Contact, Diversity, and Segregation

“The more we get together, the happier we’ll be.”

Children’s song by Jim Rule

“Good luck will rub off when I shakes (sic) hands with you.”

The chimney sweep in *Mary Poppins*

“To know, know, know him is to love, love, love him.”

Phil Spector

“Familiarity breeds contempt.”

Alternatively ascribed to Aesop, *The Fox and the Lion*, to Mark Twain—and to a Nigerian proverb.

Contact is both the great hope and the great fear of liberals who work to make people more acceptant of those from different backgrounds. Contact theory, which Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 751-2) trace back to the 1940s and especially to the summary by Williams (1947), is the claim that exposure to people of different backgrounds leads to less prejudice. The greater the opportunity for interacting with people who are different from yourself, the more likely you are to hold positive attitudes toward them.

Conflict theory dates back even further (Baker, 1934). It is based upon the argument that interactions among people of different backgrounds is likely to lead to more hostility. Key (1949, 666) argued that Southern whites in the United States were most likely to support racist candidates for office in areas with large populations of African-Americans.

These two conflicting theories of attitude formation toward “the other”—people who are different from yourself—have dominated arguments about how majorities and minorities relate to each other. Advocates of each perspective claim greater support for their argument. This stand-
off leads many to wonder how both sides could possibly be correct. Could there be nuances—or more fundamental issues—that have been overlooked? Are there common elements underlying these conflicting arguments? Have we been too quick to presume that these two simple arguments lead to starkly different outcomes for all sorts of attitudes and outcomes?

I review some of the arguments and evidence for each approach here. There are too many studies across different disciplines to summarize them (but see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). And, as Mark Antony said in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*, I come to bury both arguments, not to praise them. Or at least to suggest that they need reformulation. Alas, I cannot claim to have uncovered a new framework to supplant the old ones: Gordon Allport (1958, originally published in 1954) beat me to it by more than half a century and did it with elegance. Others have refined Allport’s thesis (Pettigrew, 1986, 1998; Forbes, 1997).

My contribution is to highlight the contributions of Allport, Pettigrew, and Forbes and to bring to the forefront an aspect of their work that often gets overlooked in the literature: residential segregation. I argue that this framework is more powerful than the “conflict theory”—the foundation of the arguments about the negative effects of diversity—in explaining why trust is lower among some people—and neighborhoods or even countries.

Segregation is not the same thing as diversity, as I shall demonstrate below. The presumed negative effects of diversity occur when people of different backgrounds live among each other. Segregation is all about isolating people of diverse ethnicities and races from each other. The key distinction is being too far away rather than too close. There is more agreement on the negative consequences of segregation than on whether diversity brings more harm than good—although segregation does have its defenders. While most recent discussions of contact and diversity have ignored segregation, many of the initial formulations and tests of contact theory—notably Allport’s—put residential isolation at the forefront.

There is a wide-ranging literature on the good and bad effects of contact and diversity. Even if diversity does have perverse effects for many outcomes, it may not have negative
consequences for trust. The theoretical linkage between segregation and mistrust is much stronger than that for diversity and mistrust. While there is a considerable literature positing a link between contact and trust, it is based upon shaky empirics and even weaker theory, as I shall discuss below.

I examine the linkages among segregation, diversity, inequality, and trust across American communities and cross-nationally as well as other consequences of segregation—overall well-being and crime. The backstory is that segregation matters— for trust and for other indicators of social life and much (though not all) of its impact comes from the effects of segregation on inequality. And segregation leads to outcomes (more crime and less well-being) that make trust more difficult to attain—while diversity has much smaller effects.

The converse of segregation is, of course, integration. How one integrates people of different backgrounds into a common culture—or, if one tries to do so at all— is a central question underlying trust in people of different backgrounds and a key issue of public policy. Multiculturalism reinforces a sense of in-group identity. I shall argue and present evidence that regimes emphasizing multiculturalism may inhibit the development of trust.

**Diversity: The Downside and the Upside**

Long before Putnam, scholars and political leaders recognized that diversity can have negative effects on a variety of outcomes. Key (1949) made one of the most famous arguments in what came to be known as the “racial threat” hypothesis: The long and bitter history of racial conflict in the American South was most pronounced where the African-American population was greatest. Whites felt most threatened when blacks were numerous and nearby. Key’s argument is a natural extension of what came to be known as “social identity” theory: We are predisposed to trust our own kind more than out-groups (Brewer, 1979). Messick and Brewer (1983, 27-28, italics in original) review experiments on cooperation and find that "members of an in-group tend to perceive other in-group members in generally favorable terms, particularly as being trustworthy, honest, and cooperative." The Maghribi of Northern Africa relied on their

Alesina and LaFerrara (2000, 850, 889) elaborate how in-group preference leads to both demobilization and to negative social attitudes toward minorities:

...individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar to themselves in terms of income, race, or ethnicity...diffuse preferences for homogeneity may decrease total participation in a mixed group if fragmentation increases. However, individuals may prefer to sort into homogenous groups...For eight out of nine questions concerning attitudes toward race relations, the effect of racial heterogeneity is strongest for individuals more averse to racial mixing.

A mini industry among academics has developed to show how widespread the negative effects of diversity are. The negative consequences of racial and ethnic diversity include:

- greater corruption, infant mortality, and illiteracy and lower rates of governmental transfers (Alesina et al., 2003, 171);
- lower long-term growth (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2004);
- less support for racial integration among Americans in the early 1970s as well as perceptions of threat (Forssett and Kielcolt, 1989) and anti-black sentiment (Taylor, 1998);
- less favorable views of neighborhoods and lower levels of participation in community improvement projects (Guest, Kubrin, and Cover, 2008, 512; Rice and Steele, 2001);
- lower rates of voting and participation in civic organizations for whites and African-Americans (but not Hispanics) across American cities (Oliver, 2001, 120); and
- higher rates of civil conflict (Matuszeski and Schneider, 2006).

Since minority groups everywhere and especially blacks in the United States and
immigrants in other Western countries are far more likely to be poor and to receive government assistance than are the majority (white) populations, greater minority populations may lead to less support for public spending, especially on welfare. Joppke (2007, 18-19) argues that diversity strains the welfare state in Europe (see also Burns, 2010, quoted in Chapter 5):

Because a majority of...migrants are unskilled and (with the exception of France) not proficient in the language of the receiving societies, and often directly become dependent on welfare, they pose serious adjustment problems.

Greater diversity is linked to lower levels of support and provision of collective goods:

- lower levels of transfer payments adjusted for gross domestic product across nations (Alesina et al., 2003, 171) but more transfer payments in American municipalities (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999, 1264)
- less spending on welfare and on roads in American municipalities (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999, 1259, 1263).
- less support for public education in more heterogenous urban areas in the United States from 1910-1928 than in more homogeneous small towns (Goldin and Katz, 1999, 718).
- public goods production across a wide variety of measures (Baldwin and Huber, 2010).
- lower support for school funding, the quality of school facilities, and ownership of textbooks across Kenyan communities as well as for the maintenance of community water wells and fewer threats against parents who do not pay their school fees or participate in school projects (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).
- the failure to maintain infrastructure in Pakistan (cited in Putnam, 2007, 143).

If diversity leads to less favorable attitudes toward out-groups and to an unwillingness to provide benefits for minorities, the claim that diversity leads to less trust makes sense. Or does it? I shall discuss the evidence–pro and con--below after I present a more general framework for trust.

The evidence on diversity and poor outcomes is not universal. Woolever (1992) finds no
connection between neighborhood diversity and community attachment or participation in Indianapolis in 1980. Collier, Honohan, and Moene (2001) find that ethnic group dominance, but not simple ethnic diversity, leads to a greater likelihood of civil conflict (cf. Bros, 2010). Even in the very diverse society of Uganda, ethnicity had only minimal effects on how people valued the welfare of others in experimental games (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein, 2009, 23).

Nor is there universally a negative relationship between diversity and support for the welfare state. Sweden is particularly generous to refugees (Jordan, 2008, A14):

[40,000] Iraqis are lured by...Sweden's famous social welfare system. The national government budgets $30,000 to help settle each person granted asylum. It pays for Swedish language classes, helps with housing and job training and pays a monthly allowance for living expenses.

Even as Swedish policy-makers realized that such generosity could lead to resentment, they redoubled their efforts to integrate immigrants into Swedish society through the welfare state—and support for welfare programs remained high (Crepaz, 2008, 225-226; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2010, 12-13). There was a reaction in the 2010 election when support for the anti-immigrant Swedish Democrats reached an all-time high—but it was still less than six percent. In Canada, diversity seems to increase, rather than decrease, support for the welfare state (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting, 2007). Finseraas (2009) finds no support for the argument that increasing diversity leads to less support for redistribution in a cross-national analysis of European Social Survey data.

The effects of diversity on prejudice and outcomes do not seem to follow a single pattern. Forbes (1997, 58) argues: “Social scientists have always recognized...that contact is a condition for conflict as well as for cooperation. Two groups must be in contact before they can fight or compete.” Yet, there is little evidence of actual contact between members of different groups in the studies showing the negative effects of diversity. The aversion to people of different
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (7)

backgrounds reduces civic participation in many different areas. Forbes (1997, 101, italics added) summarizes Key’s argument that Southern whites sought “to exclude blacks from politics, to isolate them socially, and generally to keep them subordinate to whites.” Putnam (2007, 150), some 60 years later, argued that “…inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life.”

Aversion to diversity discourages contact. When people of different backgrounds get together, the results are remarkably different. Forbes (1997, 144, 150) argues that “[t]he more frequent and the more intimate the contacts among individuals belonging to different tribes or nations, the more these groups come to resemble each other culturally or linguistically... ...Isolation and subordination, not gore and destruction, seem to be the main themes in...conflict.”

Heterogeneous networks lead to positive outcomes, such as more productive job searches (Granovetter, 1973; Loury, 1977) and more creativity (Burt, 2000). Such outcomes are more consistent with contact theory than with the claim that interaction with people of different backgrounds leads to conflict. Some aggregate results show positive relationships between diversity and economic outcomes: Diversity is associated with increased wages and higher prices for rental housing (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005), greater profits and market share for firms that have more diverse work forces (Herring, 2006), and greater problem-solving capacities (Gurin, Nagda, and Lopez, 2004). Florida, Mellander, and Rentfrow (2009) find higher levels of overall well-being in more diverse states.

The connection between diversity and negative outcomes does not receive unequivocal support—and this will become evident when I examine trust below. I cannot hope to resolve all of the issues involved. Some results stem from the confounding of measures of diversity and the size of the minority population (see below). Equally important is the argument that diversity may lead, under some conditions, to isolation (as Forbes has argued). When does diversity isolate people and when does it bring them together? To do this, I turn first to contact theory and then to the “refinement” stressing the role of residential segregation in restricting contact among
Contact Theory

When you get to know people of different backgrounds, negative stereotypes will fade away. And there is considerable evidence to support this claim—though there are also many doubters who wonder if prejudice could fade so easily.

