

**Professor Oppenheimer's GVPT 100 - Fall, 2004**

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**INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS**

In most corners of the globe, people are downtrodden and their politicians prosper. People everywhere with sufficient money are usually able to satisfy their private needs quite easily: just go to the super market and plop down your credit card. Not so for their collective needs: security, good schools, clean environments. What makes politics such a hard and deadly game for the people to win? Must it be so, and if not, what can we do about it? That is the pursuit of this course. We will examine in depth just a few small puzzles which have been solved since, and in part because of, John Nash's contributions to game theory (*A Beautiful Mind*). We will complement these with readings about the political. Specifically we will examine:

1. The pitfalls of collective action and how to overcome them;
2. The implications of the aims of politics for the naturally violent and deadly structure of political competition.
3. The strange properties of democracy;
4. The limits and properties of voting; and
5. The effect of design on institutional performance.

The course will use trivial (i.e. simple algebraic) mathematical tools to develop approaches to understanding these and other aspects of our political worlds. We will illustrate the models by reference to serious case histories of political problems. The course should be useful to all who have an interest in social and political problems.

So the course is about governmental institutions and political behavior. What are governments? What can we expect from governments? What is political behavior? Of course, we know what governments are! They are the organizations to which we pay taxes and from which we get parks, schools, wars, and armies. What is political behavior? We know that too. Political behavior is what a politician engages in to win an election. It is also voting, lobbying, and speaking out, or going to court to force the government to deliver on one's social security check. Since these types of political activity are common, we do not devote much time to identifying them. Rather, we seek some general properties of all governments and of all political behavior. Not just any properties: those which give you leverage to evaluate and predict governmental and political performance. In the same spirit, in order to assess what we get from our form of government, we see what one can expect from other forms of government. Thus, we shall be as interested in political behavior during a revolution as in an American election. We shall be as concerned with governmental institutions in modern America as in other places.

Any subject can be looked at from many different points of view. Any single viewpoint filters questions and answers. For example, one could ask, "What are the many types of government which can exist?" Not us. We shall develop a framework to generate hypotheses about political behavior in general. Let me give you a sample of some of our questions:

1. In what ways does human selfishness and reasoning effect politics and determine the nature of political outcomes?
2. Why do we need political institutions at all?
3. How do property rights, and the distribution of income and wealth limit what we can expect as outcomes from our political institutions?
4. Do democratic rules change the outcomes of political processes and if so, how?
5. Can we achieve social justice and if so, how?
6. What is the responsibility of a citizen?
7. What problems exist when we apply our normal notions of ethics to politics?

In answering these sorts of questions, we first develop a general theoretical argument: a general theory of non-market behavior to analyze the questions above. The theory is based on the same psychological assumptions used to explain market behavior in economics. About ½ the Nobel prizes (Arrow, Sen, Buchanan, North, Nash, etc.) in economics have been awarded for work in these theories. Ideally, we would spend some time checking the theory against data to see how it fares. But in this course, we will focus on the theory, its implications and applications to politics and its limitations.

The course involves two types of reading: theoretical and case oriented. The theoretical readings may appear to be difficult, yet they help us obtain general answers to questions about politics. This literature includes a number of political

science reports, as well as more current (and mathematical) theoretical formulations known as public choice and game theory (a part of the more general field of political economy). The second sort of readings give us a set of political events we can talk about and to which we can apply our theoretical tools. These works also include classics and current materials.

Assignments vary greatly in length. The easier the reading, the more pages I tend to feel I can assign. **BE SURE TO READ THE ENTIRE ASSIGNMENT *AT LEAST ONCE SUPERFICIALLY* SO THAT YOU HAVE AN IDEA WHAT IT IS ABOUT, BEFORE**

**COMING TO CLASS!** You can then allocate extra time for going back over the material. I expect a minimum of 6-7 hours of reading and 3 hours of class time a week, except during the exam period. Develop a method of reading which lets you acquaint yourself with the material during the allocated time. Note, there **IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PLUGGING AWAY AT THE MATERIAL ON A REGULAR BASIS!** The material is cumulative and if you do not keep up with it, you are likely to fall irretrievably behind. Contact me **EARLY** if you are having undue difficulty. All reading is to be done before class.

