Is the Senate More Civil Than The House?

Eric M. Uslaner

Department of Government and Politics
University of Maryland–College Park
College Park, MD 20742

e-mail: euslaner@gvpt.umd.edu
The debate on impeaching President Bill Clinton in the House of Representatives was marked by a “distrust [that] is so deep-seated and enduring that there are only downticks in the steady rise in animosity.”\(^1\) Rep. Jose Serrano (D, NY) admonished the Republican majority that voted to impeach the President on an almost strict party-line vote: “Bullies get theirs and you’re going to get yours!” Rep. Albert Wynn (D, MD) warned: “There’s raw feelings. It’s going to take a long, long time to heal and there’s not going to be any love fest.” Rep. David Skaggs (D, CO) said: “Nobody knows whether this place is going to be pulled apart so much that we can’t do our business.” And Rep. David Obey (D, WI) summed it up: “We are on the short route to chaos.”\(^2\)

The Senate trial of the President did have its low points—notably when the Senators went into closed session with no cameras to bring the proceedings to the public.\(^3\) Yet, overall, the Senate conducted its business in a much more civil manner than the House. It papered over partisan differences by unanimously adopting vague rules of procedure. Senate votes on procedure were often partisan. Yet, whenever partisan wrangling threatened to break out, Senators met in informal groups and worked out compromises that prevented the sort of outbursts that occurred in the House. Eventually, the Senate did not convict the President on either of the two counts before it. Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D, CT) pointed to “the other body” and said, “It’s so acrimonious there. It’s so sad.”\(^4\)

The House impeachment proceedings were nonstop partisan warfare, with members casting aspersions about each others’ motives. The carnage included admissions by Speaker-
designate Bob Livingston (R, LA) and House Judiciary Committee chair Henry Hyde (R, IL) that they had extramarital affairs in the past—leading Livingston to give up both his new leadership position and his seat in the House. Calls for restraint were regarded as frontal attacks. Rep. Tony P. Hall (D, OH), who has long worried about the decline in civility in Congress, lamented: “We have real partisanship, and I would like to move beyond that.” Rep. John Lindner (R, GA) soon answered that he took “personal affront” at the implication that Republicans were to blame for the partisanship.

Senators and journalists attributed the Senate’s civil deliberations to its long standing tradition of courtesy, to the bipartisan friendships that permit Senators to reach agreement even in the face of policy disagreements, to the six-year term that gives Senators more freedom to repel outsiders who would push them to extremes, and to simple fear of replicating the contentiousness of the House debate.  

Joel Achenbach of the Washington Post wrote: 

The Senate has always been clubby. There is little chance that two Senators would have a dust-up like that of congressmen Bob Barr [R, GA] and Patrick Kennedy [D, RI] on the day of the House impeachment vote. Needing to win election statewide, few senators are ideologically as extreme as the representatives, who can emerge from a smaller and more homogenous congressional district. In recent years, when new members have come on too strong and thrown too many elbows, said Patrick Leahy [D] of Vermont, “they were quickly taken aside by senior members of both sides and told, ‘The Senate’s different.’”

Senators boast of their ability to work with members of both parties. The compromises on
impeachment were worked out by bipartisan teams such as Slade Gorton (R, WA) and Joseph
Lieberman (D, CT), Dianne Feinstein (D, CA) and Robert Bennett (R, UT), Tom Harkin (D, IA)
and Susan Collins (R, ME), and even the unlikely pair of Edward Kennedy (D, MA) and Phil
Gramm (R, TX).⁷

So the Senate is different? Not so fast. Over a century ago, Woodrow Wilson cautioned
that “[t]he Senate is just what the...conditions of public life in this country make it to be....The
Senate can have in it no better men than the best men of the House of Representatives...”. The
upper chamber, then, is “a small, select, and leisurely House of Representatives.”⁸ And, as I shall
argue below, understanding the limits of civility requires heeding the words of Richard Nixon’s
Attorney General John Mitchell: “Watch what we do, not what we say.” Civility alone, to
paraphrase former Vice President John Nance Garner, isn’t worth a warm bucket of spit. Civility
matters because it is part of comity, a more general syndrome of treating others with respect both
in language and in deed. And the Senate shows that there is plenty of reason to be wary of
restricting our attention to words spoken on the floor. Senators obstruct. Representatives can’t
block legislation so easily, so they make a lot of noise instead. Legislators, like young children,
only create a scene when they can’t get their way.

Wilson makes two key arguments that help us understand comity in the House and the
Senate. First, whatever differences we find between the two chambers are of degree rather than
of kind. It is a fundamental mistake to talk about a House of Representatives out of control and a
Senate that keeps the republic on an even keel. Senators like to quote Benjamin Franklin’s
aphorism that the Senate chills the hot tempers of the House just as the saucer cools hot coffee.⁹
A more appropriate analogy might be between one saucer of steaming black coffee and another
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where the java is mixed with a bit of cream. Yes, the House is more raucous than the Senate, but in its own quieter way the upper chamber can be chaotic too. Yes, the Senate has more friendships and working relationships across party lines, but it is easier to be an obstructionist in that body. So good neighbors don’t always build good fences together. Yes, the Senate is different from the House, but are these (in John Dewey’s words) “differences that make a difference”?

Second, the behavior of both Representatives and Senators is not simply posturing among elites. The name-calling in the House on impeachment reflects deeper conflicts between the two parties that were about to take over the Senate as well until it became clear that the public was growing weary of the whole enterprise. While the public was critical of the way the House and the Senate conducted the impeachment hearings, popular attitudes were also polarized along partisan lines.