There is a voluminous literature on contact theory, most of it supportive (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). However, not just any contact is sufficient to overcome prejudice. “Superficial” contact is likely to reinforce negative stereotypes; “[o]nly the type of contact that leads people to do things together is likely to result in changed attitudes” (Allport, 1958, 252, 267). Allport formulated conditions of “optimal contact”: equal status between the groups, common goals, cooperation between the groups; and a supportive institutional and cultural environment (Allport, 1958, 263, 267; Pettigrew 1998, 66). In a meta-analysis of 513 studies of contact theory, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 760) found that any contact was likely to reduce prejudice (cf. Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux, 2005, 2007), but that optimal contact had considerably greater effects. Williams (1964, 185-190), Ihlanfeldt and Scafaldi (2002, 633), Dixon (2006, 2194-2195), and McClelland and Linnander (2006, 107-108) find that whites develop more favorable attitudes about minorities only if they know and feel close to a minority group member.

Hewstone (2009) summarizes a large body of research demonstrating that contact alone (regardless of the context) will lead to a reduction in prejudice—but interactions must be “sustained, positive contact between members of the two previously antipathetic groups.” Since trust is more demanding than “mere” prejudice reduction, so will be the conditions of boosting this stable value that doesn’t change much over one’s lifetime. Here context matters, as I shall argue and support.

What constitutes a positive environment? Context is critical—and the most important context is the nature of your community. Residential segregation leads to isolation, “exaggerate[s] the degree of difference between groups,” and makes the out-group “seem larger
and more menacing than it is” (Allport, 1958, 18-19, 256). Contacts in segregated communities are most likely to be “frozen into superordinate-subordinate relationships”—exactly the opposite of what is essential for the optimal conditions to be met (Allport, 1958, 251). Integrated neighborhoods “remove barriers to effective communication” (Allport, 1958, 261) and may lead to more contact with people of different backgrounds, especially among young people (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, and Liebkind, 2006, 94; Quillian and Campbell, 2003, 560). Forbes (1997, 144, 150) goes further, arguing that “[t]he more frequent and the more intimate the contacts among individuals belonging to different tribes or nations, the more these groups come to resemble each other culturally or linguistically... Different languages, religions, customs, laws, and moralities—in short, different cultures—impede economic integration, with all its benefits...Isolation and subordination, not gore and destruction, seem to be the main themes in linguistic conflict.”

There is considerable support for the Allport argument and ironically, some of it came even before he refined contact theory. Deutsch and Collins (1951) surveyed occupants of public housing in four projects in New York City and Newark, two of which were integrated and two segregated. “Neighborly contacts” between whites and blacks were almost non-existent in segregated projects but were common in integrated units—and contact in integrated units led to less prejudiced racial feelings among both whites and African-Americans regardless of their levels of education, ideology, or religion (Deutsch and Collins, 1951, 57, 86, 97). A similar design in cities in the Northeast in 1951 also found that respondents (all white women) in integrated housing projects had far more contact with African-Americans, were far more approving of integrated housing than those in segregated units, and were more likely to report that their views had changed to become more positive toward blacks (Wilner, Walkley, and Cook, 1955, 86, 92, 99).

Many studies have provided support for the argument that contact with people of different backgrounds leads to less prejudice in neighborhoods that are integrated or even simply diverse.
Anglos living in integrated neighborhoods have more favorable attitudes toward Latinos (Rocha and Espino, 2009). There is also evidence that more intimate contact with people of different backgrounds—approximating Allport’s optimal conditions—leads to more favorable attitudes toward out-groups (McClelland and Linnander, 2006, 108; McKenzie, 1948), especially if that contact occurs in more diverse and integrated neighborhoods (Dixon, 2006, 2194-2195; Stein, Post, and Rinden, 2000, 298-299; Valentova and Berzosa, 2010, 29; Wagner et al., 2006, 386). In surveys conducted in Elmira, New York from 1949 through 1951, more “intimate” ties between Jews and African-Americans with people of different backgrounds led to more positive views of the other (Williams et al., 1964, 185).

Contact, Diversity, and Trust

Contact may lead to less prejudice. What about trust? Putnam (2000, 67, 73, 137) sees contact and trust as interconnected:

“[N]etworks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust....across 35 countries social trust and civil engagement are strongly correlated; the greater the density of associational membership in a society, the more trusting its citizens; trust and engagement are two facets of the same underlying factor--social capital....The causal arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social trust are as tangled as well-tossed spaghetti.

The idea that contact can boost trust is that interactions with people of different backgrounds will lead to greater understanding of people of different backgrounds and will make them seem more like us. Contact could thus build trust as well as reducing prejudice. Yet most of the evidence on contact and trust is not supportive because: (1) most of our contacts are with people like ourselves; (2) trusting people like yourself does not mean that you will trust people from different backgrounds; and (3) when we do have contact with people of different backgrounds, our connections may not meet Allport’s “optimal conditions”—social ties on the
basis of equality in a supportive context. Since trust is formed early in life, casual contact with people of different backgrounds may lead to more positive views of some individuals—or even to less prejudice. But trust is more than the absence of negative stereotypes. It is viewing others as part of our moral community.

As Allport argues, we socialize and form groups with people like ourselves (cf. Uslaner, 2002, 40). Putnam (and others) assume that trust can spread from people you know—and who are like yourself—to people you don’t know and who may be different from yourself (Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse, 2010, 143). Yet, once confronted with diversity, people tend to shy away from them and to mistrust them (Putnam, 2007, 142, 148, 158).

There is reason to doubt both claims—that we learn to trust strangers by putting faith in people we know and that diversity drives down trust. Simple contact with people who are different from yourself is insufficient to boost trust. The evidence linking trust to social contacts, formal or informal, is weak—even with people of diverse backgrounds. There is also scant support for the link between diversity and trust.

The bulk of the evidence does not support a link between contact and trust (Claibourne and Martin, 2002). Uslaner (2002, ch. 5) takes Putnam’s argument that trust and social ties reinforce each other seriously—and tests to see if there are indeed reciprocal relationships between group membership and trust. He estimates a simultaneous model where trust and group membership shape each other—and finds no significant relationships in either direction.

Stolle (1998) shows that long-standing membership in voluntary associations leads to greater trust, but only for members of the group and not to the larger society. She (1998, 500) argues that the extension of trust from your own group to the larger society occurs through “mechanisms not yet clearly understood.” An even more skeptical Rosenblum (1998, 45, 48) calls the purported link “an airy ‘liberal expectancy’” that remains “unexplained.” Its proponents believe that if you develop trust in one sphere, it extends automatically to another. Uslaner (2002, 52-56, 142-148) shows that in-group and out-group trust form distinct clusters in people’s
minds and that trust in people you know does not lead to trust in strangers.

It may be naive to expect any link between civic engagement—or other forms of social contact—and trust. Many groups we join don’t require trust at all. We come together with others because of common interests, not to establish long-lasting ties. Yet, even when we do establish more enduring ties, our fellow group members and our friends are likely to be very much like ourselves, even if they don’t look the same as we do. We choose people very much like ourselves to form our social networks (Marsden, 1987; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). As Allport (1954, 17-18; cf. Uslaner, 2002, 40-42) argues:

People mate with their own kind. They eat, play, reside in homogenous clusters.

They visit with their own kind, and prefer to worship together. We don’t play bridge with the janitor.

So the notion that we transfer any trust we develop in group members to people unlike ourselves is “a simplistic ‘transmission belt’ model of civil society, which says that the beneficial formative effects of association spill over from one sphere to another” (Rosenblum, 1998, 48).

Even diverse social ties may not boost trust. Putnam’s (2007) argument is the most famous. His focus is mostly on neighborhood trust—which I shall show in Chapter 3 is not the same as generalized trust. Nevertheless, he does argue that diversity also leads to lower levels of generalized trust. His findings for trust in neighbors are reinforced by similar results by Pennant (2005) for Britain and Leigh (2006) for Australia.

Lancee and Dronkers (2008, 7) find in a survey of Dutch minorities in 1998 that ethnic diversity reinforces in-group trust and leads to declines in faith in out-groups. They report (Lancee and Dronkers, in press, 19) similar results for native Dutch respondents and argue that “[a]dherents of different religions and persons originating from different cultures can more easily collide about values and norms, thus making it less likely that conditions for optimal contact are met...”.

Their findings are challenged by other Dutch scholars. Vervoort, Flap and Dagevos (in
press) find that the diversity of neighborhoods leads to less contact between natives and immigrants, but to more contact among members of different ethnic groups. Tolsma, van der Meer, and Gesthuizen (2009, 300-301; see also Gijsberts, van der Meer, and Dagevos, in press) find that neighborhood ethnic heterogeneity has inconsistent effects on a series of measures of community cohesion: Diversity leads to more contact with neighbors, greater tolerance of people of different races, and higher levels of trust for more educated people, but to lower levels of contact with people of different backgrounds for the highly educated and less volunteering. Far more important than either ethnic or economic heterogeneity of neighborhoods is simple economic status: Wealthier neighborhoods are home to people who are more tolerant and trusting and who have more contact with people different from themselves.

Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006) find negative relationships between both linguistic and ethnic fractionalization and trust across 44 countries with data from the World Values Survey in a multi-level model. However, Hooghe et al. (2009) found no effect of diversity on trust in a similar model of trust in European Union using the European Social Survey. Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, and Scheepers (2011), also using the European Social Survey with hierarchical models, find no effect of diversity at the national level for helping or meeting neighbors and a positive effect on intergroup contact; at the regional level, the share of immigrants indirectly promotes both helping and meeting others, both of which are spurred by greater diversity. Perceived ethnic threat reduces contact and social cohesion, but diversity does not lead to greater perceptions of threat.

Leigh (2006) also finds no connection in Australia between any of several measures of fractionalization and generalized trust. Letki (2008), examining the 2001 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey, reports initial support for a negative relationship between community-level diversity and a composite indicator of social capital—but the result becomes insignificant when she controls for the economic status of the community. Her findings are reinforced by Becares, Stafford, Laurence and Nazroo (2011, 8), who report higher levels of in-group trust and social
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (14)

cohesion (respect of ethnic differences and getting along well with others) for whites in areas with greater diversity—but lower levels of in-group trust and cohesion for minorities. However, these effects were dramatically reduced for all groups once they controlled for the economic deprivation of the neighborhood.

Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes (2010) and find similar results for Norway and Denmark, respectively: Diversity no longer matters when one controls for unemployment (Norway). Dinesen and Sonderskov (2011) find marginally significant but very weak negative effects for Denmark, controlling for income at the community level. Delhy and Newton (2004) also find that diversity drives down trust, but for them it is a measure of good government that suppresses the relationship. Reeskens and Hooghe (2009) find a non-linear relationship between diversity and trust across Belgium municipalities, but the overall relationship is weak (cf. Dincer, 2009, across the American states).

Leigh (2006) reports a negative effect of linguistic diversity on generalized trust for Australian adult immigrants. But Dinesen (2011a) finds a positive effect of diversity on trust immigrant students in Denmark (but no effect for native Danes). His findings are consistent with Laurence and Heath (2008, 41, emphasis in original) who argue that “far from eroding community cohesion, ethnic diversity is generally a strong positive driver of cohesion....It is...deprivation that undermines cohesion, not diversity.” Morales and Echazarra (2010) report positive relations between the level of trust and the ethnic heterogeneity across Spanish municipalities. Stolle et al. (2011) also report a positive relationship between diversity and interethnic contact in German municipalities; informal contacts (conversations) rather than bridging friendships with people of different backgrounds leads to greater generalized trust as well as to faith in out-groups.

This brief summary of selected results does not indicate widespread support for the negative arguments on diversity. A more comprehensive analysis of 82 results in 56 studies (Tolsma and van der Meer, 2011) finds even less coherence: An equal share of results either
confirm or are inconclusive about the diversity effect (30 percent each), but the largest share is negative (40 percent). Tolsma and van der Meer (2011) present a compelling argument that the research agenda is dominated by a “one size fits all” perspective–so there are few distinctions between what constitutes “social cohesion” (see my argument in Chapter 5), little concern for measurement issues, the presumption that any effects of diversity will be the same for majority and minority groups, and the failure to link diversity with the socioeconomic context in a neighborhood. “The one size fits all model...faces severe problems with its empirical support,” they argue.

The strong negative relationship across many studies between ethnic diversity and various measures of cohesion at the neighborhood level could be real—or it could simply reflect the fact that we tend to have friends very much like ourselves and thus social cohesion may be less likely to occur in more diverse settings. This is especially puzzling since there is little evidence that diversity drives down trust beyond the borders of one’s neighborhood. The theoretical confusion Tolsma and van der Meer find is reminiscent of the argument made at a political science conference many years ago by Charles O. Jones about the state of knowledge in comparative state politics in the United States: “Lots of things are related to lots of things, other things being equal.”

My goal is to bring some greater conceptual and methodological clarification to this debate. I start with a discussion of why diversity is not the cause of low trust. Across countries, the relationships between trust and a wide range of measures of diversity are minuscule. I examined 11 measures of diversity and a measure of trust covering more countries than in other studies (see Uslaner, in press). The measures include the original Easterly-Levine (1997) ethnic fractionalization measure based upon data from an atlas from the former Soviet Union; Alesina’s indices of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization (Alesina, et al., 2003); four measures from Fearon (2003) including his own index of fractionalization and measures of cultural diversity, the size of the largest group in a country, and
the size of the second largest group; and four measures from Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)–their own indices of ethnic and religious fractionalization and their preferred measure of ethnic polarization.

The most common measure of diversity is an index of fractionalization, also called a Herfindahl index (Alesina et al., 2003). Many studies use simpler measures such as the minority share of population–but this is not of major concern since the two measures are largely interchangeable (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999, 1270-1271; see also below). The polarization index is a measure of the relative sizes of different ethnic groups in a country and Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol argue (2005, 6) that there are “... more conflicts in societies where a large ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority.” Polarization should thus be more strongly related to trust than is simple fractionalization–especially since the outbreak of civil war is associated with lower trust.

The highest \( r^2 \) for the 11 measures are for the Montalvo-Reynal-Querol measures. However, they are modest (.118 for polarization and .132 and .110 for the two fractionalization measures). They are higher than the Alesina ethnic fractionalization index (.102) only because they cover fewer countries (66 each compared to 84 for the Alesina measure). The other measures all are modestly related to trust: \( r^2 = .047 \) for the Easterly-Levine measure (N = 68), .090 for Fearon’s fractionalization measure (N = 82), .086 for the size of the second largest ethnic group (from Fearon, N = 76), and .092 for Fearon’s measure of the size of the largest group (sign reversed, N = 82). The other measures all had minuscule \( r^2 \) values, less than .01: Alesina’s linguistic and religious fractionalization (N = 83, 84) and Fearon’s cultural diversity index (N = 82). The scattergrams for each of these measures do not suggest any non-linearities–instead, diversity seems to be uncorrelated with trust. In cross-national models of trust similar to those I have estimated earlier (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 8; Uslaner, in press) only four of these measures–the ethnic fractionalization indices from Alesina, Fearon, and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol–and Fearon’s share of the largest group–achieved statistical significance at the .10
level (one-tailed tests). No measure was significant at the .05 level or greater.\textsuperscript{5}

I also examine the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on trust in another context: across the American states. Richard F. Winters has derived a measure of ethnic heterogeneity across the states in the 1990s using a Herfindahl index. Rodney Hero has estimated the share of each state’s minority population for the 1990s. I estimated state-level shares of trusting people from a variety of national surveys conducted from the 1970s through the 1990s;\textsuperscript{6} the 1990 data provide trust estimates for 44 states. Ethnic heterogeneity does not predict trust any better in the American states ($r^2 = .007$) than it does cross-nationally–indeed, the coefficient (though insignificant) is slightly positive.

Minority groups are much less trusting than are majorities–especially in the United States where minorities have faced considerable discrimination (Uslaner, 2002, 35-36), so it makes sense to expect that states with large shares of minority residents would, on average, be less trusting–yet even here the relationship is modest ($r^2 = .173$). Ethnic homogeneity and the share of the minority population are, of course, related ($r^2 = .510$), though hardly identical. Yet even the share of the minority population falls to insignificance in predicting trust when economic inequality enters the equation.

There is not significant support for the claims that social ties lead to greater trust, that trust in people you know translates into faith in strangers who may be different from yourself, or that diversity leads to less trust (or to more trust either). The many studies on each topic so far lead to a dead-end in the quest to understand how these ties and their contexts shape social cohesion.

**Diverse Ties and Trust**

While trust is largely formed early in life–and through your ethnic heritage perhaps well before that, it is not immune to the world you live in. A key reason why social connections don’t shape generalized (out-group) trust is that most of us “hunker down” with people like ourselves.

What about people who do have diverse social ties? Are they more trusting? I present
Uslaner, *Segregation, and Mistrust*, ch. 2 (18)

data in Table 2-1 from the United States and in Table 2-2 from the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and Australia–using the surveys I shall employ throughout the rest of the book. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey asked a variety of trust questions: generalized trust, trust of one’s own ethnic group, and trust in various ethnic groups *relative to one’s own group*. It also asked about friendship patterns–having friends who are black, Hispanic, Asian, or white, as well as the total number of friendship patterns across groups. Each friendship pattern is based upon out-group friendships only (so having a white friend only includes non-white respondents). Correlations are once again very modest–the highest correlation for generalized trust is for non-whites having a white friend (τ = .122), and even this relationship is small. There is no evidence that people who trust their own group highly are less likely to have friends from a different background.

Having a friend of a different group has no effect on how much one trusts African-Americans or whites, and only modest effects on trusting Latinos or Asians. Having a Latino friend makes you slightly more likely to trust Hispanics relative to one’s own group (r = .120) and having an Asian friend makes people slightly more likely to trust Asians (r = .133). Yet even these relations are modest and there is no evidence that having a friend of an opposite race makes a person more trusting in general.

For the UK, there are again very small correlations between having friends of different backgrounds and generalized trust. For all respondents, the correlation (τ) is a mere .008. For whites and non-whites separately, the correlations are somewhat higher (.059 and .064, respectively), but still very small. They are not much larger for any minority group (blacks, people of African or East Indian background, or Muslims). The results are similar for Canada, though the correlations are slightly higher: .093 for all respondents, .068 for Anglophones, and .103 for Quebecois.
The Ersta Skondal 2009 survey in Sweden does not have a simple question on friendship diversity. It asks about the number of friends of different religions and languages. Here again the correlations are small—for native Swedes, Nordics born in other countries who have emigrated to Sweden (mostly Finns), people whose ancestry is elsewhere in Europe or North America, and others (“minorities”). The correlations are somewhat smaller for minorities and people who do not say that their primary identity is Swedish. Since 90 percent of respondents live in neighborhoods that are 90 percent or more native Swedes, I restricted the analysis to “more diverse” neighborhoods (fewer than 90 percent native Swedes). In these more heterogeneous areas, the correlations between friends of different religion actually decrease but they are somewhat greater (around .150) for having friends who speak different languages for all respondents, native Swedes, and people who do not identify as Swedes. For most other groups, the sample sizes are too small to make many claims one way or the other. For language, there does seem to be a positive spillover in more diverse areas from friends of different backgrounds to trust—but even here it is rather small.

The Australian survey asks people whether they visit friends of other ethnicities and religions at their homes or host people of other ethnicities and religions in their own homes—which may come closer to the deeper sorts of ties essential for Allport’s “optimal conditions.” As elsewhere, there are at best modest correlations between trust and any of these measures of contact. The correlations are somewhat higher for majority respondents than for minorities—presaging the results for Australia in Chapter 6.

Diverse social contacts might lead to increased trust if they were more common—and especially if they are more intense. Volunteering to help people who are different from yourself rests upon a foundation of trust but also leads to more trust in turn (Andreoni, 1989; Uslaner, 2002, 133-141). And the very committed civil rights volunteers in the United States in the 1960s had much higher levels of trust than other Americans and their trust increased over time (Uslaner, 2002, 161). Volunteering for civil rights engaged people with people unlike
themselves—in pursuit of a common goal—fulfilling Allport’s optimal conditions.

Diverse contacts *do* make a difference in settings where they are most likely to be both intense and of equal status—as youngsters in school. High school students who had a friend of a different race were more likely to become trusting adults (Uslaner, 2002, 169). Higher education also leads to greater trust: At university, we meet people of different backgrounds and become exposed to courses on different culture. Education, Smith (1997, 191) argues, “may cultivate a more benign view of the world and of humanity.” Students in integrated grade schools are more trusting of out-groups (Rotenberg and Cerda, 1994). A college education broadens our horizons by teaching us about people different from ourselves and bringing us into contact with them (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Education, one might think, simply represents higher status, but if this were the case, income would be a significant predictor of trust as well and it is not (Uslaner, 2002, 35).

This leads to the question of how and where we can find the optimal conditions for contact to boost trust.