#### **READING MATERIALS:**

The following books are required reading in this course and are available in the book stores for purchase (a few copies are also on reserve at the UGL) - **NOTE THAT IF YOU, AS A STUDENT, HAVE A SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN PURCHASING THE BOOKS, you should CONTACT ME, as I may have a few extra copies for loan.**

De Waal, Frans (2000) Chimpanzee Politics, Johns Hopkins, paper, ISBN: 0801858399 [\$18.95 232 pp.] - This is an interesting alternative take on politics.

Gourevitch, Philip We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families. Farrar, Straus and Giroux

**\*\*Oppenheimer, Lecture Notes** from the previous time I taught a version of this course (2001). This is a useful item, as I will usually NOT be lecturing in this class, and it will allow you to be acquainted with my take on the material. They are on the web site as a PDF file.

Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements (Vintage) -- this is a controversial work, one which takes on the politics of welfare programs in modern democracies. It is an interpretation to be reckoned with.

Riordin, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (St. Martin's) -- this is a beauty; you will probably wish to give as a gift to your best friends, parents, etc. It is glorious fun and fine oral history as well.

Shepsle, Kenneth and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics. New York: W. W. Norton Publishers. This is a main text book which we will employ for the presentation of the mathematical models underlying the course.

Aside from these book readings there are other essential items that are assigned readings, etc. Other assigned readings are available, and is indicated, as follows, Library (or xerox) reading has been held to a minimum and is also available in a xerox packet form from Bel-Jean (i.e. at Maryland Book Exchange). They are essential to the course. (Items marked by **"\*X\*"** are in the xerox packet, and on reserve; some pieces may be made available on the web site for this

I will try to meet any extraordinary needs of any student. Such needs can arise out of either preexisting or new conditions. All students should ask themselves if they have any special pre existing condition which should be considered by us in the grading (or other procedures) in the course. Such conditions may include personal, social, physical, emotional or other impairments. Students who wish preexisting conditions to be properly considered must inform me **NO LATER THAN 10 days** before the first exam. When relevant, the student must submit some degree of documentation regarding the condition, and a personal statement of how it impacts in the academic performance in the course, in writing. It may be required that the student register with the office for students with disabilities. If a newly arising condition develops during the course, official and personal documentation **WILL** be required. Further, when ever possible, the student is obligated to inform us of the conditions as they arise, and not after the consequences (e.g. missed exams) occur.

course, \*E\* are on electronic reserve, and “\*J\*” are available from J store.). A full list of the items available at the Maryland Book Exchange (Bel Jean’s) as a separate reading packet is contained at the end of the syllabus.

**WRITTEN WORK:** The course will have a mid-term exam, and a final. The mid-term and final exams will be preceded by a study guide: a panel of questions circulated ahead of time. It is important that you get a copy of the study guide. You will partially be able to prepare yourself around the questions while working with others. Both exams will consist of multiple choice problems, short answers about the more mathematical theoretical material, and essays. **IT IS STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT YOU STUDY WITH YOUR FELLOW STUDENTS IN TRYING TO MASTER THE MATERIAL. THE INTERACTION IS LIKELY TO MAKE ABSORPTION OF THE MATERIAL MORE EFFECTIVE. STUDY GROUPS OF 3 - 5 PEOPLE WOULD SEEM IDEAL.**

**GRADES:** The grades in the course will NOT be curved. You get what you earn. The scale is 0 - 100: 0-39 = F, 40 - 54 = D, 55 - 69 = C, 70 - 84 = B; 85 and above is an A. The final exam counts 1 and a half times as much as the midterm. Class room participation in sections, can also count but only to help your grades.