My messages are those of Wilson: The House and the Senate are more similar than different. The atmosphere in both houses is less conducive to the sorts of compromise that makes it possible to enact a legislative agenda than it once was. The less hospitable atmosphere in both chambers reflects trends in the larger society. Members of the House and Senate don’t get along with each other as much as they used to because Americans don’t trust each other as much as they once did. A related reason why both the House and the Senate are less civil is the increased regional polarization of American politics. There are fewer Southern Democrats and eastern Republicans than there used to be—and each of these groups were sources of relative moderation within their parties. And it is moderates who reach out to people in the other party to compromise on legislation and who live and die by good personal relations. The famed Senate friendship of Republican Orrin Hatch (UT) and Edward Kennedy is rather unusual. Ideological opposites
may get along well enough, but they do not necessarily work well together on issues.\textsuperscript{12}

I shall lay out my framework for looking at comity in Congress and then consider arguments about why the Senate should have more comity than the House—and why the Senators can speak softly and still carry the big stick of obstructionism. Then I shall review a bit of impressionistic evidence on the House and the Senate and move to a consideration of “harder” statistical evidence supporting my argument.

\textbf{Civility and Comity, House and Senate}\textsuperscript{13}

The Senate \textit{is} more civil than the House, but civility is not an end in itself. Debate in the Congress is full of flowery language such as “I yield to my good friend, the distinguished gentleman (gentlelady) from __________, who is my good friend.”\textsuperscript{14} This civility, or as Donald Matthews called it “courtesy,”\textsuperscript{15} is a key norm of the Senate. Courtesy involves treating others with respect, even—or especially—if they disagree with you. William S. White wrote more than four decades ago:\textsuperscript{16}

To grant to one’s opponent in high political discussion and maneuver each all of the rights that one demands for oneself—this is...a Senate rule.

The mark of a good Senator, according to White, is “the absence of petty exhibitionism” and “amicable association with others minds and with the interests of others.”\textsuperscript{17} Personal attacks on other members are prohibited by Senate (and House) rules. The logical extension of courtesy is friendship. In a chamber with only 100 members—and less than that for most of American history—and a historically weak party system, personal connections mean a lot. As Ross K. Baker has argued in his study of friendship patterns in the Senate, “...the slender threads of common experience, fellowship, trust, and mutuality—the components of institutional kinship—serve to
provide an important, perhaps indispensable, force for cohesion.”

Senatorial politics often makes strange friendships. Former Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R, NY) often had few charitable words for his colleagues; he called Kennedy “an extreme, disingenuous partisan,” Howard Metzenbaum (D, OH) “a dictator,” and the collective members of Congress a “bunch of turkeys.” He saw nothing wrong with bringing the entire Senate to a halt through a filibuster. Yet D’Amato had nothing but kind words for his Democratic colleague from New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who “has served New York with distinction.”

Civil language makes friendship possible. When people are denouncing each other, they are not likely to become friendly. And friendship makes compromise across partisan and ideological lines possible for two reasons. First, friends have confidence in each other and will be willing to take each other at their word. Second, and more critically, legislators form friendships across party lines only when it is politically safe to do so–and when members believe that they have something in common other than their formal positions.

Strong friendship circles across party lines is a sign of a legislature marked by trust. This is where civility turns into comity. Comity is more than being civil to others. It also involves reciprocity, which simply means that people must respect their promises and obligations to others. They must also recognize that others’ point of view is legitimate (as White argued).

More specifically, in Congress, reciprocity means respecting other people and their expertise. Putting faith in expertise means accepting the recommendations of Congressional committees on legislation and accepting committee reports as fact rather than simple partisan posturing. Reciprocity means willingness to make deals–and committing yourself to sticking with the agreement. Reciprocity is the key to reaching compromises. Without compromises, you get
either rule by a partisan majority or stalemate. For much of American history, parties have not been cohesive enough to ensure passage of legislation by themselves. In recent years, when parties have become much stronger, there has usually been divided control of the legislative and executive branches that leads to stalemate.

It’s rather natural to think of Senators huddling together in the well of the chamber and making deals with each other. The Senate is, above all, a chamber of individuals. The Senate has few rules and routine legislative business is usually accomplished through unanimous consent agreements. A single Senator can tie the Senate up in knots and a minority (41) can sustain a filibuster even in the face of a determined majority. Without a commitment to reciprocity, the Senate could well come to a complete halt.

The House, on the other hand, is more majoritarian. It has an elaborate set of rules that in recent years have been increasingly used to restrict minority party rights. The House membership is four and a half times as large as the Senate’s. Individual members cannot bring the House to a halt. The two-year election cycle means that members have less time to chat with their colleagues since they must spend more time courting the folks back home.

Nevertheless, the norms of courtesy (or civility) and reciprocity have also been central to House deliberations. It was a Speaker of the House–Sam Rayburn (D, TX)–who coined the phrase that has become the hallmark of reciprocity in Congress: “To get along, go along.” Personal friendships among House leaders–Rayburn and Republican Joseph Martin (R, MA) and Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill (D, MA) and Minority Leader Bob Michel (R, IL)–are more legendary than close relationships among Senate leaders. And Rayburn would court other members by inviting them to his “Board of Education,” a daily strategy meeting in an unmarked
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hideaway office in the Capitol where members shared bourbon and water mixed by the Speaker himself. Members came only at the invitation of the Speaker, who made it his business to be as inclusive as he needed or wanted to be. 21

Good relations were just as important to junior members. Rep. Clem Miller (D, CA) summed up his freshman experience in a 1962 book: “One’s overwhelming first impression as a member of Congress is the aura of friendliness that surrounds the life of a congressman....The freshman congressman is being constantly made aware of the necessity, even the imperative, of getting along with his fellow congressmen.” 22 Each member might not know all the others as in the Senate. But members could socialize with Representatives from the other party working out in the House gym, at lunch in the Members’ dining room, or through groups such as prayer breakfasts. Members of House have traditionally depended upon reciprocity just as Senators have. 23 In both chambers, reciprocity signifies a willingness to make a deal—and thus undergirds the trading of votes that is so essential to pork barrel politics.