**Segregation and Trust**

The problem is not diversity, but residential segregation. Living in segregated neighborhoods reinforces in-group trust at the expense of out-group (generalized) trust.

Concentrated minorities are more likely to develop a strong identity that supercedes a national sense of identification (trust in people who are different from oneself) and to build local institutions and political bodies that enhance this sense of separateness. Segregation may also lead to greater political organization by minority groups, which can establish their own power bases in opposition to the political organizations dominated by the majority group as their share of the citizenry grows (cf. Alesina and Zhuravskaya, in press; Uslaner, 2011). Massey and Denton (1993, 13, 138, 155-6, 167, emphasis in original) write about 20th century America:

Segregation increases the susceptibility of neighborhoods to...spirals of decline...In the face of persistent neighborhood disorder, residents come to distrust
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (21)

their neighbors and to look upon them as threats rather than as sources of support or assistance...they...limit their contacts outside of close friends and family....The historical confinement of blacks to the ghetto...meant that blacks shared few political interests with whites....The existence of solid black electoral districts...did create the potential for bloc voting along racial lines....an alternative status system has evolved within America’s ghettos that is defined in opposition to basic ideals and values of American society.

Blalock (1982, 111) argues similarly: “It is difficult...to imagine how groups can socialize their members to prefer insulation without, at the same time, instilling in them a basic fear and distrust of outsiders, including other minorities. This is all the more true if there has been a previous history of mutually hostile contact.”

Wirth (1927, 61-62) made a similar argument about the impact of residential segregation on Jews in big cities in the 1920s:

Through the instrumentality of the ghetto there gradually developed that social distance which effectively isolated the Jew from the remainder of the population. These barriers did not completely inhibit contact, but they reduced it to the type of relationships which were of a secondary and formal nature. As these barriers crystallized and his life was lived more and more removed from the rest of the world, the solidarity of his own little community was enhanced until it became strictly divorced from the larger world without.

When residential choice is determined by race, language, income, or social status rather than by choice, “the task of holding organizations together and maintaining and promoting intimate and lasting acquaintance between the members is difficult” (Wirth, 1938, 17).

Isolation has been far more pervasive and destructive of social ties for African-Americans. Anderson (2011, 214) argues forcefully that segregation builds up in-group trust at the expense of generalized trust for African-Americans: “Many working-class and poor blacks
are ethnocentric because they have limited exposure to white people who are not agents of the dominant society in the ghetto. The social isolation they experience encourages them to feel that the wider society is profoundly unreceptive to them and to all black people.”

For some segregation is a way station toward integration with the larger society. Immigrant groups arrive in a new nation with few assets and fewer social connections. People from their home countries are a key support base—for social relations, religion, food, and critically jobs and economic security. Chinatowns in America have served to ease the transition into the larger communities. Yet, for all of the positive contributions ethnic enclaves can bring, they can also entrap people into their insulated worlds and make it more difficult for them to advance both socially and economically (Portes and Landolt, 1996; Zhou, 1997, 2003).

While most immigrant and minority groups succeed economically and move out of segregated areas (Massey and Denton, 1993, 27, 33, 87; Peach, 2005, 18), some—most notably African-Americans in the United States—remain segregated. One third of blacks are “hypersegregated”: Not only are they clustered together in small areas of central cities, they are also live closer to other segregated minorities and farther away from the majority white population (Massey and Denton, 1993, 74). Other American minorities, such as Hispanics, are rarely hypersegregated while neither Asian-Americans nor Native Americans are so isolated. Even as the incomes of African-Americans has risen, their isolation from white society has persisted. Middle class blacks find it difficult to escape the ghetto as upwardly mobile members of other minorities have done. White ethnic groups were never as isolated in enclaves as African-Americans are today. (Massey and Denton, 1993, 32. 74, 85, 87, 144; Wilkes and Iceland, 2004, 29, 34).

Segregation, and especially hypersegregation, leads to an unwelcome harvest of bad outcomes: Low incomes, lack of jobs, drug use, teenage pregnancies, unmarried parents, low birthweight babies, higher levels of AIDS infections, low rates of education fostered by less government spending on schools, lower levels of entrepreneurship, more crime, and deteriorating
Hypersegregation is primarily an American phenomenon and segregation rates are higher in the United States than elsewhere. The ghetto is distinctly American—but other Western nations (including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden, the focus here) have enclaves where members of many minorities live together and away from the majority white populations. What is distinctive about the United States is not only the extent of segregation, but also the worsening of conditions for African-Americans in the central cities. As black incomes have risen, middle class African-Americans have deserted the inner cities—though often to segregated suburbs rather than to mixed neighborhoods. This exodus has wrecked havoc with the quality of life in the cities. The absence of a middle class has led to spiraling rates of joblessness and low rates of graduation from high schools that has created a “sense of social isolation” (Wilson, 1987, 56-57).

Segregation breeds mistrust because it isolates groups from each other. Its effects are even more pernicious because of *how segregation shapes the lives of those with less voice in where they live*. Just as we socialize with people very much like ourselves, we often choose to live among people from our own background. Economically mobile people are likely to find people of similar interests and economic status from different backgrounds. Living in neighborhoods primarily—or exclusively—made up of people from your own background is often not a matter of choice. Sometimes it is a matter of discrimination—of not being able to find a place to buy or rent in a more diverse neighborhood. And sometimes it reflects entrapment in a ghetto without the means to get out. Either—or both—destroys trust in outsiders. If we look around our neighborhood and *only* see people very much like ourselves, we are likely to develop a much stronger sense of in-group identity that leaves little room for trust in strangers. In highly segregated Philadelphia, African-Americans reported few friends of anyone other than blacks (Massey and Denton, 1993, 161).
Segregation also leads to mistrust because it leads to both despair and especially to inequality. Since trust depends upon a foundation of optimism and control—the belief that the world is a good place, it is going to get better, and I am the master of my own fate in making it better (Uslaner, 2002, 23, 112)—residents of the ghetto have little reason to believe that their lives will get better, that they are the masters of their fates, or that “most people can be trusted.”

Anderson (2010, 2) writes: “Segregation of social groups is a principal cause of group inequality.” Bowles, Loury, and Sethi (2009, 11) argue that “...when segregation is sufficiently great, group equality cannot be attained even asymptotically, no matter what the initial conditions may be” (cf. Massey and Denton, 1993, 127-128). There is a close connection between segregation and inequality, both cross-nationally and across communities in the United States. The ties between racial and economic segregation have become stronger in recent years. Ironically, the overall level of residential segregation has declined modestly for African-Americans (Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz, 2002, 110), leaving the poor behind in the inner cities.

Racially isolated neighborhoods are far more likely to be poor than in the past, as middle class minorities move out and the ghetto increasingly becomes the home of the “truly disadvantaged” (Wilson, 1987). With better transportation and the rise of suburbs, middle-class people no longer needed to live in the city to find work, leaving only the poor—and minorities—living in the central cities (Massey, 1996, 397-398). The poor—and notably poor African-Americans—lag behind wealthier whites on such measures as the black-white achievement gap in schools (Card and Rothstein, 2007, 2189). Minorities in segregated communities are isolated from jobs and receive less police protection than wealthier neighborhoods—exacerbating the pathology of disorder in the ghetto (Anderson, 2010, 2, 41).

The migration of the middle classes to the suburbs has led to a tighter connection between racial and economic segregation in the United States from the 1970s to 2000 (Fische, 2003; Jargowsky, 1996, 990; Soss and Jacobs, 2009, 123; Watson, 2009, 15). While most whites have
upward economic mobility across generations, 78 percent of African-Americans now move down the economic ladder (Sharkey, 2009, 11).

The concentration of lower-income blacks in the central cities exacerbates despair. What had been vibrant, if economically depressed, communities are now dysfunctional. Massey and Denton (1996, 138) argue:

Residents modify their routines and increasingly stay indoors; they minimize their time on the streets and limit their contacts outside of close friends and family. This withdrawal only promotes further disorder by lowering the number of watchful neighbors in public places and by undermining the community’s capacity for collective action....If disorder is allowed to increase, it ultimately creates conditions that promote not only additional disorder, but also crime...Perceptions of crime and danger gleaned from friends and neighbors who have been victimized, or who have heard of victimizations, cause residents to increase their mistrust of neighbors and to withdraw from public participation in the community.

Blacks in segregated neighborhoods have lower rates of civic efficacy (Anant and Washington, 2009). 10

This syndrome of discouragement and inequality depresses trust among a minority that never had much reason to express faith in “most people” (Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers, 1976, 456).

Segregation seems inimical to trust. It isolates us from people who are different from ourselves and it leads to despair and perceptions of unfairness among those who are live apart from those better off. However, living in an integrated neighborhood is not sufficient to boost trust–since we can live among people of different backgrounds and stay away from them (Allport, 1958, 260). Knowing people of different backgrounds doesn’t imply that the relationships will be close: Only a minuscule share of the Jews in the Elmira study who knew blacks had close ties and about half did not call their acquaintances by their first name (Williams
et al., 1964, 210). Students across 144 schools in 80 American communities in 1994-95 largely formed friendship networks within their own race and ethnic group, even among third generation immigrants (Quillian and Campbell, 2003). Young people are especially likely to seek friends of their own ethnic group (across 13 countries) if their neighborhoods are segregated—and if their parents came from lower status groups (Phinney et al., 2006, 94).

Bradburn, Sudman, and Gockel (1970, 394-396) report few cross-racial friendships in the most comprehensive survey of race relations in integrated and segregated neighborhoods across 100 segregated and 100 integrated neighborhoods in 35 cities in 1967:

Eighty-one per cent of whites in integrated neighborhoods report that neither they nor any member of their family has even stopped and talked with a Negro neighbor in the past few months, and 95 per cent also report no equal-status interracial contact in the home or at parties, movies, or neighboring meetings. These figures are particularly striking since they refer to interracial contact in integrated neighborhoods. But the great bulk of Americans live in segregated neighborhoods. Thus, the absence of equal-status interracial contacts is underplayed by our data.

Much may have changed since 1967 but there is little reason to believe that the overall pattern is markedly different. Equal contact and friendships across race and ethnicity seem to be the exception rather than the rule.

Might inequality lead to segregation rather than the other way around? The logic seems to be more compelling about segregation being the prime mover. The initial choice of residence for minority groups seems less predicated upon income than upon a desire to live among people from their own group (Koopmans, 2010, 15). Most immigrant groups move out of segregated areas after acculturating themselves to their new home country—as I show for Hispanics and Asians in the United States and immigrants of most backgrounds in Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia in the chapters that follow. Escape to integrated neighborhoods
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (27)

does not necessarily lead to greater economic equality. And Economic and residential segregation have become increasingly intertwined—even as the latter has generally fallen (Iceland, 2009, 113). Those minorities “left behind” in segregated communities—notably African-Americans in the United States—fall deeper into poverty, suggesting that segregation is the moving force behind inequality. Segregation may have economic foundations, but they are considerably less important than are people’s preferences for where they want to live, as I show in Chapter 8. The connection between persisting segregation and inequality is more direct.