**Study in groups but your essays and answers to any questions must be your own. ANSWERS SHARED BY STUDENTS WILL BE CONSIDERED PLAGIARISM AND PUNISHED SEVERELY!** If you work together and you feel that your answers are necessarily going to be “polluted” by this, you must indicate the names of the individuals you studied with. This will let me grade your papers as a group, and on a somewhat different scale. There is no quarter given to cheaters. I hound them; I despise them. Don’t even think about it!

*Appeals:* ALL EXAMS, ETC. SHOULD BE KEPT IN CASE YOU THINK ANY OF US MADE AN ERROR IN ASSIGNING A GRADE, AND FOR ANY FUTURE NEED SUCH AS GRADE CORRECTION, **OR LETTERS OF RECOMMENDATION.** No grade can be disputed unless your exams or papers accompany your protest. Any disputation must be put briefly in writing: You must tell me how / where you think you were wrongly graded, and you should be able to show in your appeal that the difference accounts for more than 1/10 of the value of the assignment. Smaller errors on my part will not be considered regarding any essay or essay question answer or unless they are simple cases of addition, or incorrect notation on a multiple choice exam. In protesting the grade your entire assignment may be regraded (not just the section under dispute). This can (but is certainly not likely to) lead to a *decrease* in your grade on the assignment). Regrading requests should therefore be not undertaken capriciously.

**DISCUSSIONS & LECTURES:** Much of the material in the course is tough and technical. Participation can only help you (see grades) and is completely voluntary. **GUTSY ADMISSION THAT YOU DON’T UNDERSTAND SOMETHING IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN CLASS AND IS PART OF EDUCATIONAL PARTICIPATION. IT WILL BE NOTED POSITIVELY.** Note that you will not be able to get very much out of the discussions if you do not stay up on the reading.

I will do my best to be available to help you with the material. But you must be sufficiently aggressive to let me know when you are having problems. Make sure you have written down my telephone numbers, office hours, and office numbers.

Classes: Aug 31, Sep 2, 7, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23, 28, 30; Oct 5, 7, 12, 14, 19, 21, 26, 28; N 2, 4, 9, 11, 16, 18, 23, 30; D 2, 7, 9

**READING ASSIGNMENTS, ETC.:**

**-- Do the reading *before* coming to the lecture --**

**INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE OF POLITICS:**

**8/31 . . . Introduction**

No Reading required before class - of course. But:

Read ALL articles in the Washington Post on the front page of each of the parts of Section A and the business and metro sections about politics and policies: (on international, national, local, and also on business) for Tues - Thurs of this week. Also listen to ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (5-6:30 PM, WETA FM - 90.9; 6:30-8PM, WAMU 88.5) OR MORNING-EDITION (6-8 & 8-10 AM IN A 2 HOUR REPEAT ON WAMU and 6-9 on WETA) AT LEAST ONCE. Start thinking about what you don’t know and had better start knowing.

## **9/2 & 7 . . . a basis for a modern understanding of Politics:**

**Required Reading:** Shepsle & Bonchek: Ch 1 & 2

### **Study Questions:**

A. What makes for a science? How do we determine whether a theory is true or false, or useful?

**Recommended Readings:** Rapoport, Anatol (1974) *Fights, Games, and Debates*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press gives an excellent discussion of utility theory in a non-technical fashion. This position regarding the structure of human choice is not without debate. See, for example, Kahneman D. and A. Tversky (1982), "The Psychology of Preference," *Scientific American*, 246 (January): 160-173, or Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1981) "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science* 221 (Jan. 30): 453-458. Either of these give a very solid non technical fundamental critique of the biggest problems with rationality notions currently understood by the best of the theorists. Useful for counter examples on utility theory is a popular piece about some of these same problems: Gould, Stephen Jay (1988). *The Streak of Streaks*. *New York Review of Books* (Aug 18): pp. 8-12 on framing & preference reversals. Gould argues that we can't really deal well with statistical evaluations well with psychology. Shows that there are problems in our evaluations. He does this with application to Joe Dimaggio's amazing streak of hits in consecutive baseball games.