The Waning of the Norms 24

The classic discussions of the norms of courtesy and reciprocity were written in the 1950s and the 1960s. By the 1970s, Congress was becoming a less civil place. The two energy crises, the continuing conflict in Vietnam, and especially the economic turbulence of the 1970s made American social and political life far more contentious. The core American belief that the future will be better than the past gave way to a pessimism about the future—not just next year, but the longer term. People recognize that the economy has its ups and downs and they are not likely to change long-term values such as trust in others just because there is a temporary downturn. And there is good reason for recent pessimism: The gap between the rich and poor has been growing
larger over time–so the poor have less prospect of faring well in the future. When people are pessimistic, they are more willing to look out for themselves first and to see others as doing the same. In such a world, it makes less sense to trust other people and to be willing to make the compromises that underlie reciprocity. And if you view other people as selfish–and if you are looking out primarily for yourself–treating people with respect isn’t quite so important any more.

The 1970s saw an outbreak of incivility in both Congress and in public life. The freshman class of House members of 1975 were weaned politically in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam protest movements. Many members were at least as comfortable with strategies of confrontation as with norms of civility and reciprocity.\(^{25}\) In 1969, every House freshman responding to a survey said that friendly relations with other members was important. By 1976 only 63 percent of new freshmen agreed that “personal cordiality” was important and four years later just 37 percent took this position. In 1969, 72 percent of freshmen said that they were likely to trade votes. By 1976 and 1980 just about half of new members said that “ability to compromise” was essential.\(^{26}\)

Uncivil language knew no bounds at first. Moderate Republican Senator Lowell Weicker (CT) called his centrist GOP colleague John Heinz (PA) “devious” and “an idiot.” The mild-mannered Michel attacked Jack Kemp (R, NY) over their positions on Contra aid in 1987, while Guy Vander Jagt (R, MI) likened his challenger for chair of the National Republican Congressional Committee, Don Sundquist (R, TN), to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 1990.\(^{27}\) Most of the attacks, even initially, were partisan. Dole and Ernest Hollings (D, SC) got into a sharp exchange over whose personal attacks were more bitter; Dole suggested what seemed to be an old-style playground brawl.\(^{28}\)

I say to my friend from South Carolina, I will be glad to discuss this with him
privately, or maybe he wants to go out and make that statement when not pro-
tected by speaking from the Senate floor.

A real confrontation took place in 1985 when Representative Bob Dornan (R, CA) grabbed
Representative Thomas Downey (D, NY) by his tie and accused him and other Democrats of
being weak on defense. Five years later Representatives Bob Walker (R, PA) and Craig Washing-
ton (D, TX) had to be restrained from battling over intemperate remarks from Henry Hyde (R, IL) to Barney Frank (D, MA). And in between these two events, Capitol police carried Senator
Bob Packwood feet first into the Senate chamber after “arresting” him for boycotting a Senate
session and depriving Democrats of a quorum on a cloture vote in 1988. One can construct a
litany of diatribes from the collected speeches of Dornan, Frank, Representative Maxine Waters
(D, CA), and Senator Jesse Helms (R, NC)—mostly addressed to members of the other party.

Incivility became increasingly partisan when barely more than a handful of House members
sometimes succeeded in bringing the House to a halt in the 1980s by obstructionist tactics and a
plethora of controversial amendments to even routine legislation. These self-proclaimed kamika-
zes, the Conservative Opportunity Society, were organized by an upstart junior Republican named
Newt Gingrich. The Senate might be helpless in the face of such an onslaught. The House
majority leadership simply tightened the screws by adopting more restrictive rules against minority
obstructionism. Gingrich in turn launched attacks on the personal morality of Speaker Jim
Wright in 1989 (successful) and Speaker-designate Tom Foley shortly thereafter. When civility
mattered more, a Gingrich would have been relegated to the back benches and treated as a pariah.
Instead, his attacks on Wright and Foley (and even on Dole, whom he once called “the tax
collector for the welfare state”) led to his rise to Assistant Majority Leader of the House—and
later to the Speakership itself in 1995. The world of courtesy had been turned upside down. Civility gave way to unrestrained partisanship. The sharp language of the House debate on impeachment was not simply a response to a historic event. It was the logical consequence of more than two decades of uncivil tongues and mutual distrust among members of Congress.

Not only did civil language fall apart but so did reciprocity. Hard times makes it tougher to make deals. The economic downturns of the 1970s and the budget cutbacks during Ronald Reagan’s presidency led to sharp reductions in pork barrel spending. And the pork barrel--where every member regardless of party or ideology gets benefits to bring back to his/her constituency--is the bedrock of the norm of reciprocity. The new members of the House also disdained committee reciprocity--and took more of the action directly to the floor as part of a wide-ranging set of procedural reforms designed to disperse power to more members in the 1970s. Members became more likely to offer amendments to bills even if they did not serve on the originating committees. Members of both the House and the unreformed Senate became more likely to adopt amendments offered by committee outsiders. The share of amendments in the House that came from outside the originating committee increased, as did the number of Senators offering amendments outside their committee.

The waning of reciprocity and courtesy signaled more than a new breed of member and a more contentious agenda. Senator Joseph Biden (D, DE) summed up the new mood that engulfed the upper chamber in the late 1970s and early 1980s:

There’s much less civility than when I came here ten years ago. There aren’t as many nice people as there were before...Ten years ago you didn’t have people calling each other sons of bitches and vowing to get at each other. The first few
years, there was only one person who, when he gave me his word, I had to go back to the office to write it down. Now there’s two dozen of them. As you break down the social amenities one by one, it starts expanding geometrically. Ultimately you don’t have any social control...We end up with 100 Proxmires here. One...makes a real contribution. All you need is 30 of them to guarantee that the place doesn’t work.