The effects of segregation on trust (or other beliefs) are not straightforward. Segregation by itself may be sufficient to drive down trust, but integration does not automatically lead to greater trust (see Figure 2-1). Segregation will lead, with very high probability, to little contact across racial or ethnic lines. It isolates groups from each other. Integration may also lead to social isolation if you don’t make friends with your neighbors. Even if, as seems likely, integrated neighborhoods are more likely to lead to contact across group lines, these interactions may be infrequent or superficial. Deeper ties, as Allport envisioned them, are only one possible outcome in an integrated community—and not necessarily the most likely pattern.

Figure 2-1 about here

In the United States (Detroit, Michigan) and Canada, Stolle and her colleagues have found that living in a diverse neighborhood and having friends of different backgrounds makes a person more trusting (Marschall and Stolle, 2004; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008). Hooghe (2007, 719) refines this thesis when he argues that both diverse and segregated neighborhoods must occur together to lead to a decline in trust. Rothwell (2010) finds that segregation alone is correlated with distrust but for whites, trust rises if they live in integrated and diverse neighborhoods.

The issue here is that diversity and segregation are not the same thing. I shall elaborate on this below, but for now I offer the central hypothesis of my argument:
Living in a diverse and integrated neighborhood with close friends of
different backgrounds leads to a greater likelihood of trust. Living in a
segregated and less diverse neighborhood without friends of different
backgrounds makes someone less trusting.

I find support for this claim in the United States, where segregation is strongest, as well as for the United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden (and in results not reported here, for Australia). Outside the United States, segregation is not as widespread so there is less need to interact segregation with diversity. Only in Canada and Australia can I obtain distinct measures of segregation and diversity but the relationship between the two indices is stronger in Canada than in the United States, making estimation of distinct effects especially with interaction terms more problematic.

In Australia (see Chapter 6), the relationship is curiously negative, owing to a small number of outliers. But this means that creating an interaction term is problematic.

Outside the United States, having friends of different backgrounds in integrated neighborhoods leads to greater trust. Except in Sweden, the impact of living in an integrated (and diverse) neighborhood and having friends of different background matters more for majority (white) populations than for minorities. (In Australia, the optimal conditions matter only for minorities.) Whites are less likely to have friends of different backgrounds than are minorities (cf. Dinesen, 2011b for similar findings on Denmark). So when they do come closer to meeting Allport’s optimal conditions, the impact will be greater on majorities. Rothwell (2009, 18-19) finds that “[s]egregation is associated with significantly more racist views on Black intelligence and more psychological distance from Blacks” and that “[i]ntegration...is strongly and robustly correlated with higher levels of trust, voter turnout, and more favorable views of Whites towards Blacks” (cf. Anant and Washington, 2009, 814). Whites who moved from segregated to integrated neighborhoods viewed minorities more positively (Hamilton, Carpenter, and Bishop, 1984, 105; Hunt, 1959-60, 207-208).

Minorities are less trusting for good reasons—they face discrimination and inequality, so
that there is only so much that we can expect living conditions and social relations to do in building trust. Minorities are most likely to become more trusting under Allport’s conditions where segregation and inequality are most profound: the United States (see Chapter 3). Yet, even here, the effects are tempered by the profound segregation shaping the lives of African-Americans.

It is important to issue a caveat to the results ahead. The cross-national results are based upon analyses of surveys that were conducted independently in each country. There is no common set of questions, so the models of trust depend upon the available variables that might influence faith in others. Thus, inferences across countries must be taken with some caution. Just as critically, most of the surveys do not permit a direct test of Allport’s optimal conditions. Most surveys have simple questions about having friends of different backgrounds, not questions about the depth and quality of such friendships. So I cannot fully test Allport’s optimal conditions. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, the findings for all five countries support my arguments that segregation matters—and that context matters as well: Simply having friends of different backgrounds is not sufficient to build trust. But having diverse networks in an integrated (and diverse) community does seem to build trust.

Segregation and Diversity

Is my distinction between segregation and diversity merely a semantic distinction, what the British would call “not much of a muchness”? Is segregation really different from diversity? The simple answer is “yes.”

Diversity is usually measured as a Herfindahl or fractionalization index, although sometimes it is more crudely estimated as the share of minorities or immigrants in a neighborhood. To compute the fractionalization (Herfindahl) index, you sum the squared proportions of each group in the population. The resulting measure is an estimate of the probability that two randomly selected individuals in the population come from different groups (Alesina et al., 2003).
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (30)

Fractionalization measures such as those used by Putnam and others cannot distinguish between simple population diversity and residential segregation. A city/state/nation/neighborhood with a highly diverse population—and thus a high fractionalization index—may be marked by either high or low residential segregation. Figure 2-2 presents alternative scenarios on residential segregation. They represent hypothetical neighborhoods of blue and red ethnicities. Each neighborhood has equal shares of blue and red residents. In the community on the left, the two ethnic groups live apart from each other, divided by a highway or railroad tracks, so there is less of an opportunity to interact. In the community on the right, the neighborhood is mixed. Each blue (red) resident has at least one red (blue) neighbor. Yet the fractionalization indices are identical.

Figure 2-2 about here

There are multiple measures of segregation, with five dimensions identified in the literature (Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz, 2002, 8, 119-122):

• Evenness, or how people are distributed across neighborhoods and cities.
• Exposure measures the probability of contact between members of different groups.
• Concentration is a measure of how tightly each group is “packed into” an area.
• Centralization is a measure of concentration in center of an urban area.
• Clustering is a measure of how closely minority groups live to each other.

When a group is disadvantaged on most (generally at least four) of the dimensions, it is said to be hypersegregated.

The most widely used measure is based upon evenness. It is the index of dissimilarity, which measures how evenly groups are spread out across metropolitan areas. What proportion of each group in a neighborhood would have to move to make the area representative of the larger metropolitan area (in the United States, the standard metropolitan statistical area, or SMSA)? The isolation index ($P^*$) is less widely used. The isolation index, a measure of exposure, is an
estimate of the probability of interaction between members of two groups in an area (Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz, 2002, 119-122). It is generally computed for two groups at a time: the relative isolation of African-Americans from whites or the relative isolation of Hispanics from Asian-Americans. Its interpretation is similar to the fractionalization (diversity) indices.

Each measure has its strengths and weaknesses. The isolation index is sensitive to the size of each group, while the diversity index is not. The dissimilarity and related indices are not determined by the size of the group but are affected by the size of the units measured. The share of each group that would have to move to make the neighborhood resemble the larger area depends upon how large both the neighborhood and the metropolitan area are (Racial Residential Segregation Measurement Project, n.d.).

Echenique and Fryer (2007) have developed an alternative measure based upon large-scale surveys of high school students’ interactions with members of different ethnic and racial groups and have argued that their “Spectral” index is only moderately correlated with any of the other indices. However, the Spectral index is not available over time or across countries so I do not use it.

The dissimilarity index has three key strengths. First, its meaning is intuitive and it seems to fit what we think segregation means. Second, it seems reasonable that a measure of segregation should not depend upon the size of different groups in a population. This is a weakness of the fractionalization measures (and of P*). Third, since it is widely used, it is available at different levels and across countries. The Alesina and Zhuravskaya (in press) cross-national measure is based upon the dissimilarity index and measures in other countries are usually based upon this same formula. These are compelling reasons to use the dissimilarity index.

For the United States, I use a variation on the dissimilarity measure, the entropy index. This construct is “the (weighted) average deviation of each areal unit from the metropolitan area's ‘entropy’ or racial and ethnic diversity, which is greatest when each group is equally represented
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (32)

in the metropolitan area (Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz, 2002, 119). It is based upon the same logic as the dissimilarity index and is the measure employed by the United States Bureau of the Census (Iceland, 2004). The entropy index, like the traditional dissimilarity measure is an index of “the percentage of a group’s population that would have to change residence for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that group as the metropolitan area overall” (Iceland and Scopilliti, 2008, 83). It is weighted by the diversity of each census tract so that “...the diversity score is influenced by the relative size of the various groups in a metropolitan area, the entropy index, being a measure of evenness, is not. Rather, it measures how evenly groups are distributed across metropolitan area neighborhoods, regardless of the size of each of the groups” (Iceland, 2004, 8). Dissimilarity measures—as with indices of isolation—only reflect the level of segregation between two groups. Iceland estimates Theil’s measure of “multigroup entropy,” providing a single indicator for segregation across all ethnic and racial groups.

The segregation measure “varies between 0, when all areas have the same composition as the entire metropolitan area (i.e., maximum integration), to a high of 1, when all areas contain one group only (maximum segregation)” (Iceland, 2004, 3, 8). Iceland also reports a traditional diversity measure based on census tract data providing a direct comparison between indices of segregation and diversity.

Diversity and segregation are not the same thing. Across 325 communities, the simple correlation for the two measures in 2000 is just .297 (and .231 for 1990 and .270 for 1980). The diversity measure is actually a surrogate for the percent nonwhite in a community (r = -.793) while the segregation measure is only modestly correlated with the non-white share (r = -.279) for the 2000 data (see also Vervoort, Flap, and Dagevos, in press, and Tolsma, van der Meer, and Gesthuizen, 2009, 302, for similar findings for the Netherlands). Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999, 1271) admit that their measure of ethnic diversity is strongly correlated with the percent African-American in a community (r = .80) and worry that their diversity measure “...could just be proxying for black majorities versus white majorities.” They show that ethnic
diversity matters even in majority white communities, but this does not resolve the issue of whether diversity is another name for the share of the minority population.

Segregation is not as strongly correlated with the share of African-Americans in a community (r = .542) or the share of minorities—African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians—more generally (r = .150, both N = 237). In the Social Capital Benchmark Survey in the United States, there are city-level and other subnational samples in addition to the national survey. I aggregated data to the community level (as they are called in the data set) and there is a strong negative correlation between trust and diversity (r = -.662, N = 41). When I add the shares of population in a community who are African American and Hispanic to a regression, diversity is no longer significant (t = -.032), while the African-American and Hispanic population shares are significant at p < .001 and p < .10, respectively (t = -3.41 and -1.62, one-tailed tests). We know that minorities have less generalized trust than whites (Uslaner, 2002, 35-36, 98-107).

The measure of diversity, like the similarly constructed P* index, is sensitive to the size of the minority population in an area. Does diversity drive down trust or does it merely reflect the lower trust levels of groups that have long faced discrimination? If the latter, we might expect segregation to be more important in shaping faith in others than the “mere” fact of population diversity. I turn to how segregation shapes trust—and other outcomes that in turn may lead to greater faith in others.

