in communities with different levels of segregation. The GSS question on "visibly different" ethnicities taps bridging ties that are more in the spirit of "optimal contact" than simply having friends of different ethnicity would do.

In addition to the sample of all respondents, I focus on whites, Anglophones, Francophones, immigrants from (Northern) Europe, Southern Europeans, visible minorities (non-whites), Asians, and blacks. These categories are *not* mutually exclusive.

The Anglophones and Francophones are the most numerous groups in Canada–and generally regarded as the two "founding peoples." Anglophones come from historically high trusting cultures and Francophones, in Canada and elsewhere, are considerably less trusting (Uslaner, 2008b; Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston, 2007, 106; Stolle and Uslaner, 2003). Francophones are also concentrated in Quebec and are more segregated, especially from minorities (Balakrishnan and Gyimah, 2003, 121). Over the past half century, Quebec has become more diverse–but the growth has come exclusively from speakers of languages other

than English and French. The Anglophone population of Quebec has dropped form 13.8 percent in 1951 to 8.2 percent in 2006.[12] European immigrants are highly trusting–they come from countries with high levels of trust (Uslaner, 2008b), but they also live apart from visible minorities and live in more segregated communities (Balakrishnan and Gyimah, 2003, 125). The Europeans are the "oldest" immigrants–and they are likely to live among the two charter groups (Anglophones and Francophones) more than more recent immigrant groups.

Southern (and Central) Europeans come from countries lower in trust, reflected in somewhat depressed levels of faith in others and higher segregation. Visible minorities may not be as starkly segregated as minorities in the United States (Fong, 1996), but they are largely isolated from whites. Asian immigrants, and especially the Vietnamese, live in more segregated neighborhoods than do minorities in Britain or Australia (Walks and Bourne, 2006). Blacks are the most segregated minority. Since they constitute such a small share of the Canadian population, they are much more likely to have contact with whites than are African-Americans (Fong, 1996, 205). Isolation does *not* fade over time: Succeeding generations of visible minorities are as segregated as their immigrant parents (Balakrishnan and Gyimah, 2003, 123)–nor do immigrants become more trusting over time (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting, 2007, 584).

Anglophones and immigrants from (Northern) Europe have the highest levels of trust. Anglophones live in the least diverse neighborhoods, followed by Francophones and European immigrants. Visible minorities live in more diverse *and* highly segregated neighborhoods, but some minorities (Asians) have high levels of trust and others (blacks) have less faith in others. The trust levels of different groups largely follow the "historical" trust of their ancestry (Uslaner, 2008b). However, Asian immigrants stand out as far more trusting than their countries of origin would lead us to expect. (There is a more modest boost in trust for Southern Europeans).

I present levels of trust and intergroup contact in Figures 4-1 (trust and friends of different ethnicity) and 4-2 (the share of members of different ethnicity and language in groups to

which you belong). Where linguistic diversity will serve as a proxy for ethnic diversity elsewhere (see the discussion of Sweden in Chapter 6), in Canada both matter. Language may be even more salient a dividing line in a country with two official languages as ethnicity, although the rise of multiculturalism as official policy has brought ethnic heritage to the fore as well. Language and ethnicity are often intertwined, as new immigrants may be more comfortable with their native language even if they are required to be proficient in English to enter Canada.

As in the American data, the group membership measure may be a stronger measure of "optimal contact" since interactions in groups *might* be more intense. The three measures of contact are all five point scales ranging from all members/friends from the same background to all members of different background.[13] To make comparisons with trust simpler (as in other chapters), I "normed" the friendship and group contacts to a 0-1 scale.