Ross K. Baker noted almost two decades ago that “…the Senate is verging on a system in which each senator is his own judge of acceptable behavior in a colleague.”35

The Senate, unlike the House, has always tolerated “outsiders” who go their way and don’t always observe the norm of reciprocity. Wisconsin’s William Proxmire (D) and Oregon’s Wayne Morse (R, I, and then D) are prime examples of Senators who didn’t play by all the rules but made a difference anyway.36 The contemporary Senate—even more so than Biden’s Senate of the early 1980s—has a rather healthy complement of members who disdain the niceties of the old Senate norms. More than a handful of today’s Republican Senators cut their teeth in the House, where they learned first-strike tactics from the master guerilla turned leader, Newt Gingrich: Tim Hutchinson (AR), Wayne Allard (CO), Larry Craig (ID), Michael Crapo (ID), Jim Bunning (KY), Rod Grams (MN), Rick Santorum (PA), Sam Brownback (KS), Jim Inhofe (OK), Mike DeWine (OH), Judd Gregg (NH), Bob Smith (NH), and Connie Mack (FL) all served under Gingrich’s tutelage as either Assistant Minority Leader or Speaker. This baker’s dozen (though not a Baker’s dozen)37 of Senators has pushed the GOP Senate conference sharply to the right—and several vocally protested the Senate’s refusal to call witnesses before television cameras in the impeachment trial.
The Senate, then, is not a bastion of either civility or moderation. It is almost certainly less civil than it was in 1982, when Biden was interviewed. The Senate is arguably more uncivil than the House. Yet, both the House and the Senate have become more partisan over time. Ironically, the incivility of the 1970s and early 1980s arose from the collapse of the Congressional party system. In the early 1970s, as few as 27 percent of House roll calls and 35 percent of Senate votes failed divided a majority of Democrats from a majority of Republicans. Members looked out for themselves and there was no sense of collective responsibility, making attacks on other members fair game. By the mid-1980s, the cumulative effects of the Conservative Opportunity Society in the House and the overall polarization of politics during the Reagan years led to a sharp increase in party-line voting. In 1995, 73 percent of House roll calls and 69 percent of Senate votes saw party majorities opposing each other.38

As partisanship increased, members reserved their bile for legislators of the other party. Once the Republicans took over the House in 1995, there was no effective majority party in the lower chamber. The Republicans could not shed their guerilla tactics in favor of a more disciplined leadership style. The Democrats began to act like the old GOP minority. Their actions were both purposive (giving the Republicans a dose of their own medicine) and involuntary (they didn’t know how to behave as a responsible opposition). Venom became the order of the day. Rep. Sam Gibbons (D, FL), the 75 year-old erstwhile chair of the Ways and Means Committee, believed that new subcommittee chair Bill Thomas (R, CA) was stalling a hearing on health legislation. He called Thomas and his GOP colleagues “a bunch of fascists.” Republican members taunted him and Gibbons grabbed Thomas’s tie. Thomas got revenge by shutting off House microphones when Democrats were speaking one Saturday—and then closing House
Representatives James P. Moran (D, VA) and Randy “Duke” Cunningham challenged each other’s patriotism on military interventions, leading Moran to shove Cunningham and half a dozen other members to join the wrestling match.\textsuperscript{39} Republican Whip Dick Armey (R, TX) called Frank, an openly gay member, “Barney Fag” in 1995—and three years later Cunningham made an obscene hand gesture and a crude remark about Frank’s sexuality in a speech to a group of prostate cancer patients.\textsuperscript{40} Things had not improved with time. Indeed, in 1998, House Rules Committee chair Gerald Solomon (R, NY) asked on the floor: “[I]s it appropriate in this House for a Member to accuse other Members, even without mentioning a name, of being religious wackos?”\textsuperscript{41}

The mood in Congress has gotten so bad that an outside agency, the Pew Foundation, has tried to restore comity by sponsoring two retreats in Hershey, Pennsylvania to get members of the House talking to each other. The 1997 getaway was marked by good spirits all around—and the cheerfulness quickly faded. About a month later, the House Rules Committee Subcommittee on Rules and Organization of the House realized the depth of the problem and held hearings on what might be done to restore civility. The initial hearings were called to a halt when the members had to scurry to the House floor to vote on a motion to censure a House Democratic leader for insulting the Speaker.\textsuperscript{42} The 1999 meeting came after each party had inflicted further wounds on the other during the debate on the impeachment of President Clinton. Two weeks before the retreat one of the Democratic party’s leaders (Steny Hoyer, D-MD) said that the gathering would be a good opportunity to lecture the Republicans on how to behave more civilly. Senators seem more restrained, at least verbally. Occasionally Senators step over the line, as Majority Leader
Trent Lott did in 1997 when he said that two freshman Democratic Senators–Robert Toricelli (NJ) and Tim Johnson (SD)–deceived their constituents and were dishonest. Yet, while Senators are less prone to use offending language, they are hardly restrained in using the guerilla tactics that House rebels could only dream about. Incivility in the House may be a mark of members’ frustration that they cannot control the legislative process. A determined majority can work its will against even the most determined and vocal minority, especially in this era of strong partisanship.

Senators follow the advice of President John F. Kennedy: Don’t get mad, get even: Obstruct business. Filibusters have become more common in recent years, rising sharply since 1965. The number of cloture votes–attempts to shut off filibusters–has risen from three per year from 1960 to 1973 to six in the late 1970s, 7.4 in the early 1980s, 10.8 in the late 1980s, and 17.6 from 1990 to 1994. Moreover, the filibuster used to be employed primarily for major legislation, particularly civil rights bills. Now all manner of legislation, much of little consequence, is subject to extended debate. D’Amato bragged about how he filibustered proposals to cut funding for a military aircraft built on Long Island and a bill that did not have an antidumping clause that would assist a typewriter manufacturer in upstate New York.