**Segregation, Inequality, and Trust**

Segregation is a major factor leading to inequality in the United States and across nations. And inequality leads to lower levels of trust. Alesina and Zhuravskaya (in press) find strong effects of ethnic and linguistic (but not religious) segregation on reducing trust, in both simple models and more complex ones using instrumental variables and controlling for the quality of government. Using two different measures of segregation, I find strong support for the argument that segregation leads to lower levels of trust across countries. First, I employ a crude measure of segregation from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project of the Center for International
Development and Conflict Management at University of Maryland, I estimated the geographical isolation of major minority groups within a wide range of countries.\textsuperscript{15} The MAR project created a trichotomous index for each major minority group in a country and I aggregated the scores across countries. This is an approximation, to be sure, but it is the best available measure of geographical separation. Countries where minorities are most geographically isolated have the lowest levels of generalized trust, a relationship that is considerably strengthened when I eliminate countries with a legacy of Communism (Figure 3).\textsuperscript{16} The $r^2$ values are .182 and .342, respectively, substantially higher than for any of the measures of diversity.

Second, I examine the Alesina-Zhuravskaya measures of segregation. They computed indices of ethnic, linguistic, and religious segregation for 97 countries, 62 of which also have trust estimates in my cross-national data set. Neither linguistic nor religious segregation is even modestly correlated with trust, but segregation by ethnicity is ($r = -.377$) and the results are even stronger when countries with a Communist legacy are excluded ($r = -.489$), again higher than one finds for diversity.\textsuperscript{17} I present a plot of trust and segregation across 47 countries in Figure 2-3. At the very lowest levels of segregation, the relationship with trust seems rather muted, becoming stronger as ethnic groups become more likely to live apart from each other.

The direct impact of ethnic segregation on trust is rather modest in a multivariate model, whether I exclude countries with a legacy of Communism or include a dummy variable for these countries. When I estimate a model similar to that in Uslaner (2002, 233-240), ethnic segregation does drive down trust, but the coefficient is significant only at $p < .10$.\textsuperscript{18}

A more compelling story is how segregation leads to lower levels of trust because of its effects on inequality. I estimated a model for trust instrumenting inequality with ethnic segregation and two other measures: the extent of ethnic tensions as measured by the International Control Risk Group in 2005 and an index of the size of the informal sector from the
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (35)

2004 Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum. The logic of the instruments is straightforward: Segregation and inequality are strongly linked (as I argued above). Ethnic tensions should lead to discrimination against the minority by the majority—and hence to greater inequality. A larger informal sector means that some workers are marginalized, without protection from exploitive employers—leading to greater inequality.

Segregation leads to greater economic inequality across 51 nations—and inequality leads to lower trust (see Table 2-3). Alternatively, an argument that inequality might lead to greater segregation—a possible if not as plausible alternative causal mechanism—also receives strong support. Inequality in this model (not shown) is a powerful determinant of segregation and the instrument also has a powerful impact on trust.

Both across nations and American standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), segregation, not diversity, leads to greater inequality. I estimated a simple model for inequality across 65 nations with only Alesina’s ethnic segregation and fractionalization measures as predictors together with a dummy variable for (former) Communist nations. The coefficient for segregation (significant at p < .005) is almost six times as great as that for diversity (not significant). I also estimated models for two measures of inequality for American SMSAs using a measure developed by Iceland (2004), the ratio of minority income to majority (white) income in each jurisdiction and a Gini index for each SMSA estimated by Elena LaFerrara. The income ratio is available for 323 SMSAs, but the LaFerrara Gini only covers 227.

The story in the two models is essentially the same (see Table 2-4): Segregation is a major determinant of inequality—in the first model, the major influence on inequitable distributions of resources. Diversity doesn’t matter. Other factors also shape the income ratio—how many minority group members are high school graduates, own their own homes, and speak English as well as the percent suburban. The suburban ratio is especially important for the
Segregation leads to many bad outcomes and I focus on two that are central to trust and inequality: Crime and well-being. The publisher CQ Press developed a data base on crime across American communities and standard metropolitan statistical areas for 2003, 2006, and 2007. And the Gallup organization developed an indicator of community well-being for 113 metropolitan areas in 2010. Clearly many other negative outcomes stem from segregation. I focus on crime and well-being since they are widely discussed consequences of segregation and metropolitan-area data are available.

Crime is high where trust is low (Uslaner, 2002, 209-210, 244-245) and where people are poor. High rates of crime are also associated with large minority populations, since minorities are poor and the ghetto is associated with so many negative outcomes associated with high crime: high unemployment, low rates of graduation, many single parent families, and an atmosphere of despair (Liska, Chamlin, and Reed, 1985, 128; Massey, 2007, 195; Massey and Denton, 1993, 138; Wilson, 1987, 38). The effects of segregation on crime are disputed. There is evidence that segregation leads to substantially higher rates of crime, largely because segregation and poverty are so tightly connected. Yet even segregated white neighborhoods also have higher rates of crime (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl, 2009, 1786-1791). Desegregation has resulted in lower rates of crime (Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig, 2009, 35). Yet others hold that integration brings more minorities into predominantly white (and presumably safer) communities, increasing the rates of arrest for homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft (Liska, Chamlin, and Reed, 1985, 128).

I cannot resolve this issue here, but I want to distinguish between the effects of
segregation and diversity (minority population) on crime rates in American SMSAs. Using the CQ data for 2007 (Morgan and Morgan with Boba, 2009), I estimated a series of regressions for crime rates in American communities. The dependent variables are first the simple rates of robbery, murder, violent crime, assault, burglary, larceny, property crime, motor vehicle theft, rape, and overall crime for 2007 using the 2000 measures of segregation and diversity from Iceland (2004) as well as other measures from his data base: that might lead to high levels of crime: the percent vacant housing in a community, the share of minority homeowners, and the share of minorities with a high school degree. I expect that higher rates of minority home ownership and education should lead to less crime, while greater vacant housing rates should lead to more crime. The key variables are segregation and diversity. Next, I examine whether changes in segregation from 1990 to 2000 lead to changes in crime rates. The crime change data (2003-2007) are not aligned with increases or decreases in segregation. They are the closest I can get to any estimates of change. I present graphical depictions of the regression coefficients for both sets of models (based upon 210-220 communities) in Figure 2-4.

The results in Figure 2-4 for the cross-sectional models do not tell a simple story about segregation. Overall crime and rates of larceny, motor vehicle theft, property crime, and rape are higher in integrated areas. But robbery, murder, violent crime, assault, and burglary rates increase as segregation becomes more pronounced. For diversity, every crime rate except those for rape and larceny are greater when there is more diversity (greater minority populations). Whether the impact is positive or negative, the impact of segregation is almost always substantially greater than it is for diversity. Generally property crime is greater in integrated neighborhoods—which are likely to be wealthier with more to steal. The one area where the effect of diversity is greater—indeed substantially greater—than segregation is motor vehicle theft. Violent crimes, with the exception of rape, are higher in segregated communities. This fits in
with the general notion of the ghetto as a place of despair.

The story is different for change in segregation. Communities that became more integrated (negative coefficient on change in segregation) from 1990 to 2000 had substantial reductions in crime on most measures—most notably overall crime, larceny, property crime, and robbery. But more violent crime rates—for violent crime overall, rape, assault, murder, and rape all fell in communities that became more integrated. The only exception is for motor vehicle theft. While violent crime, assault, and murder all increased as communities became more diverse, they all fell as neighborhoods became more integrated. Again, the effects for segregation change dwarf those of diversity change.

Segregation is associated with greater rates of crime—notably most violent crime—and more integration leads to greater adherence to the law.

With lower crime should come better well-being in general. As part of a broader effort to measure well-being across nations, the Gallup organization in 2010 measured well-being on five dimensions across over 100 American communities. The wellbeing index consists of indicators of life evaluation, access to basic services, and physical, emotional, and personal health based upon samples of 353,000 respondents. Are diversity or segregation factors in shaping wellbeing in American communities?

I estimated regressions for both segregation and diversity and present the results in Table 2-5. The models also include the share of minorities with a high school degree, the percent in a community living at 150 percent of the poverty level or higher, and the average hourly wage (all from Iceland, 2004). In both models, the share living above the poverty rate and especially the level of education predict well-being. So does segregation—moving from the most to the least segregated of the 113 communities leads to an 11 percent increase in well-being. But diversity has no impact on well-being. Its coefficient is less than a quarter as large as that for segregation and it fails to reach statistical significance. For both crime and wellbeing, segregation leads to worse outcomes (most of the time). Diversity matters either to a lesser extent or not at all.
The Weakness of Strong Ties

Economic inequality lowers trust by creating a world of “us against them.” When you believe that others have advantages over you, you will not see any common bonds with them. This lowers generalized trust and increases faith in your own in-group (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 2). Segregation may be strongly linked to inequality in the United States and across nations. This link is not universal. It is much weaker in Canada (Fong, 1996, 205; Phan, 2008, 37-38; Reitz and Banerjee, 2007, 520), Sweden (Andersson, 2008, 20; Harsman, 2006, 1350), Britain (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 128) and Australia (see Chapter 6), largely because the overall level of segregation is lower in these countries. Residential choices play a role as do housing policies (as I shall discuss throughout the book).

However, another government policy in Canada, Britain, and (in the past) Sweden and Australia may reinforce the low trust that immigrants “carry over” from the home country. Multiculturalism is designed to ease the transition to a new home as people “make new friends but keep the old, one is silver and the other gold.” Marx argued that you can be a farmer in the morning, a laborer in the afternoon, and a philosopher in the evening. Multiculturalists argue that you can be a Brit in the morning and a Bangladeshi in the evening, a Chinese in the morning and a Canadian in the afternoon, and (to a lesser extent) a Swede in the afternoon and an Eritrean in the evening, a Vietnamese at breakfast and an Australian at dinner.

Multiculturalism encourages dual identities. Kymlicka (2010, 10) argues: “...immigrants do best, both in terms of psychological well-being and sociocultural outcomes, when they are able to combine their ethnic identity with a new national identity.” Cultures, Lord Parekh (n.d.) argue, must be fluid, adapting to what a country’s population looks like now, not in the past. Modood (2007, 150, 121) argues that “...assimilation into an undifferentiated national identity...is unrealistic and oppressive as a policy. An inclusive national identity is respectful of and builds
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (40)

on the identities people value and doesn’t trample upon them....multiculturalism is the need to give respect to stigmatized or marginalized identities that are important to people and cannot be disregarded in the name of the individual, or...social cohesion, integration, or citizenship.” Such identities can peacefully coexist with a commitment to a broader national identity, even if the ethnic/racial / religious identity is the dominant one (Modood, 2007, 115).