Figures 4-1 and 4-2 about here

The Anglophones and Europeans are the most trusting. Aside from the French, however, they are *the least likely to have friends and fellow group members from diverse backgrounds*. The French are both less trusting and more isolated in their social networks. About 30 percent of Francophones believe that "most people can be trusted," almost half as many as Anglophones and European immigrants. And their social networks are the least diverse: Francophones have friendship and group ethnic diversity scores of between .10 and.15 (on a range of 0-1) and a linguistic group diversity score not much greater. All white groups have relatively low levels of interaction of people of different backgrounds. Europeans are the "exception" in having a more moderate score (.25) for belonging to groups with people speaking different languages. Francophones stand out as the least trusting and the most isolated. Visible minority groups have more friends and group members of different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds–which is at least partially a matter of simple mathematics. Minorities with many friends are simply more likely to have acquaintances who are white. This is clearly the case for both Asians and blacks. But

Asians are far more trusting than are blacks and barely less trusting than whites.

Why are Asians so much more trusting than blacks–and more trusting than we might expect them to be based upon their heritage? It can't be levels of contact, since Asians and blacks have roughly similar shares of friendships and memberships crossing ethnic and linguistic boundaries. Might it be the result of contact in integrated neighborhoods? I turn to an examination of how diverse friendships and group memberships in integrated neighborhoods might shape trust across the various ethnic and racial groups in Canada. I cannot separately control for diversity of neighborhoods since the fractionalization and segregation measures are highly correlated.

The models for trust for each group include interaction terms for friendship and group membership ethnic diversity with multigroup entropy. As in the United States, the construction of the interaction terms leads to an expected *negative* coefficient on the interaction term if the optimal conditions lead to greater trust. I also include a simple measure of group members who speak a different language and I also expect a negative coefficient. The segregation measure is based upon different racial and ethnic groups so it makes sense to create interaction measures only for ethnic diversity in contacts. I also include in the model an index of optimism, a measure of how strongly one belongs to Canada, trust in the health system, and the standard demographic variables of education, age, income, Catholicism.[14]

The key social-psychological foundation of trust is optimism (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 2, 4). The General Social Survey included a wide range of questions about one's world view and I constructed an index of optimism through a factor analysis of eleven questions on one's overall outlook–does the future look bright and can you shape your own destiny (Uslaner, 2002, 31) as well as the beneficence of people around you.[15] While I argued above that pessimism is central to Canadian culture, this negative outlook seems limited to the polity and to group relations. In their personal lives, Canadians tend to have a sunny disposition. Across the eleven measures I used to construct the optimism scale, only one had fewer than 70 percent positive responses, six

had 85 percent or greater agreement, and the remaining four had agreement greater than 75 percent.[16] Across white ethnic groups, there is little variation in levels of optimism. Visible minorities are less optimistic, with blacks notably less sanguine than Asians.

Trust rests upon the perception of a common fate and identity (see Chapter 2)–in contrast to a strong sense of in-group identity (Jantzen, 2005, 115). Belonging to Canada, rather than identifying mostly with your home province, should promote generalized trust. Federal versus provincial power has long been central to Canadian politics. Prime Minister Pierre Eliot Trudeau's attempt to forge a distinctive national identity in the 1980s focused on centralizing power in Ottawa rather than in the provinces. Provincial identity in Canada is thus a rejection of the idea of common bonds among all Canadians. Visible minorities whose ethnic identity is strong have a substantially weaker sense of Canadian identity (Reitz, Breton, Dion, and Dion, 2009, 40). A key exception are Chinese immigrants, who feel as much Canadian as migrants from Europe (Reitz and Banerjee, 2007,.507-509). Given the weak sense of what constitutes Canadian identity more generally, a sense of belonging should promote generalized trust.

Kumlin and Rothstein (2008, 2010) argue that a social welfare regime based upon universal coverage can build trust by treating all people fairly and leading to greater equality. Their argument focuses on Sweden–and I shall show in Chapter 6 that confidence in the universal welfare state does indeed boost trust, especially for minorities. In Canada, the universal health care system is often portrayed as the defining characteristic of national identity (Johnston, Banting, Kymlicka, and Soroka, 2010, 368-369):

> ...for many English-speaking Canadians "medicare" has become part of the very definition of the country. The nationwide reach of the system has been celebrated as part of the social glue that holds together a society otherwise divided by language and region; and its universal coverage is widely seen as one of the defining features distinguishing Canada from its powerful neighbour to the south.