The filibuster is the tool of a minority. Individual Senators increasingly have the power to block legislation–and face no sanctions for doing so. Senators can put “holds” on legislation. Originally designed to let Senators indicate that a proposed schedule for consideration of a bill was inconvenient, the hold has been transformed to an effective veto. Senators put holds on bills anonymously (though often leaders can guess who has placed the hold) and the legislation can remain bottlenecked indefinitely. The hold is now a major source of obstructionism in the
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Individual Senators can also wreak havoc with policy in other ways. As Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, Helms has blocked ambassadorial nominations from both Democratic and Republican administrations—sometimes to extract other policy concessions from administrations, sometimes because he simply doesn’t like the nominee (moderate Republican William Weld, nominated by Clinton as Ambassador to Mexico and James Hormel, nominated as Ambassador to Luxembourg, but objectionable because he is gay). Hatch, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, has blocked many of Clinton’s nominations for judicial positions—again sometimes to advance his own agenda (naming a Republican judge in Utah to the federal bench) or sometimes because he disapproves of nominees’ ideologies.

Even in the absence of a high decibel level, many Senators, including sitting and former leaders, have taken to the floor or to public forums such as op-ed articles in major newspapers, to decry the lack of civility in the Senate. The list is impressive: Former Majority Leaders Mike Mansfield (D, MT), Howard Baker (R, TN), and Robert Byrd (D, WV); Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R, KS), and Gary Hart (D, CO). A recent edited volume of Senatorial farewell addresses contained pleas for civility by Bill Bradley (D, NJ), William S. Cohen (R, ME), Howell Heflin (D, AL), Claiborne Pell (D, RI), and Paul Simon (D, IL). And Dole, while not criticizing the contemporary Senate in his farewell address, went out of his way to praise Democratic members of the Senate (and especially their leaders) and bipartisanship when neither was particularly popular in his conference. Senators David Pryor (D, AR) and John Danforth (R, MO) had established a “Quality of Strife” caucus to improve life in the Senate in 1985, to no avail.
Only a handful of cockeyed optimists should have expected caucuses, hearings, retreats, or the structural reforms that were supposed to come out of these meetings to restore comity to the Senate or the House. The nasty mood in the Congress reflects the growing hostile mood in the country. Since the 1970s, civility has been in shorter supply than it used to be. From the explosion in litigation rates to air rage and road rage to “shock jocks” on radio and talk show guests attacking each other on television, American society is far more contentious than it used to be. Stores now advertise polite service as if it were something reserved for special occasions.

Congress isn’t insulated from the public. Instead, it is first and foremost a representative institution. If anything, it may respond too quickly to public opinion. So the decline in comity in both the House and Senate is not traceable to problems with the institution of Congress or with its members. Wilson was right: The members of Congress take their cues from the public. As the public has become less civil, so has the Congress. The public doesn’t mimic Congress (even though Jerry Springer was a politician before he became a referee on his television talk show).

The most telling indicator of the public’s sour mood is responses to the survey question: “Generally speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?” The question was first asked in a national survey in 1960, when 58 percent of Americans were trusting. By the mid-1990s, barely more than a third of Americans had faith in others—before a slight upward bounce to 40 percent in 1998. I plot the downward trend in trust in others in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 about here

People who trust others have a positive view of human nature. They feel comfortable
with people who are different from themselves and are willing to compromise when necessary. They don’t look at people from different groups, religions, or races as rivals, much less apostates. People with faith in others believe that underlying any differences we have is a common set of values. They thus possess the very ideals that are essential to comity—both civility and reciprocity—in all forms of human relations. Dole stressed the importance of this assumption in his farewell address when he defined civility by stressing that “...I do not believe we (Republicans and Democrats) ever had any real disagreements.” Trusting people are tolerant of others’ views and take an active role in doing good works, especially giving to charity and volunteering their time. They also believe that most other people share a common set of values, even if they espouse very different political views.

As fewer people trust each other, our civic life has become more contentious. We give less of our national income to charity and spend less of our time volunteering (at least for the Red Cross). Most critically, we are simply less connected to each other. We are more likely to question the motives of people who look and think differently from ourselves. And we are thus less likely to compromise with people on the other side of the political divide. As our national mood becomes more nasty, a civil Congress would be very much out of touch with the public. If pro-life and pro-choice (or fundamentalist Christian and more secular) people don’t trust each other, they will put heavy pressure on their elected representatives not to compromise with the other side. We no longer see a shared fate with others, so we look out first and foremost for ourselves.

A related, though analytically distinct, reason for the decline in civility is the weakening of the center in American electoral politics. The reciprocity norm in Congress smoothed over
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differences between Democrats and Republicans. Legislators could all claim credit for bills passed with the support of both parties, especially the pork barrel projects that legislators believe are so popular with their constituents. And this makes it possible for legislators to win by overwhelming margins and secure safe seats for themselves. Since 1994, however, almost 90 percent of Democrats and a similar share of Republicans voted for House candidates from their own party. Democrats are thus pulled to the left (and Republicans to the right) when they can’t get Republican (Democratic) votes in the general election.