Multiculturalism is connected to segregation in two ways. First, encouraging immigrants to adopt a dual identity, especially through government policies that promote identification with the “old country,” is likely to lead to social segregation—to a friendship network centered around people very much like oneself. This is social segregation and it works against the unitary temperament that I argue is central to generalized trust. Second, fostering in-group identity may also lead people to remain in communities composed of people of their own kind. Koopmans (2010, 15-18) finds that Northern European countries with strong multiculturalism policies have more residential segregation than those placing a greater emphasis on assimilation. Multiculturalism may thus promote both residential and social segregation.

The American model of the “melting pot” or *E pluribus unum* (“one out of many”) is an alternative to multiculturalism. The focus on integration into a common identity includes an expectation that immigrants will assimilate into a “superordinate” (or dominant) American identity. While people have a variety of identities—I am a professor, a husband and a father, a Chicago White Sox (baseball) fan, a native of New Jersey but now a resident of Maryland—the assimilationist model is based upon the idea that my *primary* identity is as an American. Multiculturalism emphasizes at least dual identities—from the old country and the new.

Governments adopt policies that help groups sustain their identity, such as the multilingual broadcasting network in Australia and newspapers in the language of the home country in Sweden. Such government support has the potential to the maintenance of strong in-group identity.

Every country I examine here other than the United States has adopted multiculturalism.
It originated in Canada but has spread widely across Western countries as they try to adapt to increased immigration into cultures that have traditionally not had to contend with increasing diversity. The debate over diversity and who is an “American” has a long and tortured history in the United States. It was always discussed in terms of integration and assimilation—since almost everyone in America (save for American Indians) came from somewhere else and the national motto of the country extolled diversity. Ironically, the country with the greatest commitment to an assimilationist (rather than multiculturalist) model of identity has the most residential segregation (in contrast to Koopmans’s findings for Europe)—and this will shape how social ties with diverse groups in integrated neighborhoods shapes trust (see Chapter 3).

Supporters of multiculturalism argue that this policy, which Canadians call the “mosaic,” makes immigrants feel less alienated from the majority (white) culture. Trevor Phillips (2005), Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the UK, argued in support of multiculturalism in a speech to the Manchester Council for Community Relations: “We need to be a nation of many colours that combine to create a single rainbow. Yes, that does mean recognising diversity and rejecting assimilation.” Lord Parekh (2002, 18) argues: “The danger is...compounded in the case of an imperial or post-imperial nation like Britain, where the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are imagined to be racial, rooted in unalterable nature.” Under multiculturalism, there is no single primary identity.

By promoting dual or multiple identities, multiculturalism may inadvertently lead to lower levels of trust. Generalized trust is based upon the notion of a common identity. As I argued in (Uslaner, 2002, 191, 197):

Generalized trusters have a distinctive view of civil society: They see it as one society united by a set of common values....Trusters want to empower minorities and other groups that have faced discrimination. Yet they worry that groups that disadvantaged groups might be wary of forming broad coalitions. Empowerment might easily lead to fractionalization. This would go against the very lesson that
Uslaner, *Segregation, and Mistrust*, ch. 2 (42)

trusting people put highest on their agenda: working to include rather than exclude folks who are different from yourself. So trusters are especially likely to say that ethnic politicians should *not* primarily serve their own communities. And, reflecting their view that there *is* a common culture, trusters are wary of the claim that high school and college students spend too much time reading classic literature.

It is easier for minorities to assimilate into a culture that does not have a dominant race or ethnicity, where virtually everyone has come from somewhere else and there are national symbols and holidays that are not based upon race, ethnicity, or religion. It is more difficult for people to become part of a culture that has a dominant race, ethnicity, or culture. But the alternative–remaining true to the culture you left behind–leads to lower levels of trust for the minorities seeking to establish bonds with their new home.

Reitz, Breton, Dion, and Dion (2009, 40) find (italics in original): “...*ethnic attachments seem, to have a clearly negative relation to the emergence of a ‘Canadian’ identity, and for immigrants to the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.*” Turkish immigrants with the strongest senses of national and religious (Muslim) identity are least likely to identify with their new home countries and have friendships across different ethnic groups in three European countries (Germany, France, and the Netherlands). In-group ethnic and religious identification are strongest in the Netherlands, with a long-standing multiculturalism policy and weakest in assimilationist France (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2009).

Data across countries and in the United States, Canada, and the UK all support this argument. The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in 2003 asked respondents whether they opposed government aid to minorities to preserve their culture (an unusual negatively worded question). Kymlicka (2007b, 260) identifies this as a key government policy designed to promote multiculturalism. Since generalized trust is based upon an inclusive sense of your community, I would expect a negative relationship between support for this policy and
generalized trust. And this is what I find: In Figure 2-5 I show a strong negative relationship (\( r^2 = .561 \)) between the level of generalized trust in 36 countries and the extent of opposition to government support for this multiculturalism policy. Perhaps ironically, Canadians are among the most supportive of multiculturalism in general\textsuperscript{25} but are among the strongest opponents of government aid to ethnic groups in maintaining their identity. The governments of Sweden and Australia are all committed publicly to multiculturalism, though more recently mixed with overtures back to assimilation--and their publics also show high levels of both trust and opposition to government aid to ethnic groups to maintain their home identities.

There is a modest relationship between trust and whether people think that their ethnic identity is very important from the 2003 ISSP (\( r^2 = .223 \)). When we consider the strength of ethnic identity across different groups, the picture changes. For both the United States and Canada, the more strongly members of a group feel that their ethnicity is important, the lower their levels of trust. For the United States, I aggregated responses to ethnic identity strength and trust by group from the General Social Survey. For Canada, Jantzen (2005) reports levels of both trust and the strength of ethnic identity by ethnic group. Her figures encompass responses to the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey for all respondents and second generation immigrants. When we focus on how identity shapes trust by group rather than for entire populations, we see much stronger relationships between the strength of identity and trust. Across 16 groups in the United States (Figure 2-6), there is an almost perfect linear relationship between the aggregate scores on the strength of identity and trust (\( r^2 = .824 \)). Minorities--African-Americans, Puerto Ricans, Latin Americans, and Mexicans--are strongly attached to their ethnicity and have lower levels of trust. People of European background are generally far less attached to their ethnicity and also are more trusting.
The same pattern holds for Canada—and notably there is a strong relationship between the aggregate level of trust and the strength of ethnic identity for second generation immigrants (Figure 2-7, \( r^2 = .767 \) across 19 groups). The strength of ethnic identity for the children of immigrants remains strong for “visible minorities” (as they are called in Canada): Caribbeans, Africans, East Indians, Filipino, Arabs, and Latin Americans, and Chinese—as well as Southern Europeans (Portuguese and Italians). Chinese immigrants are less bound to their ethnic identity and have higher levels of trust—but this may reflect the higher socio-economic status of Chinese immigrants to Canada (as it does to Asian-Americans more generally). Northern Europeans have both the highest levels of trust and the least identification with their homelands.

One group that is notably missing from this figure is Quebecois—there are no data reported for second generation immigrants and this makes sense since Quebecois are not a “new” or “visible” minority. Quebecois are included in the data for the “current” generation, where we see similar results (Figure 2-8, \( r^2 = .742 \) across 19 groups).\(^{26}\) Quebecois have a strong sense of ethnic identity and a level of trust that is even lower than one would expect from their in-group ties. Otherwise, the picture for the current generation looks remarkably like that for second generation immigrants.

For both the U.S. and Canada, there is a strong relationship between a group’s levels of ethnic identity and trust. Multiculturalism cannot be the culprit in this story, since Americans favor assimilation rather than a mosaic. Yet, even in a high trusting country such as Canada, multiculturalism is not a rising tide that lifts all boats. Visible minorities remain low trusting. Africans and especially Caribbeans in Canada are barely more trusting than are African-
Americans. And visible minorities remain tied to their ethnic identities even after a generation has passed. Every visible minority except Chinese and Filipino has a stronger ethnic identity after a generation has passed while the in-group ties of most Northern European minorities remains constant (and low). Most visible minorities have either unchanged or lower levels of trust after a generation.

By encouraging minorities to maintain strong affinity for the home country, multiculturalism may lead to social segregation. Strong bonding with one’s own ethnic group may inhibit trust especially if immigrants bring with them a low level of faith in others from the home country (Uslaner, 2008b) and if the mores and values of the host country seem strange or threatening.

Multiculturalism is not without its critics among minorities in countries that place a high value on this ideal. Kenan Malik (2011), a British writer, argued in an the New York Times argues that multiculturalism has led to a radicalization of immigrants, most notably European Muslims: “In place of citizenship and a genuine status in society, the state ‘allowed’ immigrants to keep their own culture, language and lifestyles. One consequence was the creation of parallel communities....this has resulted in the scapegoating of immigrants and the rise of both populist and Islamist rhetoric.” Neil Bissoondath (1998), a Canadian novelist, argues that many immigrants “recognize that multiculturalism...has exoticized, and so marginalized, them....

Multiculturalism, which asked that I bring to Canada the life I had in Trinidad, was a shock to me. I was seeking a new start in a land that afforded me that possibility. I was not (emphasis in original) to live in Toronto as if I were still in Trinidad....” Such claims may exaggerate the level of alienation among minorities (see Chapter 9). The larger point is that multiculturalism does encourage a continuing identification with a culture that is distinct from that of the “host country” and thus is inimical to forming bonds of trust across groups.

Hanging with the Homeboys: The Route to Low Trust

Are strong connections to your in-group necessarily destructive of generalized trust?
Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse (2010, 142-143) suggest otherwise:

stronger intra-racial bonds and stronger interracial bridges can be positively, rather than negatively, correlated....the same American or Brit who has more ties to others of their own racial and ethnic group is actually more likely, not less likely, to have more social bridges to other racial or ethnic groups....American whites who trust whites more tend also to trust Latinos more, not less than whites who distrust whites.......our research tends to support public policies which foster the building of strong bonds within ethnic groups...because that could be an important prelude to the broader social bridging we seek....A social salad bowl is thus a better ideal than a homogenizing melting pot....

Not quite. This argument pays little heed to how trust is developed and “expands.” If I trust people who are very different from myself, I will surely trust my wife, my son, and my close friends. But if I trust my wife, this says nothing about trust in people who are different from myself (Uslaner, 2002, 145-148).