They show that support for the health care system leads to a stronger sense of national identity.

Can such a program also create trust? If so, does its reach go beyond the majority population (as it does in Sweden)?

I focus on the segregation interaction terms as well as the linguistic diversity of group membership, the sense of belonging to Canada, and trust in the public health system. The other variables perform mostly as expected.[17] I report the main results in Figures 4-3 (all respondents, whites, and Anglophones), 4-4 (Francophones, Europeans, and Southern Europeans), and 4-5 (all visible minorities, Asians, and blacks).

Figures 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 about here

The key results are that contact with people of different ethnicities, both as friends and in organizations, builds trust if you live in integrated neighborhoods and if you are a member of a dominant group (white, Anglophone, Francophones, or to a lesser extent a European immigrant). Optimal contact works for the majority. It has limited effects for visible minorities–such contact is only effective for blacks. The effects are smaller for whites and Anglophones (as well as for all respondents) than those for the United States–but about the same as I shall report for majorities and minorities in the United Kingdom (Chapter 5) and for whites in Australia (Chapter 6). Having diverse friends in integrated neighborhoods matters slightly more for all whites than for Anglophones and the effect of diverse group membership in integrated communities has a tiny effect for Anglophones. Having friends who speak a different language does not boost trust for all respondents or whites by an appreciable amount and seems to have a small negative effect for Anglophones.

The big effects seem to occur for Francophones, where having many friends of different ethnicities and living in an integrated neighborhood boosts trust by 47 percent and joining groups with diverse members in a similar context leads to a 65 percent increase in faith in others. Having many friends who speak a different language further boosts trust by 10 percent. If all of this seems too good to be true, it probably is. Francophones respondents are the least likely to

have friends of a different ethnicity or to join groups made up largely of members who are of a different ethnic or linguistic group. Francophones are also unlikely to live in areas with visible minorities.

These strong effects may be attributable to either: (1) differences stemming from small numbers of people at the highest and lowest values of the interaction terms; or (2) more likely, multicollinearity among the predictors. Under the first scenario, the gap in trust may be particularly large between Francophones who live in segregated neighborhoods and have no friends or group members from different groups. This is plausible but less likely since I also estimated a model with only the friendship diversity*segregation interaction. This model indicates that, counterintuitively, that living in an integrated diverse neighborhood with all of your friends from a different ethnic group makes one 12 percent *less* likely to trust others.

The alternative explanation seems more likely. Since Francophones are the least likely to have friends and fellow members from other groups, the few who do have such bridging ties will also be more likely to live in more diverse neighborhoods and to extend these ties from one arena (friends) to another (group members): 95 percent of Francophones had either all (71.8) or most (23.2) of their friends from their same ethnic group–and only 2.9 percent had most or all of their friends from other groups. Of course, most people have most of their friends from their own group–and Anglophones are only somewhat more likely to have diverse ties. Asian immigrants have more diverse friendship networks–almost a quarter had most of their friends from different groups, while almost 30 percent of blacks' friends come from different groups. Even 11 percent of Southern European's friends largely come outside their own ethnicity. The effect for Francophones may be positive–or it may be negative. It is almost certainly less than that for Anglophones.

There are also large effects for Southern Europeans–increases in trust of about 35 percent for both friendship and group membership in integrated communities–and a further small increase (five percent) for group members with different languages. Some collinearity may lead

to spuriously high effects here but Southern Europeans do have far more variation in the structure of their networks. There are much smaller effects for (Northern) Europeans, 13 percent for diverse friendship networks in integrated communities and seven percent for membership in heterogenous groups in similar settings.

For visible minorities, we see two different stories. Diverse friendship networks (which are common) in integrated neighborhoods (far less common) matter less for Asians on trust than they do for most other groups: Only belonging to diverse groups and living in integrated neighborhoods leads to an increase in trust (23 percent). This effect seems large but few Asians are both group members and live in such diverse communities.