Democrats and Republicans are also polarized by their regional patterns of representation. Traditionally, the East has been the bastion of liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans, while the South has been home to conservatives, regardless of party, and some Democratic moderates. Southern Democrats and Eastern Republicans have traditionally pulled the two parties to the center—making compromise (and good relations) with the other party necessary. However, the once “solid (Democratic) South” has become more competitive, even tilting toward the Republicans, in House and Senate elections. In the 80th Congress (1947-48), 55 percent of Democratic Senators and 49 percent of Democratic House members came from the 11 states of the old Confederacy. By the 105th Congress (1997-98), just 28 percent of Democratic Senators and 16 percent of Democratic House members were Southerners. There were no Southern Republican Senators until John Tower’s victory in a special election in Texas in 1961, but by 1997 they constituted 27 percent of the Senate GOP conference. Southern strength grew from one percent of the House GOP conference in the 80th Congress to 32 percent in the 105th. Southerners were particularly important in the Democratic party because they held a disproportionate share of committee leadership positions. In 1995, Southerners held 67 percent of committee chairs in the
House and 56 percent in the Senate. By 1993-94, the last years of Democratic control, Southerners held only a third of committee chair positions in either house. As the Southerners became less influential within the Democratic party, committee chairs became more representative of the full Democratic caucus—and thus more liberal.51

As the South became more Republican, the Northeast has become more Democratic. Easterners have grown from 16 percent to 26 percent of the House Democratic House caucus from the 80th to the 105th Congress.52 Easterners now represent just 15 percent of House Republicans, down from 37 percent in the 80th Congress. And the story is pretty much the same for the Senate, where members from New England and the Middle Atlantic states now constitute 22 percent of the Democratic caucus (up from 11 percent in the 80th Congress) but just 18 percent of the Republican conference (down from 29 percent).

There are thus fewer pressures for Democrats to move to the center and more demands for the GOP to tilt toward the party’s right. More Easterners mean a more liberal Democratic party and more Southerners mean a more conservative Republican party. The Southern Democrats who remain in the party are increasingly elected by majority minority districts—and their members are ideologically indistinguishable from Northern Democrats.53 The moderates have been at the forefront of drives to restore comity to both chambers. One of the few Southern moderates left in either party, Representative John Tanner (D, TN), summed up the dilemma:54

...Democratic districts become more Democratic and Republican districts become more Republican. There are fewer and fewer districts in the middle. We are the roadkill. We are the yellow line in the middle of the road that gets hit on both sides. Because the districts in Congress are more and more one-party dominant,
the American Congress is more extreme.

Both the decline in trust and the changing regional basis of partisan representation are likely causes of the waning civility in the House and Senate. These are not alternative explanations. The partisan polarization in the South and the Northeast reflect a hardening of political stands that is part and parcel of the movements that treat compromise as a four-letter word. Indeed, as the country has become less trusting, it has been more willing to elect more Southern Republicans and fewer Eastern Republicans in both chambers. As trust has gone down, there have been fewer Southern Democrats in both chambers and more Eastern Democrats (but only in the Senate).55

Many quantitative indicators of waning civility track interpersonal trust rather well. I have shown elsewhere that committee reciprocity in both the House and Senate weakened as interpersonal trust fell: In both chambers, members were more willing to offer amendments to bills from outside their committees and the chambers were more likely to adopt these amendments. As trust fell, the level of partisanship on special rules for the consideration of legislation also rose. And the level of trust in other people was the most important factor shaping the number of cloture motions filed (and, indirectly, the number of filibusters) in the Senate. Perhaps most critically, as trust declined, Congress passed fewer major laws.56

Can we say anything else systematic about declining civility in the House and Senate? There is a lack of good data on civility. Hostile words on the floor tell only a small part of the story of comity—since the most nasty words may occur when there is the least chance of them being taken down: in committees, in the cloakrooms, to reporters, or to public audiences. And my House-Senate comparisons so far indicate that you can have plenty of incivility even with
restrained language. Obstructionism and minority rights are notoriously difficult to measure. We lack the most basic public information on holds—who files them and how many there are.

I thus seek an indirect measure of incivility. Let’s start with two simple assumptions. First, comity presumes a willingness to compromise. Second, strong ideologues are less likely to accept compromises than are moderates. Then, we can expect that as there are more strong ideologues in the Congress, there should be less civility. My surrogate measure for civility is a measure of the ideological homogeneity of each Congressional party. A very liberal party and a very conservative party, each with few moderates, will have fewer incentives to cooperate with the opposition. There are fewer restraints in a homogenous party to bring members to the center—and in such a polarized environment, even to socialize with each other. It is hard to imagine a contemporary Republican leader of either House bragging, as did GOP chief Joe Martin (R, MA) in the 1950s, of “my long and close friendship” with Democratic leader Rayburn that “enabled me to obtain for our side more patronage, such as jobs around the Capitol, than we, as the minority, ever would have got otherwise.” Indeed, it was Michel’s close relationships with O’Neill and Foley that led Gingrich to form the Conservative Opportunity Society to press for a more ideologically distinctive and strident agenda.

The measure of ideological homogeneity I employ is the standard deviation of ideology in the House and Senate (by party). The larger the standard deviation within each party, the more moderates there should be. A strictly liberal Democratic or an overwhelmingly conservative Republican party will have a small standard deviation of ideology scores. I use the DW-NOMINATE scores developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal as my measure of ideology. I present the standard deviations for each Congressional (House and Senate) party from the 80th to
Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (23)

the 105th Congress in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2 about here

If there were a simple downward trend in civility, we should see four parallel lines—for
House and Senate Democrats and House and Senate Republicans—all sloping ever downward.
We don’t. There seems to be a somewhat jumbled pattern, especially in the early years of the
time series. But appearances can be deceiving. For all but Senate Republicans, there is an overall
downward trend from the 80th Congress to the 105th. The correlations of the standard deviations
with time are -.611 for House Democrats, -.712 for House Republicans, -.864 for House
Democrats, and just -.078 for Senate Republicans. But it might not make sense to look back
quite so far. A bit more careful inspection of Figure 2 shows that there is a very powerful
downward trend for all four Congressional parties beginning with the 89th Congress (1965-66).
Now three of the four correlations with time are greater than -.90 and the fourth comes close to
it.61 At least since the mid-1960s, then, there is a single syndrome of incivility for all four
Congressional parties. Ideological extremism shows the same basic time path in the Senate as it
does in the House for both parties.