### **I. PUBLIC GOODS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION**

**EXERCISE - Hand in / due IN YOUR SECTIONS after lecture 9/9!:** Specify a current **policy problem** (e.g. related to poverty or rights or regulation in the US or the role of the US in the world) in the news which you will find interesting to follow in the news for the semester. You will be responsible for following and thinking about the problem, and applying the analysis of the course to the material you find out about it. Hand in **3 copies** of a paper shorter than 1 page - dbl spaced, typed - *with* the biblio - (keep a copy for yourself). The topic:

Why do you think there is this policy problem? In a couple of sentences: 1) Identify the policy problem; 2) State your best testable hypothesis as to why there have (or have not) been effective policies enacted to solve the problem you have chosen. 3) What evidence would be needed to determine whether this is a false hypothesis? Give full biblio of all articles in the Post on those days and items on NPR that you found on the subject. This is a relatively straight forward assignment to get us all acquainted with one another.

2 copies of your paper will be distributed to other students for their grading. Put *only* your UMDID # on your paper. For the 2 papers you grade: the grade is to be written on the paper along with the UMDID # of the grader.

### **9/9 - 23: the basic theory (NB: No lecture Sep. 16)**

**Required Reading:** Shepsle & Bonchek: Ch 8 - 10

### **Study Questions:**

- A. What limitations do you see to the theory of collective action posed in S&B?
- B. Does the theory of collective action explain of why there are so many problems with public participation in politics? Why?
- C. Which policy problems can be usefully analyzed with this theory? How?
- D. What are the goals we ought to use government to achieve and why these particular goals? How does this relate to the concept of public goods and how does the theory of public goods help us understand the problems of government?

**Recommended Readings:** Axelrod, Robert. (1984). *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books. New York. This is a beauty. (But, don't forget that tit-for-tat is not defined for more than 2 persons.) Olson, M. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Harvard, 1967. This is the classic which started this line of research. A great read. Ostrom, E., J. Walker and R. Gardner. 1992. Covenants With And Without The Sword: Self Governance is Possible. *American Political Science Review* 86: 404-417. Schelling, Thomas C. (1973) "Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Savings: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v. 17, No. 3 (September), pp. 381 -428 is a very interesting synopsis of some of the early findings.

## II. RELATED TOPICS - POLITICAL IGNORANCE; LEADERSHIP; & ETHICS

9/28: (Experiment) ignorance & leadership (set up)

### Study Questions

- A. What are the implications of rational ignorance for citizenship and governmental quality in a democracy?
- B. When if ever is it rational for the average political subject to spend effort to gain political information? Why?
- C. Can you think of any design changes to democracy that could improve the information accrual of the citizen?

9/30-10/7: leadership

### A. at the top:

#### Required Reading:

Riordin, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (St. Martin's)

\*\* Remnick, David. "Dons of the Don," NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 16, 1992. pp. 45 - 50. ("Remnick")

\* Michels, Robert Political Parties, Part One (A), Chaps. 1-2, Part Two (B) 2-3

Recommended Reading: Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1978), Modern Political Economy, Chap 3 & 4. Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Oran Young (1971), Political Leadership and the Supply of Collective Goods. Princeton University Press. Schappera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies: The pros are not only in the U.S. Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1978), Modern Political Economy, Chap 3 & 4. Hardin, R. Collective Action. Johns Hopkins Univ Press, Baltimore, Md. (RFF), Chaps. 2-5.

### B. at the bottom:

Required Reading: Piven and Cloward, Ch 5. (264-326)

### Study Questions

- A. Do you think it is useful to think of politicians as 'public good entrepreneurs'? Why?
- B. Given rational ignorance, and the need for incentives, can one expect different sorts of individuals to compete for democratic leadership positions than those who compete for leadership in non-democratic societies? Why?
- C. How do your favorite and least favorite political hero fit this theory differently?

Recommended Reading: Chong, Dennis (1991), Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Mason, T. D. (1984), "Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis," APSR, 78 (December), 1040-1056. Autobiography of Malcolm X; Peter Matthiessen, Sal Si Puedes.