For blacks, there are powerful effects–larger than for any other group. Living in integrated neighborhoods (uncommon) with diverse friendship networks (the most common of any group) boosts trust among blacks by 35 percent. For Asians, the effect is a tiny drop in trust of one percent. For visible minorities overall, the results parallel the findings for Asians–since they constitute by far the largest share of minorities in Canada and especially in this sample.

The sense of belonging to Canada leads to higher levels of trust for the "charter groups," the English and the French. Belonging to Canada does not boost trust for either other European groups or visible minorities. Confidence in the health system has large impacts on trust (about 25 -30 percent) for Anglophones, Francophones, and Southern Europeans and a more moderate effect for Northern Europeans (17 percent). A sense of attachment and positive attitudes toward the welfare state lead to greater trust for whites but not for visible minorities.

Why Contact Works–and Doesn't Work

Optimal contact in Canada works mostly as it does in Australia (see Chapter 6) but partially as it does in the United States (Chapter 2). This is not surprising since in many ways Canada and Australia are very similar: The former British colonies long gave preferential treatment to immigrants from the home country (although Canada had two "founding peoples") and others who looked like them (Europeans). More recently, both countries shifted their

immigration policies and embraced multiculturalism. Each had an influx of immigrants from Asia. Both invited professionals who already had the education, skills, and language ability that would make them fit into a middle-class society. Canada and Australia have lower levels of segregation and inequality than the United States and Asian immigrants have levels of trust close to the dominant Anglo majority.

What makes Asians more trusting in Canada (and in Australia, see Chapter 6)? And why are they largely resistant to the positive effects of optimal contact? Canada and Australia both have "points systems" for immigrants.. Canada's system is less demanding than Australia's but nevertheless, it is not easy for most potential immigrants to gain entrance into Canada. But when they come, they are welcomed warmly (DeParle, 2010). As in Australia, the new system adopted in 1967 abolished racial quotas but replaced them with educational and professional tests. The new immigrants– with Chinese, Indians, and Filipinos being the most numerous–were required to bring savings of about $10,000 with them, making the new Canadians "strikingly middle class" (DeParle, 2010).

Asian immigrants do face discrimination: About a third of Chinese and other Asians report biased treatment (Reitz and Banerjee, 2009, 128). Some Asians–notably Bangladeshis–are very poor and identify more with their local neighborhoods, Chinese immigrants have above average incomes compared to other residents of Toronto with Indians only marginally below the overall average (Murdie and Ghosh, 2010, 302, 306). Asians, notably South Asians, have among the highest levels of belonging among Canadians (Reitz and Banerjee, 2009, 150).

For a people who do face some discrimination–but who nevertheless flourish economically and who are very optimistic about their own futures–trust reflects success more than social interactions. What is striking about the trust model for Asians is that only two non-contact variables are significant even at the $p < .10$ level: Catholicism (which likely reflects the fact that Filipinos are less prosperous than Chinese or Indians) and optimism. Asians in Canada are not as fully assimilated as they are in Australia–so the closer contact of membership in

diverse groups in integrated neighborhoods does lead to an increase in trust.

Canada and the United States both have black populations–more than ten times larger south of the 49th parallel border than above it. Blacks in both countries are substantially less trusting than either whites (except for Francophones in Canada) or Asian immigrants. They report substantially more discrimination than do Asian minorities and are the least likely to live in integrated communities. Phan and Breton (2009, 111) argue that "...the experience of discrimination increases the likelihood that respondents will draw into their ethnic group."

Forty-three percent of blacks say that they have faced racial discrimination in Canada, compared to an overall level of 24 percent for visible minorities. On a wider measure of discrimination–for any reason–half of blacks report facing such bias, compared to 35 percent for all visible minorities (Reitz and Banerjee, 2009, 128-129).[18] Blacks are not only low trusting; they are also less optimistic on most of the measures and they are the least likely to say that they trust strangers.[19] As with African-Americans, the relatively small number of Canadian blacks who live in integrated neighborhoods and have close friends of different backgrounds (either racial or linguistic) become significantly more trusting.