I estimated a series of statistical models to determine what drives this surrogate measure
of incivility for the four Congressional parties. I shall not discuss them in detail. But I shall
summarize what I have found briefly to highlight similarities and differences between the
chambers and the parties. First, a note of caution. Since the first survey question on trust was
not asked until 1960, the analyses using trust do not begin until the 86th Congress. Secondly,
there are no measurements for trust for either the 87th or 91st Congresses, so these cases are
omitted for models with trust. And third, the other major source of incivility, regional patterns of representation, are generally highly correlated with each other, since representation is like a see-saw: When the Democratic House contingent from the South goes down, the share of Eastern seats in the party’s caucus goes up virtually in lock-step. And most of the measures of party regional representation, as noted above, are also strongly correlated with trust. Finally, I also examined (and dismissed) several other possible causes of incivility: divided control of the legislative and executive branches, the relative seniority levels in each chamber, and the both the absolute difference in party membership percentages and the share of seats held by each party in the two chambers.\textsuperscript{62}

The models focus on trust and regional representation, but I also include another variable for all four estimations: James A. Stimson’s measure of public mood, which is a summary indicator of how liberal (high scores) or conservative (low scores) public opinion is.\textsuperscript{63} Congressional parties should respond to ideological trends in the country, as well as to the more general atmosphere of trust and distrust. I expect that Democrats would have smaller standard deviations when public opinion is pushing them to the left (the public mood is liberal) and Republicans would be most conservative when public attitudes tilt rightward.

Briefly, the multivariate statistical analyses suggest that social trust has the most pervasive effects on the surrogate measure of incivility for all four Congressional parties. A less trusting citizenry leads to more incivility in Congress. Trust matters in the Senate, but its effects are stronger in the House. This is not surprising since the disruptions in the House are more on public view and since House constituencies are more homogenous—and thus more likely to push members away from compromise. For both House parties, trust is the stronger of two significant
predictors in the statistical models.

Regional representation is not quite so powerful or ubiquitous. It is statistically significant only in the model for Senate Democrats. As Northeastern Democrats became a greater force in the Senate Democratic caucus, Democratic Senators became more ideologically extreme (and thus more likely to be less civil).

Finally, public attitudes play a major role in shaping ideological extremism— but the relationship is not always as simple as we might expect. The Democrats behave as predicted: The more liberal the country is, the lower the standard deviation of ideology is for both House and Senate Democrats. When the country is liberal, Democrats tilt more sharply to the left and clearly see no need to compromise with Republicans. However, Republicans in both the House and the Senate are clearly countermajoritarian. When the country is liberal, Congressional Republicans circle the wagon and become increasingly conservative. These are not minor effects. They are easily significant by any conventional standards (even using two-tailed tests). The powerful effects for trust and the countermajoritarian finding for public mood tell a consistent story of a minority party that believed that it had to develop a clear-cut alternative to the dominant majority in order to have any hope of gaining power. And this is precisely what the Republicans, especially in the House did. They turned away from the optimal political strategy of the moment to develop support in their core constituencies. And some of them, especially Christian fundamentalists, did not at all trust people who are different (and think differently) from themselves.

Let me caution that the weak results for the regional representation variables likely stem from their interrelationship with trust. Consider the case of House Southern Republicans: As Southerners became a more powerful force in the House Republican conference, the party became
increasingly conservative and monolithic. The culmination of this trend was the ascension to power of three Southerners–Gingrich (GA), Majority Leader Dick Armey (TX), and Majority Whip Tom Delay (TX) when the GOP took control of the House in 1995. But the Southern road to power in the GOP was not a sudden phenomenon. It had been developing at least since the Republicans made major inroads in the South in the 1964 Presidential election. The correlation between the House Republican standard deviation and the Southern share of GOP House seats is .901 from the 89th to the 105th Congress. When I reestimate the model to begin with the 89th Congress, trust drops out (due to its high correlation with the Southern share of House Republican seats) and the regional variable dominates the equation.

Overall, the statistical analyses suggest that incivility has the same roots in the House and the Senate—and that the most consistent effects come from trust in other people. The Democratic party seems more majoritarian than the Republican party, which may be why Republican obstructionism generally shows up as less popular in public opinion polls than Democratic tactics—but this is of little solace, since the Republicans have been able to maintain majority status in both houses.

A Plague on Both Your Houses?

Is the Senate, then, more civil than the House? If the criterion is the decibel level, the answer is an emphatic yes. If the criterion is handling important national issues such as impeachment, the answer is less reassuring. Were the constitution different and the Senate acted first, it is far from clear that the widely heralded center would have held. The Northeastern moderates who held the balance of power on the first article of impeachment are a weak reed on which to hinge an overall image of moderation for the Senate GOP. The Republicans have a five seat majority in
the 106th Senate. Three of the four Northeastern moderates who vote with their party less than two-thirds of the time—three of whom voted against impeachment—are either gone (D’Amato) from the Senate, retiring (John Chafee, RI), or facing stiff competition in the year 2000 (Jim Jeffords, VT). D’Amato has already been replaced by a Democrat and Chafee’s likely successor will be a Democrat. Two others who also voted against impeachment, Maine’s Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins, vote with their party about two-thirds of the time, so that their relatively infrequent defections might be balanced by moderate Democrats who will vote with the GOP. The slim Republican majority in the Senate nevertheless remains a working majority, even if by just one or two votes.

Unless the moderates can exert enough influence to swing victories to the Democratic minority on key issues, they are effectively powerless. By voting with their party two-thirds of the time, Maine’s moderates are effectively ensuring that the more conservative members of their party will be able to dominate the legislative process in the Senate. And this means that there are no effective sanctions that moderates can exert over more extreme members who seek to obstruct the legislative process. The pull of party unity has gotten so strong that members who look moderate by their voting record might use the same tactics as their more extreme colleagues (on the right or the left), as D’Amato’s braggadocio about filibustering shows.