10/12: the moral obligations of the individual to the group

Required Reading: \*\*Shavit, Ari, On Gaza Beach, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, vol. XXXVIII, No. 13 (July 18, 1991). pp. 3 - 6. ("On willingness to torture")

### Study Questions:

- A. How can one justify anyone making an effort to make the world better given that the likelihood is so small that the individual will be able to make a difference.
- B. How can one justify 'doing nothing' for the group given that the likelihood is so small that the individual will be able to make a difference?
- C. Why ought one to vote?

Recommended Reading: A more general view of the problems involved is by Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals. Also see his Playboy interview. Again, the Heym novel, The Wandering Jew is a serious reflection on some of these issues. Also, see Oppenheimer, (1985) "Public Choice and Three Ethical Properties of Politics," Public Choice, 45: 241-255.

Nagel, Thomas (1979). Mortal Questions has other interesting essays on specific issues of political morality. Deak, Istvan. "Memories of Hell," NY Review of Books, XLIV, 11 (June 26, 97): 38-43 is yet another interesting view of the problem as witnessed in concentration camps in WWII. Zentropa (a film & vhs) - is about the loss of innocence: the non-viability of a 'fundamentalist' (in this case, Quakeresque non-violence) stand to judge one's actions in a mainly political environment. In this case, the moral stand of a pacifist is confronted with the Nazi residue in his attempt to do the right thing by helping to rebuild war torn Germany. The moral issues are clearly delineated, and the packaging is a well done thriller. Fine action, acting, and highly intelligent.

#### 10/14 - 19: Review & Exam

### III. COMPETITION

#### 10/21 - 28: non-democratic competition, [Rwanda genocide, and international reactions]:

##### A. non-democratic competition:

**Required Reading:** Gourevitch, Philip (1998) We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. (To page 226 only.)

**Recommended Reading:** Battle of Algiers, Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago: 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation; Shakespeare's history plays.

##### B. international reactions & ethics of leaders

**Required Reading:**

\*\* Samantha Power, (2001) "Bystanders to Genocide," Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen," The Atlantic Monthly, September. ("On Rwanda")

\*\* Pankaj Mishra, 'We Have No Orders to Save You': State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat. a report by Human Rights Watch 2002, The New York Review of Books. August 15, 2002 ("On India")

\*\* Berlin, Isaiah (1971) "The Question of Machiavelli," New York Review of Books, XVII, No. 7, Nov. 4: 30 - 32. ("Berlin")

E - Nagel, Thomas (1979). "Ruthlessness in Public Life," Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. New York, Chap. 6 (pp. 75 - 90)

#### Study Questions:

- A. What should Clinton, the U.S., etc. have done re Rwanda? How does this impact your feelings about Iraq? Why?
- B. What are the obligations of a ruler to care for people in other countries and why?
- C. What should have been the role of the U.N.?

**Recommended Reading:** Barnett, Michael (2002). Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Carleton, Mark T. (1971). Politics and Punishment; the History of the Louisiana State Penal System Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. An unbelievably powerful bit of American history in post bellum South documenting the rounding up of ex-slaves for work crews to work to death on Southern plantations as a way of reducing the political power of the ex-slaves. Chang, Jung (1991), Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China. Anchor-Doubleday: New York. A great read about three generations of women during the great revolution and the ensuing upheavals. Brown, Dee (1971) Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Here in the US it is often presumed that we are immune (except of course, for slavery) from the sorts of 'crimes against humanity'. The question is not how the military, but rather the populace more generally can be involved in horrendous activity. Chang, Iris (1997) The Rape of Nanking. Basic Books. Here the question is how the military of one country can be involved in horrendous activity with no 'second' thoughts. Lang, Daniel. [1969] Casualties of war. New York, McGraw-Hill. Originally appeared in the October 18, 1969 issue of the New Yorker. On the structure of casualties in one family, and its causes during the

Vietnamese Conflict. The Trials of Henry Kissinger, and The Fog of War are two documentaries that could be useful. Machiavelli, The Prince.