Optimal contact works in Canada, but, as in the United States and Australia, more for whites than for visible minorities. The evidence seems inconclusive as to whether Francophones become more trusting when they have more diverse social networks in integrated communities. Friendship across ethnic or linguistic lines is uncommon for most Canadians–and especially for Francophones.[20] The simplest model I estimated showed "optimal contact" reducing trust among Francophones. Their geographical isolation (most are in the province of Quebec and most live in segregated neighborhoods) and their social seclusion are among the factors leading to their low level of trust.

Can you define identity through social welfare policy? In Sweden you can (see Chapter 6). The universal welfare state helps build trust among immigrants from countries with low levels of trust. The Canadian health care system is universal. It stands in sharp contrast to the

private and very expensive medical care in the United States. It does build trust among Canadians–including Francophones–but only among white Canadians. The health system is not a universal social welfare regime. And it does not lead to greater trust among visible minorities (and not among either Asians or blacks). If it is a source of national identity, it only binds together people who look like each other.

Ironically, the groups with the most contact across ethnic/racial and linguistic lines–visible minorities–do not become more trusting as a result of those contacts. Canada's multiculturalism policy does not preclude some minorities from becoming trusting. But it doesn't build the bridging ties that build trust, at least for most visible immigrants (Asians). Nor does it eliminate discrimination. Multiculturalism is not a substitute for the unifying national identity that builds trust among diverse populations. Nor have any national institutions–especially national health care–filled the gap.

Canada may have had no choice, as Kymlicka and Soroka, Johnston, and Banting have argued. There is no common vision on which to build an overarching sense of national identity. Canada has avoided severe conflicts beyond the Quebec-Rest of Canada (or ROC) divide not by socializing new immigrants, but by choosing who can come rather carefully. By doing so, Canada has created a society that is seen as fair, especially compared to its southern neighbor. Most Canadians are also optimistic about their own lives. Without a clear sense of national identity–and with modest levels of interactions among people of different backgrounds–social interactions may not be as strong a key to generalized trust as it is in its far less trusting and more segregated neighbor to the north.

NOTES

1. As with native minorities in the United States, Australia, and Sweden, there is simply not enough data to consider attitudes of the First Nation. See my discussion in Chapter 1.
2. The history of the song and the lyrics are at http://kids.niehs.nih.gov/lyrics/dixie.htm .
3. See http://www.provincequebec.com/info_quebec/motto-license-plate/ .
4. See http://ca.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20091024091321AATTqrX .
5. Their home page is http://royalcanadianairfarce.ca/index2.html. I have no source for this line from the Farce other than my own memory.
6. The three surveys showing trust at 54 percent in 2000 are the Canadian National Election Study (http://prod.library.utoronto.ca:8090/datalib/codebooks/utm/elections/2000/ces_td_001.pdf), the Economy, Security, Community Survey at the University of British Columbia (see ch. 2, n. 6), and the Quebec Referendum Panel Survey (http://prod.library.utoronto.ca:8090/datalib/codebooks/utm/elections/1980/can.elec.80.cdbk). The links are to the codebooks. The 2008 survey is the one I shall use in this chapter, the General Social Survey (http://www.statcan.gc.ca/dli-ild/data-donnees/ftp/gss-esg/gssc-esgc2008-eng.htm). The GSS is only available to Canadian residents and with geocodes it is only available at sites affiliated with Statistics Canada. I used the offices of the Quebec Inter-University Center for Social Statistics (QICSS) at the Universite de Montreal after receiving both academic and security clearances. I am grateful to Franck Larouche of QICSS (http://www.ciqss.umontreal.ca/) for his great help in preparing and merging the data sets, Feng Hou of Statistics Canada for generating the diversity and segregation data, Jean Poirer and Isabel Cadieux of QICSS, to Carmen Charette and Matthieu Ravignat of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and to Denis Gonthier of Statistics Canada for logistical help.