There may be a ray of hope, however. If obstructionism and uncivil language reflect a society in distress, the good times of the mid-to-late 1990s may make the public more public spirited. Throughout the early-to-mid 1990s, interpersonal trust continued to fall even as the economy boomed. Americans were still worried about the longer term. But there are signs of a turnaround, however small. Americans are now more upbeat about the longer-term future and
there was an blip upward in trust in 1998 (from 36 percent to 40 percent in one survey, the General Social Survey, and up to 46 percent in another, the American National Election Study). If this spurt upward in trust is the beginning of a trend, then there is hope for more civility in Congress. After all, a trusting citizenry will not tolerate a Congress that seeks to divide the nation against itself.

A polarized politics can not survive in a trusting environment. The 1998 elections saw some interruptions in the seemingly inexorable growth of conservative Republicanism in the South (even as Eastern Republicans struggle to retain their positions). Moderate Democrats defeated incumbent Republicans in the Alabama Governor’s race and the North Carolina Senate contest. If there is to be a rebirth of civility in the Congress, it will start from the ground up. And we are now in a pretty deep hole so that the trip upward will at best be slow.
Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (29)

**FIGURE 1**

Trends in Trust Over Time

![Graph showing trends in trust over time from 1960 to 1998. The x-axis represents the years 1960 to 1998, and the y-axis represents the percentage of people who believe most people can be trusted.]
Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (30)

FIGURE 2

Trends in Standard Deviations of DW-Nominate Scores

Legend: + House Democrats   G House Republicans
        " Senate Democrats   △ Senate Republicans
NOTES

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14. The repetition is designed to make people believe the remark, even when it lacks immediate plausibility.

15. Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North
Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (33)


17. White, Citadel, p. 117.


19. Senator Al D’Amato, Power, Pasta, and Politics (New York: Hyperion, 1995), pp. 140, 146-148, 153. D’Amato’s friendship with Moynihan is not atypical. A state’s two Senators are more likely to be rivals if they come from the same party. Senators often get along better with their state colleague if (s)he represents the other party. See Wendy Schiller, Dual Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming); and Ross K. Baker, “Factors Influencing the Political Relationships of Same-State Senators,” paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, Boston.


24. This section relies heavily upon Uslaner, The Decline of Comity in Congress, chaps. 1-2.


Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (35)


33. The measures come from Smith, Call to Order, p. 145 and Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate, p. 82. The correlation between the two time series is .830 (N = 9).

34. Quoted in Alan Ehrenhalt, "In the Senate of the '80s, Team Spirit Has Given Way to the Rule of Individuals," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 4, 1982, pp. 2176, 2181.


37. Former Majority Leader Howard Baker (R, TN) had a very different style and remains one of the former leaders most committed to restoring comity.

Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (36)


42. The leader was Rep. John Lewis (D, GA). I was scheduled to testify at this hearing in April. It was rescheduled for May.


45. Binder and Smith, Politics or Principle?, pp. 11-12.

Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (37)


48. See Eric M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland–College Park, 1999, Chapter 1. The next several paragraphs are based upon this manuscript.


The growth of the Eastern share of Democratic House seats is actually less than it seems, since the 80th Congress was a low point (under GOP control). When the Democrats regained control in the 81st Congress (1949-1950), the Eastern share rose to 21 percent. It also reached its current height of 26 percent in the late 1960s (1967-1970) before falling slightly.


55. The average absolute value of the correlation between trust and the share of Southern and Eastern Republicans (Democrats) is .842, excluding the insignificant (and incorrectly signed) correlation for the share of Eastern Democrats in the House caucus. See the discussion in n. 51 above to see why the latter correlation is not strong.

56. See the analyses in Uslaner, *The Decline of Comity in Congress*, chaps. 4-6; and Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, chap. 5 (for discussions of filibusters using data collected by Richard S. Beth and an updated measure of amendments from non-committee members in the House developed by John Owens).

57. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson, “Civility in the House of Representatives,” Annenberg School for Communications, University of Pennsylvania, 1997, for an attempt to measure incivility through textual analysis of floor proceedings.
Uslaner, “Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?” (39)

58. Binder and Smith, Politics or Principle?, p. 11; and Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 2.


60. For a discussion of the general methodology, see Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting (New York: Oxford University Press). Poole graciously provided the standard deviations. He notes (personal communication) that the ideology scales are constant for members across their service in the House or Senate so that all changes in means and standard deviations reflect membership change in the Congressional parties. And he cautions that the House and Senate scores are derived from separate scaling analyses and that cross-chamber comparisons should be done cautiously. I don’t find this argument damning, since I am precisely interested in how the chambers differ. The measures I use are for the Poole-Rosenthal first dimension, which is a general measure of ideology.

61. The correlations are: -.970 for House Democrats, -.933 for House Republicans, -.965 for Senate Democrats, and -.874 for Senate Republicans.

62. One might hypothesize that incivility would be greater under divided control, when there are greater pressures to stick with your own side rather than to compromise. And one might also expect that as aggregate seniority falls, we would find members with less of a stake in the system and thus more incivility. And, finally, we might hypothesize that as the overall partisan balance in the chamber gets smaller, there might be greater pressures to
stick with your own party. None of these hypotheses were supported. The models below were estimated first using ordinary least squares and then reestimated by ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) models to control for time series correlations (always using first-order autoregressive processes, since higher order processes and moving average parameters were never significant).


64. The seventh least loyal Republican, William Roth (DE), is likely to retire and may also be replaced by a Democrat who would be more loyal to his own party. See “Leading Scorers: Party Unity,” *CQ Weekly*, January 9, 1999, p. 81.