#### **IV. DEMOCRACY**

##### **11/2-9: democracy, coherent choice, and national interest**

###### **Required Reading:**

Shepsle & Bonchek, Chap 3 & 4

X Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Random House. Chapter 7 “Famines and Other Crises” (to p. 284)

###### **Study Questions:**

- A. Do you think most of politics is like a mix of the divide the dollar game discussed in Sen and S&B and the collective action or public good games analyzed earlier? So what?
- B. What do you think of the seriousness of the Arrow problem (cyclic outcomes) in the functioning or long term justification of democracy?
- C. How do special majority rules (e.g. 2/3 rules) stack up with regard to the criteria put forward by May? Normatively do the differences matter? Why?
- D. What’s special about majority rule?
- E. Given Sen’s finding, and Arrow’s discovery, why do democracies do better than dictatorships?

**Recommended Reading:** Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. Yale: New Haven. Sen, A.K. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Sen, "The Possibility of Social Choice," Nobel Prize Lecture (1998), in Rationality and Freedom (2002). 65-97 plus references

##### **11/11 - 18: elections and voting**

**Required Reading:** Shepsle & Bonchek, Chap. 5 (pages to 115, 133-136)

###### **Study Questions:**

- A. Do you think most issues are 1-dimensional?
- B. Do parties and campaigning ‘reduce the political space’? Do they do this by generating an agreement on values? What difference does this make?
- C. Do you think democratic outcomes are more stable than the predictions (why or what not, and what do you think is the cause of this)?

**Recommended Readings:** Hotelling, Harold (1929) "Stability in Competition," ECONOMIC JOURNAL: v. 39 (1), 41 - 57. Black, Duncan (1958) The Theory Of Committees And Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Part II is especially interesting from the point of view of history of science. Anthony Downs (1957) was one of the first to develop these ideas. See his An Economic Theory of Democracy New York: Harper and Row.

##### **11/18 - 30: voting institutions**

**Required Reading:** Shepsle & Bonchek, Chap 7, Ch. 5 (115-132), Ch. 13 (345-355)

E Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Random House. Chapters. 6 “The Importance of Democracy”

###### **Study Questions:**

- A. What do you see as the gain from democracy?
- B. How would you explain the effect of democracy on the existence of famines? On holocausts? On pluralism? On economic justice?

- C. Why do people vote? Why don't they?
- D. What could be done to get more people to vote?
- E. Can you think of a way of measuring the quality of any particular democratic political system?
- F. What makes for a democracy?

**Recommended Readings:** Miller, Gary J. and T. H. Hammond, (1990) "Committees and the Core of the Constitution," Public Choice. Vol 66, No. 3, 201 - 228. Miller, N. R. "Pluralism and Social Choice," American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 734-747. Riker, William H. (1982) Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights, IL.: Waveland Press.

**12/2 - 7: are more than humans political, and does it tell us anything about governing?**

**Required Reading:** de Waal, Introduction (from p. 10) - through Chap. 3, and chap. 5.

**Study Questions:**

- A. Are chimps rational, in the sense used in the course? What implications do the findings have for the theoretical material in the course?
- B. Are we informed regarding human problems by their behavior? How or why not?

**Recommended Readings:** de Waal, Frans (1996). Good Natured: the Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. Landa, Janet. 1986. "The Political Economy of swarming in honeybees: Voting with the wings, decision-making costs, and the unanimity rule." Public Choice vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 25-38.

**12/9: how can we improve government?**

**Final Exam** date and time to be announced-

**LIBE RESERVE LIST**

The following assigned materials are available from Bel-Jean (Md Book Exchange) in a xeroxed, combined booklet. They may also be made available separately at the undergraduate library on 2 hour reserve.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties, Part One (A), Chaps. 1-2, Part Two (B) 2-3 (JF2049 .M62 1959)

Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Random House. Chapters. 6 "The Importance of Democracy" and chap. 7 "Famines and Other Crises" (to p. 284) (HD75 .S455 1999).

**Electronic Reserves:**

Nagel, Thomas (1979). "Ruthlessness in Public Life," Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. New York, Chap. 6 (pp. 75 - 90)

Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Random House. Chapters. 6 "The Importance of Democracy"