7. The 2007 index is from the CIA Fact Book and it placed Canada 35th of 123 countries (though many countries with lower Ginis were former Communist countries, which historically have lower reported rates of inequality). These data are available at http://www.photius.com/rankings/economy/distribution_of_family_income_gini_index_2007_0.html.

8. The "points system" is based upon a total of 100 points. Potential immigrants must score at least 67 on this scale based upon education (25 points), language proficiency (24 points), experience (21 points), age (10 points), arranged employment (10 points), and "adaptability" (10 points). See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/apply-factors.asp and http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/factor-adaptability.asp for the measure of adaptability.

9. In the 2001 census there were 469,000 native Italian speakers, 423,000 German speakers, 208,000 Polish speakers, 148,000 Ukranian speakers, and 129,000 Dutch speakers in Canada (see http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/themes/RetrieveProductTable.cfm?Temporal=2001&PID=55534&APATH=3&METH=1&PTYPE=55440&THEME=41&FOCUS=0&AID=0&PLACENAME=0&PROVINCE=0&SEARCH=0&GC=99&GK=NA&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=&FL=0&RL=0&FREE=0&GID=431515).

10. Reitz and his co-authors use the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=4508&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2#b3), while I use the 2008 General Social Survey. I chose the GSS because it had better questions for estimating a model of trust and is more recent.

11. Their measure is how likely a person is to return a wallet found on the street to a stranger, a neighbor, or the police.

12. See Table 2.1.1 at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-642-x/2010002/tbl/tbl211-eng.htm. The relative weight of Anglophones has fallen by half over the same period (Table 2.1.3) at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-642-x/2010002/tbl/tbl213-eng.htm.

13. The variable "friends who speak the same language" was recoded to "friends who speak different languages" for consistency with other measures.

14. People with more education and who are older should have higher levels of trust. Income is not significant in American models (Uslaner, 2002, 99, 108-110) but these are more sparse models. Catholicism is a hierarchical religion and should be associated with lower trust (Putnam, 1993, 107; Stolle and Uslaner, 2003 on Canada).

15. The questions and their loadings on the single optimism factor (with the largest loadings in bold) are: I experience a general sense of emptiness (.49); there are plenty of people I can rely on when I have problems (-.40); there are many people I can trust completely (-.34, -.48 on a second factor); I often feel rejected (.44); **you have little control over the things that happen to you (.55); there is really no way you can solve some of the problems you have (.57); there is little you can do to change many of the important things in your life (.61); you often feel helpless in dealing with problems of life (.66);** sometimes you feel that you are being pushed around in life (.49); what happens to you in the future mostly depends on you (-.33); and you can do just about anything you really set your mind to (-.43). The low loading of the "trust completely" measure on the optimism factor and the strong relationships of optimism for trust I report below supports my overall argument that generalized trust does not stem from trust in specific people, especially people you are close to (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 2, 3, 5).

16. Levels of agreement are: feel rejected (4 percent); feel emptiness (7 percent); feel helpless (14 percent); little you can do (15 percent); pushed around (19 percent); little one can do to change (20 percent); no way to solve problems (22 percent); little control (26 percent); have friends to rely on (80 percent); future depends upon you (89 percent).

17. Variables that do not attain significance and the models for whites are: education (Europeans and Southern Europeans); age (Francophones, Southern Europeans); income (Francophones); and Catholicism (Anglophones, Europeans, Southern Europeans). For visible minorities, income and Catholicism are insignificant. For Asians, only Catholicism and optimism are significant, the latter barely at $p < .10$. For blacks, only age, optimism, and belonging are significant, the latter at $p < .10$.

18. The General Social Survey did not have questions on discrimination, so I could not include them in my analysis.

19. On a five point scale, the mean for blacks is 3.09, compared to 3.91 for Anglophones, 3.61 for Francophones, and 3.49 for Asians.

20. For all Canadians, 88 percent have all or most of their friends with people of their (visibly) same ethnic group and 87 percent with people who speak the same language.