Clark, Putnam, and Fieldhouse focus primarily on trust in one’s neighbors rather than generalized trust. In Putnam’s Social Capital Benchmark Survey, I examined the interrelationship among generalized trust and dichotomized measures of trusting one’s neighbors and trusting your own race. For whites, the modal category is trusting other whites and your neighbors but not “most people” (43.7 percent). Only 3 percent have faith in “most people” but not in their neighbors. The simple correlation between the two measures is modest (tau-b = .225), at least in part because so many people trust their neighbors (85 percent). About two-thirds of whites trust other whites, but less than half (46 percent) of those who trust people of their own race believe that “most people can be trusted.” Eighty nine percent of whites have faith in others of their race and 86 percent of them also trust their neighbors.

Forty six percent of African-Americans trust their neighbors but not people in general, while 30 percent do not trust either their neighbors or “most people.” Two-thirds of African-
Americans trust blacks but not “most people,” while almost 60 percent trust blacks and trust their neighbors. *For whites and especially for blacks, the modal pattern is to trust their neighbors and their own racial group but not people in general.*

The same pattern holds for the UK. In the 2007 Citizenship Survey, the modal pattern (56 percent) for all respondents is to trust their neighbors (a dichotomized measure) but not people in general. The pattern again is particularly strong for minorities, with approximately two-thirds of blacks, Africans, South Asians, and Muslims giving particularistic trust responses. Almost twice as many minorities trust only their own kind as have faith in people in general and their in-group. Fifty-two percent of whites, who are far more trusting overall, have faith in their neighbors but not people in general.

Trusting people like yourself is not part of a “transmission belt” to faith in people unlike yourself. Faith in in-groups is primordial, trusting out-groups is not. Strong in-group trust often, indeed usually, crowds out faith in strangers, especially for minorities who are more likely to have faced discrimination.

In-group ties go hand-in-hand with attachment to place. High levels of in-group trust are most common among groups who do not live intermingled with the majority. And attachment to place also leads to weaker ties with the larger community.

The 2007 UK Citizenship Survey asked respondents to rate on a four-point scale how important various factors are to “a sense of who you are.” The possible answers are interests, occupation, education, income, gender, age, your family, where you live, religion, ancestry, your ethnicity/race, and national identification. Then people were asked which factor is the most important in self-identification. I present the results in Figure 2-9 for all respondents, whites, non-whites, Africans, South Asians, and Muslims (the first bar is for the share of trusting respondents for each group).

---

Figure 2-9 about here
For all respondents and for each group, people who identify themselves by their interests are the most trusting. People who say that their identity is shaped primarily by their level of education and their occupation are more likely to trust most people. The lowest trusting respondents cite ancestry, ethnicity and race, religion, and especially where you live, as the basis for their identity. The sole exception for religion is for whites. Whites in the UK are largely members of the Church of England, which is a mainline Protestant denomination religion with a strong ecumenical outreach (see Chapter 4 and Schoenfeld, 1978, 64).

Where you live shapes your identity more if your neighborhood is more segregated, especially for minorities. Thirty eight percent of whites say where they live shapes their identity if almost everyone living within 15-20 minutes walking distance of their home are like themselves. Only 27 percent give this source of identity if less than half are of their same background. For non-whites the comparable figures are 49 and 31 percent. Segregation reinforces in-group identity, which in turn leads to lower out-group trust.

**The Path Ahead**

I move now to a consideration of how living in an integrated and diverse neighborhood and having a diverse friendship network can boost trust. The evidence suggests that such connections can lead people to be more trusting—at least until we realize (Chapter 8) that residential choice itself depends upon trust. My argument in this chapter sets the stage for various threads in the rest of the book: why inequality depresses trust for minorities, why it also mostly depresses the effects of Allport’s conditions for contact for minorities, why one country (Sweden) stands out as distinctive, and why in the end we need to place segregation in the context of economic inequality.

We cannot understand why segregation’s effects are so pernicious and why they are so difficult to overcome if we don’t make the connection of isolation with inequality. Even in countries with much lower levels of inequality than the United States and without the pronounced hypersegregation faced by African-Americans, the combination of ethnic enclaves,
inequality, and discrimination cannot be easily overcome by rearranging housing patterns as if we were playing a game of Monopoly.


4. My trust measure is based upon aggregate responses to the 1995 survey supplemented with: (1) measures from 1990 when 1995 data are not available; and (2) imputed scores for 13 other countries. Waves from 2000 onward of the World Values Survey have many anomalous results so I do not use them. I shall provide details on request but here I note briefly the high levels of trust reported in 2000 for Iran and Indonesia and the sharp drop for Canada despite almost identical results to 1995 in three other surveys that year: the Canadian National Election Study, the Quebec referendum survey, and the Ethnic Diversity (ESC) of the University of British Columbia. The variables used to impute trust are: gross national product per capital; the value of imports of goods and services; legislative effectiveness; head of state type; tenure of executive (all from the State Failure Data Set); distance from the equator (from Jong-sung You of Harvard University); and openness of the economy (from Sachs and Warner, 1997; data available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html). The $R^2 = .657$, standard error of the estimate = .087, N = 63.

5. The models included the Gini index of inequality, whether a country had a civil war, the share of Protestants in the population, and a dummy variable for former Communist countries. The Fearon data came from http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/, the
Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (51)

Alesina data are available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html. I am grateful to Marta Reynal-Querol, Richard Winters, and Rodney Hero for providing me with their data.


7. The data from the United States come from Putnam’s Social Capital Benchmark Survey, a national survey with local add-on samples available for free download at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/data/datasets/social_capital_community_survey.html. The United Kingdom Citizenship Survey 2007 is a national survey with oversamples of minorities (for a total N of over 14,000) and is available at www.data-archive.ac.uk, registration required. The documentation is available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/citizenshipsurveyaprsep07. The Canadian data come from the two waves of the Equality, Security, Community
survey conducted at the University of British Columbia under the direction of Richard Johnston and available for download at http://www.yorku.ca/ist/download/ESC/esc.html.

The Swedish data come from a mail survey conducted by Statistics Sweden for Ersta Skondal University College. This is a proprietary survey and I am part of the research team under the direction of Lars Svedberg, Lars Tragårdh, and Susanne Lundåsen. The data for Australia are also a proprietary survey from the Scanlon Foundation (the 2007 Mapping Social Cohesion survey; see Chapter 6).

8. These categories are not mutually exclusive, of course. African background is defined as being born in Africa, having either one’s father or mother born in Africa, or speaking an African language as the primary language at home. South Asian background is similarly defined.

9. There are too few Francophone respondents outside Quebec to analyze and it is hazardous to treat Francophones outside Quebec with Quebecois.

10. As noted above, Oliver (2001, 120) finds that African-American turnout and participation in organizational meetings falls as the share of whites in the city increases—and white participation in both forms of political action falls as the share of blacks increases.

11. Rothwell uses the 2000 General Social Survey and has access to the municipal codes (not generally available) to merge the Iceland segregation data I employ here.

12. The segregation/diversity data are available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/housing_patterns.html, accessed October 28, 2008. The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey was conducted in 40 jurisdictions, but eight were either states or areas (such as “Rural Southeast South Dakota”) that could not easily be linked to any city. Of the remaining 32 cities, only 20 had matching data from the residential segregation data. The ethnic groups used in the indices are non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic African Americans, non-Hispanic Asians and Pacific Islanders, Non-Hispanic American Indians and Alaska
13. The P* indices for Asian-American and Hispanic isolation from whites, as well as white isolation from minorities, are all highly correlated with Iceland’s diversity (Herfindahl) index (between -.73 and -.76). The correlations of the P* indices for Asian-Americans, Hispanics, and whites are only modestly correlated with segregation (-.22 and -.23) and the P* index for Asian Americans is barely correlated with segregation (-.04). The index for African-American isolation from whites is strongly correlated with both diversity and the entropy index of Iceland (-.66 and -.70, respectively), which is hardly surprising since African-Americans are hypersegregated (segregated on multiple dimensions). The N is 239 for all correlations (P* is available for fewer SMSAs than are the segregation and diversity measures). In Chapter 6 I show that diversity and segregation are not the same thing across Australian neighborhoods either, although the correlation is somewhat higher (r = .405).

14. They also find that segregation leads to a lower level of quality of government on multiple indicators.

15. The data are available for download at [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.htm](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/data.htm), accessed May 10, 2004. I am grateful to Alberto Alesina and Ekatarina Zhuravskaya for sharing their cross-national segregation data.

16. See Uslaner (2002, 226-231) for a discussion of why countries with a legacy of Communism are excluded: Inequality is artificially low and the survey measures of trust may not be reliable.

17. The correlation between trust and ethnic fractionalization in the Alesina data set is -.320 for all cases (N = 84) and -.370 excluding countries with a legacy of Communism (N = 63).

18. The other variables in the model are the share of Protestants in a country and the level of economic inequality (the Gini index from the United Nations Development Programme
1. Uslaner, Segregation, and Mistrust, ch. 2 (54)


19. Is the size of the informal sector exogenous to inequality? Being constrained to work in the informal sector may increase inequality, but the very existence of a large informal sector seems (at least theoretically) to have a greater effect on inequality than any reverse causality.

20. The instruments are all insignificant predictors in a single-equation estimation of trust. The Nordic dummy is not significant when inequality is entered as a predictor.

21. I am grateful to Elena LaFerrara for providing the Gini index data.

22. I copied the data by hand from the website since the data are not downloadable. The well-being site is http://www.gallup.com/poll/116497/rankings-reveal-state-strengths-weaknesses.aspx#1; the indicators are life evaluation at present and in five years, physical well-being (sick days in the past month, disease burden, health problems that get in the way of normal activities, obesity, feeling well-rested, daily energy, daily colds, daily flu, and daily headaches), emotional health (smiling or laughter, learning or doing something interesting, being treated with respect, enjoyment, happiness, worry, sadness, anger, stress, and diagnosis of depression); personal health (smoking, eating healthy, weekly consumption of fruits and vegetables, and weekly exercise frequency); work environment (job satisfaction, ability to use one's strengths at work, supervisor's treatment, an open and trusting work environment), and basic access (access to clean water, medicine, a safe place to exercise, affordable fruits and vegetables; enough money for food, shelter, healthcare; having health insurance, having a doctor, having visited a dentist recently; satisfaction with the community, the community getting better as a place to live, and feeling safe walking alone at night). Wording is taken directly from the Gallup site. For the municipality data, see Page (2010).

23. I calculated this effect by multiplying the difference in segregation (.44) by the regression
coefficient for segregation and dividing by the range of the wellbeing index (from the minimum of 63.5 to the maximum of 72.5).


25. Kymlicka (2010, 7) reports that 89 percent of Canadians regarded multiculturalism as central to their national identity in a 2003 survey. See also Harrell (2009) for a compendium of survey findings on Canadian support for multiculturalism.

26. Chinese and Portugese were strong outliers, so I excluded them from this graph.

27. Homeboys is a term used by some African-Americans to refer to their close-knit group, especially in ghettos.